

Note de recherche stratégique 10

The comprehensive approach and the European Union: a case study of the Horn of Africa

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The Horn of Africa is a region that faces major multidimensional challenges. It is therefore especially appropriate to define and implement the comprehensive approach in this area. As a global actor seeking to ensure its security and international stability, the European Union (EU) is particularly well-equipped to intervene effectively in the Horn of Africa through a unique strategy combined with its economic, diplomatic and military instruments. Although internally, the EU has all the necessary tools available, putting them to use causes numerous problems, despite improvements brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and mentioned again during the last European Council of December 2013. The Horn of Africa, and Somalia especially, is considered a case in point, even though it is evident that the EU's approach was empirical and pragmatic for a long time, before refocusing on a comprehensive strategy. After comparing the organisations' conceptual approaches and describing the actions implemented as well as the stakeholders' involvement, this article aims to tackle the issues from the budgetary, coordination and governance angles. To conclude, it offers several recommendations.

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1. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH OF THE ORGANISATIONS

Before going into a detailed analysis of how the EU implements its strategy in the Horn of Africa, it appears requisite to first take a look at the notion of the comprehensive approach. Devoid of any specific, universal definition, this notion differs depending on who is applying it. The idea of a comprehensive approach is therefore different for each organisation or State, especially as its definition is much debated over amongst stakeholders seeking legitimacy on the international stage. Once conceptualized, a comprehensive approach leads to numerous actions which themselves cover several fields. These actions are planned and carried out under the authority of several players and within the same global strategy which specifies the final goals.

Organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU agree on the guiding principles of the comprehensive approach, such as the necessity to coordinate the efforts undertaken or the need for cooperation between the different actors. According to Florence Vu Van¹, the three organizations “*understand this term as a set of answers to threats to international stability and security which are not strictly military.*” Nevertheless, the lack of a shared definition results in many differences of opinion as far as its field of action and its reach are concerned. The UN considers it as integrated missions that must comply with three purposes: security reinforcement, the strengthening of political institutions and economic and social recovery. NATO took on an approach that focuses on the political, civil and military aspects, while emphasizing the necessity to cooperate with other organisations and to coordinate action on the ground. But the lack of civilian assets within NATO is one of the main weaknesses of its approach. Lastly, the EU considers the comprehensive approach as several actions using the available civil and military resources and encompassing the fields of defence, development and diplomacy. The EU offers a significant advantage compared to other organisations as it has all the levers necessary to implement the comprehensive approach.

2. ACTION IMPLEMENTED

The international community has undertaken many initiatives in the Horn of Africa, whether they were started by European actors or external organizations and States, and usually without any real coordination. Although the EU’s action aims to be comprehensive by using all of its diplomatic, security, humanitarian and development instruments, this is not always true for the other stakeholders. The UN alone may be considered to have a similar approach, and this is why strong cooperation exists between the two organizations.

¹ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l’Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published






Figure N. 1:
EU and non-EU actors involved in initiatives in the Horn of Africa (not exhaustive)

European Union actions and stakeholders

The EU makes every effort to undertake actions that are consistent with the comprehensive approach, even though they fall under two separate spheres: intergovernmental and EU. Some actions are developed by the Council or within the CSDP, whereas others are carried out by various Directorates-General within the Commission or by EU agencies. This characteristic means that the actions undertaken as part of the EU's comprehensive approach come under specific lines of responsibility, with mandates, areas and commitment durations that are rarely coordinated. In some cases, this may cause undesirable and even



counterproductive effects, which may lead, as an example, to unintended competition and the overlapping of areas of responsibility. In 2011, the EU adopted a regional strategy² for the Horn of Africa. It aims to *“support the region’s populations for greater peace, stability, security, and prosperity, and to build accountable governance.”* It sets out five areas for EU action in the region: development partnership, the political dialogue, the response to crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship. Put simply, these areas incorporate the fields of security, humanitarian action and development.

