(FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation

Doctrine for the Employment of the French Armed Forces

Joint Doctrine (FRA) JD-01(A)_DEF(2014)

MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE

Foreword

This Doctrine document was prepared by the French Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations [CICDE]*). It is promulgated and made public by the Director of the *CICDE* as part of its mission of joint doctrine development and experiment in a national and multinational context, and participation in interministerial studies and research.

It was conceived and written by a panel of experts working at the *CICDE*: it is a Doctrine document and not a legal document; it has no regulatory effect.

As set out in § 107 to 111 of the capstone document DC_001(A)_DOCTRINE(2013) for doctrine in general, the content of this document serves as a common reference, provides a rigorous analytical framework for thought and helps to define a language and methods shared by all those who are tasked with developing and executing plans, missions and orders. It cannot therefore affect the authority or limit the responsibility of the command structure, whether it be in organizing forces or planning and executing missions.

This French Joint Doctrine (FRA) JD-01(A) *Doctrine for the Employment of the French Armed Forces* is in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine Development*, as of 2011. The front cover of this document was created by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*CICDE*).

Please note: the only official reference document is the electronic online French version released on the Internet and/or Intradef pages of the *CICDE* (http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr).

(FRA) JD-01(A)[1]

DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMED FORCES

No. 128/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 June 2014

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[1] The letter A indicates the first complete revision of the original document since its promulgation.

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Letter of Promulgation

Paris, 12 June 2014

No. 128/DEF/CICDE/NP

<u>Object</u>: Promulgation of DIA-01(A)_DEF(2014), *Doctrine d'emploi des forces*.

<u>Reference</u>: CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013), *Concept d'emploi des forces*, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013. English version available: (FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) *Capstone Concept for Military Operations*.

The joint doctrine DIA-01(A)_DEF(2014), *Doctrine d'emploi des forces*, is hereby promulgated.

It supersedes the former edition DIA-01_DEF(2011), no. 127/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 July 2011.

Le Vice-amiral Arnaud de TARLÉ
Directeur du Centre interarmées de concepts,
de doctrines et d'expérimentation,
(CICDE)

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Foreword

Paris, 03 June 2014

General Pierre de VILLIERS
Chief of the French Defence Staff
(*CEMA*)[2]

The French capstone concept CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013)[3] bases our military strategy on the notion of dynamic synergy of efforts. Accordingly, I'd like to provide forces with a new doctrine to guide the employment of the French Armed Forces, so that the development and conduct of their action are in line with this approach.

Dynamic synergy of efforts involves greater interaction between strategic functions, greater ability to shift effort between missions and between theatres, and increased flexibility in terms of organization, command and action. It is a proper response to the military challenges of our time. The armed forces are challenged more than ever to become even more agile: agility in action, but most importantly, intellectual and doctrinal flexibility.

This means breaking stereotypes. In other words, if a doctrine for the employment of the French Armed Forces sets out principles for action, it should not under any circumstances be doctrinaire and confine itself to dogmatic rigidity. Instead, innovation and flexibility should be favoured so as to better adapt ourselves to the specific realities proper to each engagement.

Indeed, it consists of being able to face extremely diverse situations:

diversity of opponents, who might be state or non-state opponents, or of an undetermined nature (cyber threat). Moreover, while Western forces operate within a strict ethical and legal framework, some adversaries—who often are less constrained—will not hesitate to exploit this asymmetry of standards;

diversity of strategies and courses of actions, far beyond conventional military confrontations;

diversity of partnerships, since, in addition to our engagements with our traditional allies, we will have to operate in theatres with local partners who are sometimes far from our standards of thought and action. Moreover, the variety of risks and threats to which we will be confronted will lead us to develop interministerial and civil-military partnerships;

diversity of environments, since, in addition to the three traditional areas of confrontation (land, air, sea), which cover very heterogeneous realities, two immaterial confrontation fields will become increasingly important: cyberspace and the field of perceptions.

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[2] *CEMA: Chef d'état major des armées*.
[3] CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013), *Concept d'emploi des forces*, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013. English version available: (FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) *Capstone Concept for Military Operations*.

We will also have to face uncertainty, which, in spite of our capabilities of knowledge and anticipation, remains an essential part of strategy, manoeuvre and combat. Examples of uncertainties are:

the occurrence of crises: crises, at least some of them, will still surprise us, especially by their nature, sudden explosion, rapid development, or immediate or long-term consequences;

the engagement to conduct: the adversary's strategy is never the one we expect or the one we have imagined. In addition, it always evolves in response to our action. This uncertainty is an inherent part of the very concept of strategy, a dialectic in which each party tries to impose its will without being subject to that of the other;

the course of the engagement: the intervention itself affects the pre-existing strategic balance, in a way that is not always easy to plan or evaluate. It might create a diversion or offer opportunities to seize, especially for some local and regional actors. This may impact the employment of our forces;

the duration of engagements: the longer a conflict lasts, the more it develops its own dynamic, which might differ from the initial expectations. A long-term confrontation also raises the issue of the constancy and determination of the coalition and public opinion. The uncertainty factor can potentially have serious consequences on the employment of our forces;

legal uncertainty: we live in a context of increasing *"judiciarisation"*[4]. Consequently, some adversaries are difficult to identify with regard to the Law of Armed Conflict due to the blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants. Moreover, our assessment of the legality of some actions and our conception of the rules of engagement may differ from our partners. Finally, it is important to consider and, if possible, to anticipate the constant developments in international law.

Finally, it is necessary to draw on the consequences of the extension of our spaces of engagement:

In its traditional understanding, the concept of theatre implies a type of **geographical containment which does not always take into account current realities**.

Likewise, the **protection of the national territory is less and less limited to the territory strictly speaking** and its associated spaces; it has now an extended range.

Considering the enlarged spectrum of potential engagements, the military response cannot be unique and stereotypical.

The purpose of the present document is to provide the Armed Forces with a common framework, common practices and vocabulary, for a shared understanding of military action. This doctrine will serve as a foundation for an evolving doctrinal corpus. The *CICDE*, which provides input to good practices, long-term operational planning, lessons learned and exchanges with our partners and allies, will adapt this doctrinal corpus and make it evolve accordingly.

These doctrinal texts are to be applied rigorously but without rigidity, with the necessary discernment and flexibility required by contemporary military engagements.

Le général d'armée Pierre de Villiers
chef d'état-major des armées

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[4] The French term *"judiciarisation"* is defined as *"the submission of military acts to the supervision of the judicial authority [...]; the possible effective confrontation of a military personnel with a magistrate accordingly with the rules of the judicial procedure [...]"*. La *"judiciarisation" des opérations militaires*, by Christophe Barthélemy, January 2013.

References

    a.   CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013), *Concept d'emploi des forces*, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013. For ease of reading, this document will hereinafter be referred to as CIA-01. English version available: (FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) *Capstone Concept for Military Operations*.

Preamble

1.   The French doctrine DIA-01_DEF(2014)[5], here translated as *Doctrine for the Employment of the French Armed Forces*, contributes to the shared understanding of contemporary military action.

2.   It is the capstone document of the national joint doctrinal corpus. In order of importance, it follows the capstone concept for military operations (ref. a.), and precedes all other joint doctrine publications. It ensures the consistency of the resulting operation doctrines.

3.   DIA-01 is the national counterpart of AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, and is perfectly compatible with it. Indeed, NATO is the main reference for the French Armed Forces' multinational engagements.

Scope

4.   DIA-01 addresses military operations commanded by the *CEMA*[6] (French chief of Defence Staff). It covers, among others: operations linked to the implementation of nuclear deterrence, knowledge–anticipation operations, security and protection operations, preventive actions, and interventions as part, or not, of an overseas operation.

5.   **Deterrence** is the object of a specific document[7]. The joint doctrine on the implementation of nuclear and conventional forces as part of a deterrence mission is not addressed in DIA-01 due to its protection level.

6.   For **protection**, the Armed Forces ensure security of the national territory, air space and maritime approaches at all times. In case of a major crisis, they provide support to the civilian authority, within a specific legislative and regulatory framework[8], and following specific procedures that are not addressed in this document. The strategic function "Protection" is preferably studied in a mission approach, which is more similar to its legal and regulatory framework[9].