In reference to security, three operations were set up: a counter-piracy operation (EUNAVFOR Atalanta 2008), a training mission for Somali soldiers (EUTM Somalia 2010), and a coastguard training mission for countries in the region (EUCAP NESTOR 2012). Operation Atalanta may be considered a success at the operational level: *“while there were nearly 200 attacks in the first years (163 in 2009, 174 in 2010, 176 in 2011), there were only 34 in 2012 and 4 in 2013... as for the number of piracy attacks on ships, (respectively 46 and 47 in 2009 and 2010), it dropped by half in 2011, fell to 5 in 2012 and is still 0 in 2013.”*³ Operation Atlanta embodies the comprehensive approach spirit because it uses several European tools to detect, identify, follow and arrest suspected pirates and bring them to trial. It has set up a pragmatic coordination system at the tactical level, called SHADE⁴, which enables the coordination of the action of over 30 countries involved in the fight against piracy.

At present, EUTM Somalia has contributed to the training of around 4,000 Somali soldiers who were successfully recruited for AMISOM (*African Union Mission in Somalia*). This mission, launched in 2010, is considered a success. The value of these soldiers’ commitment to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia by AMISOM’s side has been acknowledged on several occasions. The United States’ quick and effective support in launching this mission is a first that should be recognized. It enabled the mission to provide equipment, transportation and salaries for the Somali soldiers in training. Apart from a very low defection percentage, the mission was used as an example for EUTM Mali, in 2013. On the other hand, the time required to launch the mission was long, between Javier Solana’s initial statements in September of 2009 and the actual launch on May 5, 2010, especially for a mission of modest proportions (less than 150 men). This served as a lesson for EUTM Mali since time-frames were shortened to 3 months, *“between the expression of the need for this mission in November 2012 and its actual launch in February 2013, while the mission’s strength only reached 550 people. In ten weeks, the European Union adopted three political decisions: the concept of crisis management, the mission’s legal framework and its launch.”*⁵

² Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf

³ Bruxelles 2 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde 2 October 2013

⁴ The 31st Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) conference on counter-piracy took place in Manama, Bahrain, on March 11, 2014.

⁵ GRIP Bérange Roupert April 19, 2013



It is worth mentioning that other training missions were carried out bilaterally, e.g. France in Djibouti, the United-Kingdom in Kenya⁶ and the United States in Uganda, Burundi and Kenya. The need to transfer responsibility of their own security to the region's countries soon became obvious. The reinforcement of regional maritime capacities gave rise to the launch of the EUCAP NESTOR mission, in July of 2012. It aims to enhance the regional maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. The mission was initially carried out in summer 2013, in Djibouti and the Seychelles, where it started its advisory, training and instruction activities. Made up of around a hundred people, its area of action was gradually extended to Kenya, Tanzania, then to the Puntland and Somaliland regions.

The EU's main fields of intervention in Somalia in the areas of development and humanitarian action are based on governance, education, economic growth and food security. Both the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) and the Development and Cooperation Directorate-General (DEVCO) are involved. The humanitarian action, which responds to immediate needs arising from many natural disasters (drought, flooding) and conflicts, is managed by DG ECHO. ECHO's action in this region is based on four priorities, which are to provide humanitarian aid (food security, nutrition, health, water, hygiene, protection); strengthen the capability of affected populations to respond to emergencies (such as natural disasters); take part in rebuilding and strengthen the capability of populations and refugees to respond to their needs in the long term. It contributes to the efforts of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP): the EU is the second-highest contributor to the WFP and the primary contributor of direct financial aid. WFP ships are escorted as part of Operation Atalanta. It is essential to DG ECHO to keep operating independently from the EEAS activities because its action is based on "*the principles of **humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence***".⁷

The EU has adopted a framework for the implementation of its humanitarian action in the Horn of Africa⁸. This document recalls the challenges of humanitarian action in this region, and sets out the goals and results expected. It is based on a network of European NGOs which benefit from its financial support. According to Clara Egger⁹, an estimated 200 NGOs collaborate with DG ECHO and DEVCO. Development is managed by DG DEVCO and is envisaged in the long-term. This DG set up a partnership for development with the ACP countries (the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States), as part of the Cotonou Agreement¹⁰. For Somalia, the EU plays a major role in the New Deal process, which was