7.   Likewise, **prevention** aims at containing crises and conflicts to the minimum level, for as long as possible, while ensuring the protection of the interests of the nation, within the limits of available capabilities. It imposes the positioning of military forces in nations with which France has privileged links or in certain maritime areas. The implementation of this disposition is addressed in a different document[10]. The contribution of the Armed Forces in the field of prevention covers a wide spectrum, from cooperation and influence activities to the preventive deployment of forces.

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[5]   For ease of reading, this document will hereinafter be referred to as DIA-01.
[6]   *CEMA: Chef d'état-major des armées*.
[7]   For more information, refer to *Dissuasion nucléaire : éléments constitutifs de la doctrine française*, CICDE.
[8]   See § 109.
[9]   Cf. DIA-3.32, *Engagements terrestres sur le territoire national*, no. 143/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 31 August 2011; PIA-3.31, *Action de l'État en Mer (AEM) – Notions et références*, no. 059/DEF/CICDE//NP as of 11 April 2013, amended on 10 July 2013; PIA-3.33_PPS-A(2014), *Posture permanente de sûreté – air – Notions et références*, no. 63/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 March 2014; *Partie publique du Plan gouvernemental de vigilance, de prévention et de protection face aux menaces d'actions terroristes – VIGIPIRATE*, no. 650/SGDSN/PSN/PSE as of 17 January 2014.
[10]   RDIA-2014/001 *Contribution des armées à la prévention des crises extérieures*, no. 016/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 27 January 2014. English version available: (FRA) JDN-2014/001 *Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Prevention of External Crises*.

8.   **Intervention capabilities** outside the national territory provide the strategic depth essential for safety. They provide the Nation with the means to defend its interests and honour its alliances by countering threats at their source. Defining the modalities of the expeditionary dimension of the employment of forces is a priority objective; it is at the core of DIA-01.

9.   There is a strong connexion between prevention, protection and intervention. The employment of forces through intervention cannot be considered separately from the other two pillars.

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Section I – Introduction

Scope

101.   The employment of armed forces is the way in which the Armed Forces[11] combine and guide their action towards the achievement of their operational objectives.

102.   The challenge is to make the best of the capabilities of the forces, directorates and services, as well as of their organization. To do so:

a.   at the strategic level, CIA-01 recommends the implementation of a "dynamic synergy of efforts"[12], i.e. the Armed Forces' ability to combine their actions at the interministerial, joint and allied level, in order to guide them towards the desired end state.

b.   the purpose of DIA-01 is to define the utilization of military means within the framework established in CIA-01.

Elements of Operational Superiority

103.   CIA-01 lists seven factors of operational superiority which need to be developed:

a.   a favourable balance of forces;

b.   high morale;

c.   agility, understood as the combination of initiative, responsiveness and adaptability;

d.   agility to combine technological superiority and operational expertise, mutually enhancing each other;

e.   mastery of information, taking into account the increasing flow of information;

f.   ability to act in unconventional conditions;

g.   ability to deal with complex and changing operational environments, in order not only to adapt, but also to anticipate.

Priorities of Effort

104.   Finally, in a more targeted way, CIA-01 defines five major objectives:

a.   developing a sufficient level of operational autonomy in situational awareness and assessment, decision-making and operational action;

b.   strengthening the Armed Forces' ability to operate with each other, and to interact with various stakeholders;

c.   exerting leverage within alliances and coalitions;

d.   integrating cyber actions in our operations;

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[11]   The French Armed Forces include the Army, Navy, Air Force, and *Gendarmerie Nationale*, for its "defence" missions, as well as the joint directorates and services, devoted to committing in operations and operational tasks.

[12]   Cf. CIA-01, p. 7: *"To meet those challenges and enable the French Armed Forces to make the most of the means available to them, CCMO bases their action on a **dynamic synergy of efforts**, involving greater interaction between strategic functions, greater ability to shift effort between missions and between theatres, and increased flexibility in terms of organization, command and action."*

e. strengthening subsidiarity and adaptability in the fields of organization and command.

105. The objective of DIA-01 is to put into action the elements of superiority and priorities of effort as part of a joint campaign.