⁶ See Dominic Wabala's article, dated March 5, 2013 "3 000 British troops arrive in Kenya for military training", <http://allafrica.com/stories/201303051270.html>

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm

⁸ See *Humanitarian Implementation Plan* of July 1st, 2013 (3rd version)

⁹ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

¹⁰ Agreement signed on June 23, 2000 between the European Union and the ACP states. It includes the EU and 79 States of the ACP group



passed in 2013 and aims to give the Somali government a key role in development aid coordination.

Among the many current projects in the Horn of Africa, the “*Critical Maritime Routes*” programme, financed under the long-term component of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), manages the project *Enhancing Security and Safety through Information Sharing and Capacity Building*, supporting the police, coast guards and penitential administration of the region’s collaborating States.

Various programmes are ongoing in Somalia to help eradicate poverty and foster peace and democracy, linking security and development. The European Development Fund (EDF) provides financial support to the AMISOM mission of the African Union (600 million euros since 2007). This help covers expenses such as the troops’ pay, civil and police-related costs of the mission as well as the operating costs of the mission’s head office in Nairobi, Kenya. The EDF contributes to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “Rule of law and security” programme for the police forces and the justice system in Somalia.

The EU also takes action through a post-conflict recovery mission which provides support to the police forces in the handling of anti-personnel mines. The EU election observation missions are financed by DEVCO¹¹. Two missions have taken place in the Horn of Africa: the first one in January 2011, during the referendum in South Sudan, and the second in 2010 for the elections in Ethiopia.

Actions and stakeholders outside the European Union

The United Nations’ primary action in the Horn of Africa targets the consequences of drought, which affects nearly 15 million people. Humanitarian aid is implemented by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). DG ECHO is closely linked to OCHA. Among other actions implemented by the UN in the Horn of Africa, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) plays a logistics role, focusing on the supply of equipment and services to African armed forces.

As part of the fight against piracy, UN Resolution 1851(2008) resulted in the creation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which brings together 60 countries or organizations in order to coordinate the programmes initiated.

The African Union benefits from European support, mainly financial, through the African Peace Facility (APF), which receives the European funds for AMISOM. However, relations

¹¹ All electoral observation missions are financed by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)



between the AU and the EU are still complex as AMISOM is often criticized for its lack of respect for humanitarian and human rights.

IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) brings together the region's countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, and Uganda. This organization is hampered by power rivalries between States, especially between Sudan and Uganda. It suffers from structural weaknesses and "is still an underdeveloped tool for the reinforcement of cooperation, integration and security in the region."¹²

Many States intervene bilaterally in the Horn of Africa. This study offers three examples.

To Stephen Burgess¹³, the trauma caused by the death of 12 American soldiers in 1992 (*Restore Hope*) restrained the United States' action in Somalia. The US then gave priority to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is why the Americans favoured a more indirect approach, leading training missions in peripheral States (Uganda, Kenya and Burundi), and focusing on development aid. The author underlines the lack of nationwide coordination between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

Turkey began to participate in the initiatives in Somalia in 2011. According to Sonia Le Gouriellec¹⁴, it was extremely well perceived among the population. First of all, this Muslim country managed, through excellent communication links, to provide direct support to the populations by rebuilding roads, schools, hospitals and airports. Although generous outwardly, this approach suffers from low financial investment and has become debatable because of its political position. To Sonia Le Gouriellec, "*various Somali actors soon highlighted political interferences, disparities in the treatment of different territories and hidden intentions (religious proselytism) of Turkey.*"

According to Raphaël Rossignol¹⁵, China has become a key player in the region. Greatly involved in the fight against piracy, China managed for the first time to have its war ships permitted offshore. In obtaining the international community's approval to have a naval presence off the Somali coast, China has assumed a position of great power and is already considering establishing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean for the long term. This activity enables it to test its operational capabilities in comparison with other navies, and to modernize and train its crews. China has managed to be accepted as a strong support to the AU and the states of the region. It finances the AU's peace-keeping operations, and especially the AMISOM's, through the supply of equipment. Lastly, China takes an interest in the exploiting of natural resources. For instance, it takes part in the *Lamut Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET)* project in Kenya, for a total cost of 26 billion dollars,

¹² Strategy for the Horn of Africa, 2011

¹³ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

¹⁴ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

¹⁵ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published



through the Chinese companies of the consortium led by the *China Communications Construction Company* (CCCC). This approach aims to foster the establishment of Chinese oil companies CNPC (in South Sudan, with an oil pipeline in Kenya), and CNOOC (in Uganda and Kenya).

3. STRATEGIES

Three different strategies have been written on Africa in general, and on the Horn in particular. The Communication from the Commission of 2006 entitled “Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa” specifies that “*security and development are important and complementary issues.*” Choosing an exclusively regional approach, it recommends developing a strong political partnership with the region’s stakeholders, especially the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2007, the Communication was followed by an action plan called the “Horn of Africa Initiative”, which did not take the CSDP dimension into account, among others.

In 2009, the Council signed a document called “an EU policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive strategy”. This was the first step towards the notion of implementing the comprehensive approach. This long-term reflection led to the creation of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn region. The goals are specified: ensure consistency and coordination between EU instruments, set action priorities according to development in the region, develop a regional framework and link EU action to that of other international actors (such as the United Nations and the United States).

Lastly, a “Strategy for the Horn of Africa” was approved in the conclusions of the European Union Council in 2011. The essential goal is to “support the region’s populations for greater peace, stability, security, and prosperity, and to build accountable governance.” To this end, preference is given to the regional approach, tackling the underlying causes of the conflicts. The comprehensive approach requires that “the High Representative and the European External Action Service, the EU Special Representative, the EU delegations in the region, the European Commission and the Member States work jointly.” Five areas are prioritized: development partnership, the political dialogue, the response to crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship.

Although the development logic of these strategies is quite satisfactory, they face implementation issues on the ground. In its latest report (2013/2146(INI)) on “EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action”, the European Parliament underlines the importance of these documents in “making strategic goals known, coordinating political reactions, building partnerships and emphasizing the application of budgets.” It requests that the strategies be jointly written by the EEAS and the



relevant Directorate-General of the Commission (especially DEVCO and ECHO), under the supervision of the High Representative or vice-president. It stresses the necessity of writing a roadmap with clear goals and priorities as well as a work schedule, which is not the case today. It points out that the CSDP's role and input should be an integral part of the initial political analysis and of the first definition of political goals, so as to make the planners' participation in CSDP easier, when required, right from the first phases.

4. BUDGETS

Financing mainly comes from the EU budget and is managed by the European Commission. Only two instruments elude this rule and are directly financed by Member States: the European Development Fund and the *Athena* mechanism. The others are determined on a basis that lasts several years. The Parliament has democratic control over them and reserves the right to reassess them, within a mid-term review, to analyse their implementation and to make the necessary modification.

Instrument	Object	Financing 2011	Department responsible
European Development Fund (EDF)	All ACP Countries, Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). This includes the African Peace Facility programme (APF)	€3780 M	Extra-budgetary, managed by DG DEVCO
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian action, crisis response	€765 M	DG ECHO
CFSP	Finances the civilian missions of CSDP	€300 M	EEAS /FPI
Instrument for Stability (IfS)	Political stability and peace building	€282 M	DG DEVCO and EEAS/FPI
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	Promoting democracy and human rights	€150 M	DG DEVCO

Figure 2: Assessment of spending allocated to the Horn of Africa in 2011

The EDF, the main financial instrument, supports the actions carried out in the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) in economic, social and human development and regional cooperation and integration. The EDF is an extra-budgetary fund financed by Member States according to a specific contribution key. It is governed by the partnership agreement between the ACP and the EC, signed in 2000 and revised in 2005. The 11th EDF has commenced for the 2014-2020 period.