Principles of Military Action

106. The three founding principles[13] of national strategic military thinking remain the reference; they must be understood as in the modern understanding given in CIA-01, Chapter 5.

Section II – Legitimacy of Engagements

107. CIA-01 highlights the legal requirements which underpin the Armed Forces' action. Legality is conditional on the observance of national and international laws, ethics and rigour in action.

108. The Charter of the United Nation (UN Charter) highly recommends a peaceful settlement of disputes between states. It supports the general principle of restraining from the use of force between states, but admits two exceptions:

   a. **interventions under the states' right of self-defence**, in compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognizes the *"inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary [...]."* The right to use force is regulated by mandate from the Security Council and is time limited. As laid out in *French White Paper – Defence and National Security* (2013)[14], *"France is committed to consolidating the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter that prohibit threats or the use of force in relations between States, other than in self-defence and application of Security Council resolutions"* (page 23). This notion is nonetheless weakened by the emergence of a wide range of threats (cyberattacks, terrorism, etc.)—conducted by non-state actors or from failed states—or hostile actions that are difficult to blame with certainty on a given state.

   b. **interventions under international mandate**, authorized by the UN Security Council, in application of chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. This happens especially when the Security Council decides to undertake any measure it judges necessary for the maintenance or restoration of order, after observing any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

   c. **in addition, two other types of intervention are considered as legal under international law:**

      (1) **interventions on request of a third state**: this type of engagement enables France to discharge its bilateral obligations (defence agreements);

      (2) **evacuation of a state's nationals** on a third state's territory, when this intervention has an exclusively humanitarian purpose (rule of international customary law).

National Territory and Areas Under Sovereignty

109. The Armed Forces' engagement in the national territory is legally regulated by specific provisions issued from two specific documents:

   a. the *Constitution*, through three main articles: Article 15 (the President of the French Republic is the chief of the Armed Forces), Article 20 (responsibilities of the Government, which directs the armed force), and Article 35 (declaration of war and intervention of the Armed Forces abroad). In addition, two exceptional situations are addressed in Article 16 (emergency powers) and Article 36 (state of siege).

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[13] Freedom of action, concentration of efforts and economy of force.
[14] *Livre Blanc – Défense et Sécurité Nationale*, la documentation française, 2013, foreword by François HOLLANDE, President of the French Republic. For ease of reading, this document will hereinafter be referred to as LBDSN-2013. English version available: *French White Paper – Defence and National Security*.

b.	the *Code de la défense* which, in its legislative part, defines the defence legal regime (part 2) with a distinction between the emergency provisions (implementation in times of war, state of siege or state of emergency) and situations under ordinary law and mainly consisting of requisitions (book 2, title 2).

110.	The Armed Forces' contribution to the state action at sea, in air spaces and, in the event of a major crisis, in the national territory, is subject to specific provisions[15].

Outside the National Territory

111.	Each engagement outside the national territory is regulated by a given legal framework, defined by:

a.	the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions;

b.	the Law of Armed Conflict (or international humanitarian law);

c.	the International Human Rights Law;

d.	any other obligation under international law, and international or regional conventions to which France is a party;

e.	the domestic law of the host nation, if any and if it corresponds to the standards accepted by France. Usually, exchanges between the force deployed and the host nation are regulated by a Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). If no SOFA has been signed, French personnel are subject to the law of the host nation by right[16];

f.	the French national law[17].

Section II – Use of Force in Operations[18]

112.	The four main principles of humanitarian international law are:

a.	military necessity;

b.	proportionality;

c.	distinction;

d.	humanity.

113.	The employment of forces is directly linked to the use of force. The specificity of the military is to fight in the name of the Nation. The use of force is regulated by rules of command (especially Rules Of Engagement [ROE]) and by the law. The legitimacy of an engagement is also determined by the purpose for which force will be used, and by the behaviour of the forces. Moreover, the legal dimension is always part of operations, in various ways depending on their nature: intervention on the national territory, crisis management, high intensity coercion action, etc.

114.	LBDSN-2013 and CIA-01 refer to various concepts that are important to define so as to better understand the consequences on the forces. Indeed, these considerations provide a structure with significant effects on force employment. The operations community's common understanding has to be precise.