It has an overall budget of €22.7 billion, 97% of which is allocated to ACP States. No less than €2 billion was allocated to the Horn of Africa by the 10th European Development Fund (EDF, 2008-2013).

The resources that make up the European Development Fund are not registered in the EU budget, and are not part of it. This financial autonomy constitutes an exception in the general finance system of the EU, thus making this instrument unique. The European Parliament does not control the EDF. There are a large variety of FED aids. In order of priority, they are allocated to economic cooperation, regional integration and institutional support, and the health, education, rural development, environmental and transportation sectors. Horizontal policies are also taken into account, such as human rights, democracy, gender equality, food security and the fight against narcotics.

As an example, the African Peace Facility (APF) was implemented as part of a partnership with the African Union to support the development of peace and security. It includes AMISOM financing, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and rapid response mechanisms at continental and regional levels. The EDF contributes to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “Rule of law and security” Programme to finance the police force and the justice system in Somalia. As part of this programme, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is responsible for the construction and refurbishment of prisons. Since 2006, humanitarian aid has amounted to more than €1 billion for the Horn of Africa. A general document, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid¹⁶ was signed in 2007. It defines the scope of the EU’s action in terms of humanitarian aid. It states its values and principles and underlines the necessity of European aid coordination to make it as effective as possible.

The Instrument for Stability (IfS)¹⁷ aims to strengthen peace, and is made up of two components: the short-term component is under EEAS responsibility, and the long-term under DG DEVCO responsibility. The goals of the IfS short-term components – crisis-response and preparedness – are conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation support. It works to support the development of democracy and international criminal courts, promote independent and pluralist media, and provide assistance to victims of illicit weapons, such as anti-personnel mines. Although short-term IfS falls under the High Representative’s responsibility through the EEAS, it is managed according to EU regulation by an independent body, the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI). The long-term IfS component focuses on three priorities: non-proliferation, reinforced border control against organised crime, terrorism and illicit trafficking, and assistance in crisis prevention or reconstruction.

¹⁶ This statement was signed in December 2007 by the three European institutions. It was approved by the Council on November 19, by the European Parliament on November 29, and was signed by the presidents of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament on December 18, 2007.

¹⁷ The IfS has become the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace through the adoption of the Regulation No. 230/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council on March 11, 2014



CSDP civilian missions are financed by the EU's general budget, under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) financing. It is managed by FPI, like IfS.

CSDP military missions are intergovernmental in nature and fall under the Member States' responsibility. The *Athena* mechanism was established on February 27, 2004 and aims to finance common costs following a distribution key. It takes into account headquarters expenditure (FHQ, OHQ), recourse to NATO assets, overheads, expenses for the preparatory and withdrawal phases of operations, as well as medical evacuation. Since December 2011, Athena also takes into account common costs for battlegroup deployment. Additionally, a start-up fund made up of the Member States' contributions was set up to finance preparatory activities of the Petersberg tasks, which are not covered by the general EU budget¹⁸.

Although EU financing for the Horn of Africa is significant, we must acknowledge that it is difficult to obtain an overview of the situation. Reports do exist but lack intelligibility. It seems impossible to collect coherent figures on the region's financing, which makes the investment policy and its management quite unclear. According to Chantal Lavallée¹⁹, *“the EU should ensure that the risks of duplication are reduced, which would bring costs down. In-depth reflection is required. Expressing the comprehensive approach on a cost basis, with an overall budget for each overall action, would be profitable to the EU.”* The European Parliament, in its 2013 report²⁰, requests more clarity and coherence: *“external financial instruments for the period 2014 to 2020 are designed so as to facilitate the pursuit of a comprehensive approach to the Union's external relations, in particular by creating instruments that work across the nexus of conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-building, development cooperation and the strengthening of strategic partnerships.”*

5. COORDINATION

The complexity of actions and actors involved in the Horn requires the development of numerous coordination actions. This is all the more complex as coordination must reconcile the intergovernmental and EU aspects.