15	Cf. PIA-3.31_AEM(2013), *Action de l'État en Mer – Notions et références*, no. 059/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 April 2013; PIA-3.33_PPS-A(2014), *Posture Permanente de Sûreté–Air – Notions et références*, no. 63/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 March 2014. The hypothesis of a major crisis is addressed by *Instruction ministérielle n° 10100/SGDSN/PSE/PPS/CD du 03 mai 2010*.
16	Cf. DIA-4(B)_SOUT(2013), *Doctrine du soutien – Les sous-fonctions du soutien*, booklet 2/3, no. 040/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 14 March 2013.
17	Mainly the *Code de la défense* and *Code pénal*.
18	In joint documents, the term "operation" covers a variety of typologies: in the national territory, in areas under sovereignty, as part of prevention, intervention, etc.

Coercion

115. The term "coercion" is barely used in the former reference documents (LBDSN-2008, CIA-01 edition 2010 or DIA-01 edition 2011). It must be understood as the imposition of our strategic objectives by force and more generally, the ability to bend the adversary's will.

116. LBDSN-2013[19] more specifically considers coercive operations in a high-intensity situation (deterioration of the international situation which might oblige them to enter into military combat with the armed forces of another State, possessing organised, well-commanded and complementary capabilities that might be backed by effective weapons systems).

117. The three main missions defined in CIA-01 are likely to integrate actions of coercion (protecting the Nation against any military threat, contributing to the settlement of situations threatening international peace and security in compliance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter) or inherently include such actions (using coercion to constrain the political will of a state adversary).

118. However, obtaining a balance of power in our favour might be enough to achieve the objectives set by the political authority, without the necessity of engaging in combat.

119. The goal of coercive operations is to neutralize the adversary's political-military platform, which calls for a very high-level technological response.[20] The use of force will be consistent with the desired military objective. To do so, the armed forces model defined in LBDSN-2013 chooses a military tool mainly based on the differentiation of forces based on the priority missions they must fulfil.[21] The ability to take part in coercion operations justifies the favoured use of technological operational superiority to generate the necessary ad hoc forces.

Crisis Management

120. Crisis management operations[22] are operations conducted when the armed forces are faced with situations arising from the fragility of certain states or from states' forceful actions, but without reaching open conflict. These operations involve adversaries who are difficult to identify with regard to International Law. The complex legal environment is one of the most important and restrictive characteristics of these operations.

121. Section 23 "Contingency Engagements" of CIA-01 draws a non-exhaustive list of the most characteristic crisis management operations.

122. In these operations, confrontation with adversaries who do not observe the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict, adds a significant level of complexity. The definition of precise ROE is a key priority of effort. The use of force will range from individual self-defence (see § 130) to an extensive use similar to that of coercion operations (see § 115 *et sqq.*).

Engagement in the National Territory and in Areas under Sovereignty

123. Operations within the national territory or areas under sovereignty are subject to a specific legal and regulatory framework (see §§ 16 and 130 *et sqq.*). The right to individual self-defence (see § 130 *et sqq.*) is a legal imperative that shall be taken into account in the planning and execution of a mission.

124. Limits to the use of force are specified by the rules on the use of force within the national territory[23].

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[19] Cf. LBDSN-2013, p. 83 (English version: p. 80).
[20] Cf. ibid. p. 136 (English version: p. 128).
[21] Cf. ibid. p. 138 (English version: p. 130).
[22] Cf. ibid. p. 84 (English version: p. 81).
[23] Cf. DIA-3.32, *Engagements terrestres sur le territoire national*, no. 143/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 31 August 2011. The rules on the use of force (*Règles d'emploi de la force* or *REF*) apply to missions carried out within the national territory, and complement the *CEMA*'s orders so as to define the circumstances and conditions in which the forces engaged in a given mission may use force. The use of force includes all the measures and actions of a coercive nature likely to limit people's freedom and rights. The use of force does not necessarily include the use of weapons.

The Use of Force by our Adversaries[24]

125. The different types of military strategies used by enemies or potential opponents define the nature of the war to come, as well as the use of force. Annex A[25] lists the nine main types of military strategies used by our potential opponents.

126. Moreover, our adversaries may use hybrid strategies[26], aiming to pose diverse threats to us. They are carried out in different fields of confrontation, simultaneously or successively. The hybrid nature of threats is even more likely when the adversary—a mix of civilian and military, state and non-state elements—is characterized by a hybrid nature.

127. The concept of a "hybrid threat" should be distinguished from the following terms[27]:

   a. irregularity: an irregular war is not necessarily illegal with respect to the international standards; however, it refers to the involvement in the conflict of irregular combatants who are hardly identifiable and do not respond to a state authority. To confront an irregular adversary requires an appropriate analysis of the use of force in order to guarantee its legitimacy. The existence of a chain of command is enough to identify a group as an irregular adversary;

   b. symmetry: confrontation between adversaries that are similar in terms of their capabilities and employment doctrine;

   c. dissymmetry: disparity of power between two opposing entities following a similar approach to the conflict;

   d. asymmetry: a mode of combat that exploits our weaknesses. The adversary deliberately takes a position in a different environment to the one where we have undeniable superiority. This notion is not specific to an irregular conflict or irregular adversary; it is rather a possible option.

128. The resort to asymmetric courses of action is an integral part of most contemporary military operations.

129. Some fields of confrontation, especially cyberspace, may be occupied by opponents whose very identity is hard to determine. This makes it harder to respond.

Legal Framework for the Use of Force

130. In French law, Article 122-5 of the *Code pénal* defines self-defence as the possibility to respond with force to an ongoing, unjustified and real aggression against people or, in some cases, against properties. However, in order to be legitimate, this response must be concomitant[28] with the attack, be absolutely necessary, and be an act of defence proportionate to the severity of the attack. Although it could be supplemented by the ROE specific to some theatres or units, legal individual self-defence is an inalienable base for the military in operations. This notion involves individuals and, by extension, formed units (isolated ships or groups of ships, isolated soldiers or basic units, isolated aircraft or aircraft on patrol).

131. Furthermore, the military may use force in cases other than self-defence. Indeed, according to Article L 4123-12.II of the 2005 *Code de la défence*,[29] amended in December 2013, following the extension provided by the 2013 *Loi de Programmation Militaire* (short term military planning law) in the chapter "Dispositions relatives au traitement pénal des affaires militaires", a member of the armed force may, during an operation mobilizing military capabilities and conducted outside the French territory or territorial waters, legally exercise coercive measures, up to the use of lethal force, when it is necessary for the exercise of its mission, in compliance with the

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[24] Cf. CIA-01, p. 16, section 34.
[25] This annex is based on the on-line paper released by the *RED* department (studies, research and development) of the *CICDE* on 05 September 2012: *Les différentes formes de strategies militaires de nos ennemis ou adversaires potentiels*. English version available: *Different Forms of the Military Strategies of our Enemies or Potential Opponents* (restricted).
[26] Cf. LBDSN-2013, p. 85 (English version: pp. 81–82).
[27] Cf. on-line paper *Hybridité*, released by the studies, research and development department (*RED*) of the *CICDE*, 26 May 2013.
[28] *Code pénal*, Article 122-5: specifies "at the same time".
[29] Article 4123-12.II: *"N'est pas pénalement responsable le militaire qui, dans le respect des règles du droit international et dans le cadre d'une opération mobilisant des capacités militaires, se déroulant à l'extérieur du territoire français ou des eaux territoriales françaises, quels que soient son objet, sa durée ou son ampleur, y compris la libération d'otages, l'évacuation de ressortissants ou la police en haute mer, exerce des mesures de coercition ou fait usage de la force armée, ou en donne l'ordre, lorsque cela est nécessaire à l'exercice de sa mission."*

rules of international law. In such circumstances (see § 135), the military is exempt from criminal liability.

132. Some allies—mainly Anglo-Saxon states such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia—put forward preventive self-defence to counter a hostile intent against them.

133. The extensive interpretation of the concept of preventive self-defence by some partners within a coalition may result in ambiguities at the detriment of the conduct of some missions.

134. France makes a distinction between hostile intent and self-defence. It acknowledges and uses this notion of hostile intent which is then treated specifically within the framework of the ROE.