Within the EU

Internal coordination in Brussels concerns Member State relations within the Council, the Political and Security Committee and working groups. It has an impact on the relationship between the Council and EU institutions, namely the Commission, the EEAS and the Council Secretariat. Within the EEAS, the Executive Secretary General's role is to standardize expert

¹⁸ Lisbon Treaty: article III-313

¹⁹ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

²⁰ 2013/2146(INI): Report on the comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action



assessments from geographic and thematic services, CSDP crisis management bodies with the crisis response department as well as the delegations under its responsibility. Lastly, the Commission oversees the coherency of the different initiatives undertaken by the Directorates-General. Several coordinating bodies have been created.

As for the Commission, relevant examples are the LRRD (Linking relief, rehabilitation and development) between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO, and especially since 2012 for the Horn of Africa, the SHARE initiative (Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience) which fosters close coordination between humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation.

At the EEAS, the role of the Crisis Response and Operational Cooperation department is to link the actors together, especially through the Crisis Platform. Although it enabled significant progress to be made, the platform is not permanently active. For CSDP, the EU's operation centre was activated by the Council in March 2012 to coordinate CSDP civilian and military operations in the Horn. However, it does not have command responsibility and does not aim to ensure coordination between the CSDP and the Commission's actions.

Although the increase in EU actors in the Horn of Africa has taken a generally coherent approach, it was more random than planned.




Figure 3: EU Representatives in the Horn of Africa



The first source of complexity lies in the presence of two Special Representatives, six Heads of Delegations, three CSDP Heads of Mission or Operation, a Special Envoy and several offices in the region, which sometimes results in rivalries and the overlapping of responsibilities. For instance, the Maritime Security programme²¹ (MASE) is not coordinated with EUCAP NESTOR although they share similar goals. Still worse is that, despite the existence of a contact group, there does not seem to be much coordination with the UNODC project, “Combating maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean”²². This project’s aim, among others, is to support the region’s countries in arresting, prosecuting, sentencing and imprisoning convicted pirates²³. The coordination of the three CSDP missions (Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR) is starting to make an impact thanks to joint efforts from Brussels Operation Centre, the three Heads of Mission and Operation and the Special Representative (EUSR). Combined actions took place thanks to NESTOR and ATALANTA’s united initiative. Several actors have also pointed out a waste of resources due to offices all over Somalia and an increasing number of political advisers for each mission. Despite the adoption of a strategy to ensure a continuum between humanitarian aid and assistance in development, the situation between DG ECHO and DEVCO remains difficult. Lastly, public visibility of the actions undertaken is paramount to better communication.

With EU external actors

There is visible competition between the States involved in bilateral cooperation. Competition is all the more obvious given the weak capacities of regional States and rivalries between the African Union and IGAD.

Aside from organisations, many State actors are present due to historical, economic or security reasons. Coordination between the international and regional organisations in the region is disparate. According to Clara Egger²⁴, “*the EU and the UN are mutually dependent... The European Commission, which finances most civilian crisis management programmes, bases its action on a large network of partners, at the heart of which operate UN agencies and NGOs with irreplaceable expertise*”²⁵. Though coordination is satisfactory at the humanitarian level with the EU, it is not as effective at the development level.

²¹ In 2009, the European Commission set up a programme called “Critical Maritime Routes” with a 4-million euro budget to fight against piracy in the Horn region.

²² http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2013/CPP_Evaluation_Report_-_Final_07JUNE2013.pdf

²³ “To strengthen the national criminal justice systems of the targeted countries, so as to effectively arrest, prosecute and detain convicted pirates in accordance with universally accepted norms and standards pertaining to crime prevention, criminal justice and penal reform”.

http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/indepth-evaluations/2013/CPP_Evaluation_Report_-_Final_07JUNE2013.pdf

²⁴ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l’Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

²⁵ “Evaluation of Commission’s External Cooperation with Partner Countries through the Organizations of the UN Family”, final report, vol. I, May 2008 quoted in TARDY Thierry, Ibid, p. 11.



The African Union benefits from European support, which is above all financial, through the African Peace Facility (APF). It receives the European funds for AMISOM, but relations between the AU and the EU are still complex.

IGAD is hampered by power rivalries between States, especially between Kenya and Somalia. It suffers from structural weaknesses and *“is still an underdeveloped tool for the reinforcement of cooperation, integration and security in the region”²⁶*.

Coordination between States, whether EU Members or not, causes more problems, and often reveals a difference of opinion in terms of their objectives. Coordination is a real challenge for all the actors in the field. In this respect, within the EU, the European Parliament stressed in its 2013 report, the institutional and procedural weaknesses that have hampered the efficiency of the comprehensive approach. The lack of coordination and the lengthy administrative procedures are counterproductive. Although the DG ECHO must respect the specific principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality, this should not prevent it from working with other EU actors, if only for the sake of coordination. ECHO and EEAS cooperation should be strengthened, as much at commissioner and DG levels as on the ground, for instance between ECHO local offices and EU delegations. Likewise, the Commission’s Emergency Response Centre (ERC) must work with the EEAS’s crisis platform. This is why the EEAS’s Crisis Response and Operational Coordination department must play a prominent role. However, we must not forget that this lack of coordination is also due to the inexistence of a strategic directorate for the EU’s programmes.

6. GOVERNANCE

A strategic directorate for the implementation of the comprehensive approach and its effects is needed. Governance is difficult because of the two intergovernmental and EU approaches to the implementation of external action. Lines of responsibility are different and do not operate under the same mechanism or follow the same procedures. Situated between the Council and the Commission, the legal position of EEAS is inconvenient.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission (HRFASP or simply HR/VP), has a major role in the implementation of the Union’s external policy. Articles 18 and 27 of the TEEC state that the HR/VP *“ensures the Union’s external actions are coherent. Within the Commission, he/she takes care of its responsibilities in external relations and coordinates other aspects of the Union’s external action.”* The HR/VP also presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and is the director of the European Defence Agency. Catherine Ashton, the first HR/VP, is not visible enough at the coordination level. Today, she doesn’t exercise any real strategic leadership

²⁶ Strategy for the Horn of Africa, 2011



over the EU's external action. She has not been able to build a bridge between the Council, acting as part of the CFSP/CSDP, and the Commission. She has not managed, as the Commission's Vice-President, to draw on its financial resources, and to sufficiently rally the Member States to the cause.

At the regional level, employing a Special Representative (EUSR) turned out to be very useful. The EUSR's mandate remains quite vague: he coordinates, dialogues, represents, maintains a global perspective, monitors the situation's evolution and expresses opinions with relative authority. Personality and individual commitment alone enabled the EUSR to become a major actor on the ground. As the EU's representative to the relevant international bodies, he managed to make the EU's action much more visible.

According to Elise Daniel²⁷, *“the division of responsibilities between the EUSR for the Horn of Africa and the EU's Heads of delegations is not specified. There is no hierarchical link between them, which forces them to work together in a pragmatic way. Likewise, “no formal link exists between the EUHR and the Commission, particularly DEVCO and ECHO” nor with the command hierarchy of the CSDP's missions and operations.*

The CSDP's management and planning structures are inadequate and divided. There are no planners, notably within the EU Military Staff, which is undersized. The same can be said for the EEAS's Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which struggles to plan and carry out the EU's civilian missions. An effort should be made to rationalise the procedure so that the decision-making process is easier and the implementation timeframes reduced, as they are often too long.

In its 2013 report, the Parliament stressed the importance that must be accorded to the High Representative/Vice-President in order to give a sense of unity, coherence, visibility and efficiency to the EU's external action. The actors of the comprehensive approach must work together in accordance with the specificities, field of expertise and responsibilities of each, as well as their own command hierarchy.

7. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations take inspiration from the Joint Communication of December 11, 2013²⁸ and from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament²⁹. The Treaty of Lisbon enabled significant progress to be made in the coherence of the EU's external action, which is partly due to the creation of the HR/VP position and the EEAS's support. The EU's internal coordination has since been subjected to numerous efforts

²⁷ « Approche globale et Union européenne : le cas de la Corne de l'Afrique », IRSEM 2014-35, to be published

²⁸ JOIN(2013) 30 JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises

²⁹ 11.12.2013 PEU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action



to go from a pragmatic and step-by-step approach to a more organised one, based on moderate governance.

In its report on the EU's strategy for the Horn of Africa, the European Parliament³⁰ underlined that: *"the political instability and the conflict lingering in Somalia have almost crushed all chances of sustainable economic growth in the region"* and that the situation in Somalia remains *"dangerous and unpredictable."* Implementing the comprehensive approach in a region such as the Horn requires the ability to combine security with humanitarian action and development. Though we all agree that one-dimensional efforts, such as a purely military effort, are counterproductive, we must acknowledge that any action undertaken without a minimum of security is bound to fail; take Mali before 2012 as an example.

The UN aside, coordination with stakeholders outside the EU is inefficient. A significant effort must be made to take all actors into account, especially the "non-traditional stakeholders" such as Turkey, Egypt, the Gulf States and China. Sharing the same understanding of the comprehensive approach is paramount. It must cover all crisis levels, from the early-warning phase to complete recovery of stability in the region. Although the goals stated in the strategy for the Horn of Africa are clear, a strategy for the resources and operating procedures is missing: short, medium and long-term goals must be defined and shared from the very beginning. This is why the HR/VP plays a major role: he or she must fulfil all of their responsibilities, from the implementation of security policies to the instruments under their responsibility of Vice-President of the European Commission. The HR must have a limited but real power of initiative to enable him or her to initiate actions in emergency situations, including within the CSDP. The effort for simplifying decision-making procedures must continue.

The exchange of information between Brussels stakeholders must be developed more systemically, whether in the fields of observation, prevention, planning or in the conduct of actions. Procedures, norms and operating procedures must be established, with due regard to necessary confidentiality levels. Regarding CSDP, strengthening the structures for planning and execution of operations is essential. The EU's actions usually lack visibility. This is all the more important to the EU's external action to enhance its commitment and make it more coherent with regard to the international community.

It is important to simplify and accelerate the Commission's financial procedures so that civilian missions may be rapidly launched. More broadly, an effort for more transparency is required, as obtaining simple data on the EU's expenditure in Somalia and the Horn is difficult. Reports lack clarity and there doesn't seem to be any effective management audit.

³⁰ December 10, 2012



Lastly, the EU finances programmes that are carried out by third parties, in particular the UN and ONGs, and that lack visibility.

The EU's internal coordination requires the DG ECHO to increase its efforts in working in cooperation with other European stakeholders. While complying with the specific regulations of humanitarian aid, this will prevent the proliferation of European offices setting up in the Horn. In this respect, the crisis platform must become a hub for exchanging information and a place for synergy, for both governmental and EU actors. Both centres, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the EU Situation Room, should share the same location so as to work better together.

While taking into account the interests, often differing, of other stakeholders, it is important to develop structures to dialogue with major international or regional organisations, and with the States, starting with those in the Horn. Special attention should be paid to EU Member States involved in bilateral actions. The role of the Special Representative for the Horn of Africa must be acknowledged at all decision-making levels. While complying with the specificities of every line of responsibility, the Special Representative must be identified as the person in charge of the implementation of the strategy with the HR, the Commission and the Political and Security Committee. This will help avoid increasing the number of European agencies on the ground, which brings with it the risk of overlapping with the others' responsibilities, or even developing rivalries. As for the delegations, they must coordinate the stakeholders' actions within their area of responsibility, and in relation to the EUSR. They must possess the necessary expertise, especially in security and defence, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. Collaboration with the Member States' embassies in the country is highly recommended.

Ultimately, a feedback system will have to be set up, which would look back on and study the actions carried out in the region and allow corrective action to be carried out.