Rules Of Engagement (ROE)

135. For a given mission, Rules Of Engagement (ROE) are essential to define the principles of the use of force, beyond self-defence, by the units engaged in an overseas operation. ROE are an integral part of the orders given with a view to accomplish the mission. Compliance with them guarantees legal protection to the military in operations, especially under Article L 4123-12.II of *Code de la défense* (see § 130).

136. They apply whenever forces are deployed, including in a strictly national environment, and take a special dimension in the case of multinational operations. ROE depend on the context, but also on the chosen objectives and Concept of Operation (CONOPS).

137. The states' individual laws may be different from French law in terms of the use of force. In the case of a multinational operation, and especially if France is not the framework nation, it is important to ensure respect of ROE does not contradict French legislation and its international commitments, which apply to the French contingent. This task is mainly the responsibility of the Senior National Representative France (SNR FRA), the responsibilities of whom are listed in § 418. The reference documents of the international organizations (NATO, EU) give states participating in an operation the opportunity to add comments or caveats.

138. The development, dissemination and good understanding of the ROE are a priority to all the command echelons of an operation.

139. This approach is consistent with the general framework for the development of plans and orders. It must be accomplished by seeking maximum freedom of action for the benefit of the Force, as part of the mission.

140. There is no reference method (NATO or national) to develop ROE in view of an operation. However, there are two different approaches:

   a. a "bottom-up" approach, which consists in starting with the concept of self-defence and then extending its implementation consistently with the nature of the operation and of the adversary. This approach is particularly relevant for crisis management activities in a highly constrained legal environment;

   b. a "top-down" approach, which consists of translating the military dimension of a mission, i.e. breaking down its implications in Rules Of Engagement (ROE), in order to carry out the action with the necessary freedom and security level required for the forces (application of the principles stated in CIA-01).

141. NATO, UE and national reference documents in terms of ROE are:

   a. MC 362/1 *NATO Rules of Engagement*, 22 July 2003;

   b. MPS/981 *Guidelines for the Development of and Training on United Nations Rules of Engagement (ROE)*, 2002;

   c. ESDP/PESD. COSDP 342 *Use of Force Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations*, 20 November 2002;

> d. DIA-5.2 *L'usage de la force en opération militaire se déroulant à l'extérieur du territoire français*, 25 July 2006 (joint doctrine relative to the use of force during a military operation outside national territory).

142. For many other regional partners, the main reference document is *Rules of Engagement Handbook*, November 2009, published by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.

Caveats in Multinational Operations

143. The national armed forces contributing to the operation are not expected to:

> a. execute tasks under restrictions of use of a political or operational nature (caveats);
>
> b. act according to principles that would contravene their own laws and regulations.

144. Consequently, a state may restrict or specify multinational ROE.

145. French caveats of political or operational nature are issued by the *CPCO*[30] (French defence operations centre). Caveats of legal nature are issued by the *EMA*[31] (French Defence Staff), more specifically by the *JUROPS* (military legal section) and *DAJ* (legal affairs directorate).[32] The operation commander is part of this approach.

Rules of Behaviour

146. Rules of behaviour define the "know-how", or self-management skills, of the forces deployed in a given environment. They define the proper individual and collective attitude to be adopted by the forces towards the environment and different possible situations. In addition, they specify the relationships to maintain with the different actors in theatre.

147. Rules of behaviour are based on the characteristics (political, social, cultural, etc.) of the environment in which the forces are to evolve, and are fixed by the operational commander. They complement ROE and contribute to the prevention of violent situations that could result from the misunderstanding of the forces' behaviour.

148. Reference documents are the same as those mentioned for ROE.

"Judiciarisation"[33] of Operations

149. The *"judiciarisation"* of operations is a current phenomenon addressed in LBDSN-2013[34]. Armed action to serve the interests of the state does not relieve the military from accountability. Recent legal provisions[35] ensure that certain consequences of this largely social phenomenon are regulated.

150. The actions of the military commander carried out as part of his mission should not be restricted by this evolution, as long as the due care and ad hoc procedures are respected, the planning and conduct of operations are conducted in compliance with the applicable rules of law, and the ROE, combatant ethical rules and good practices are applied. Anticipation and advice are more than necessary, especially with recourse to experts (*EMA/JUROPS* at the strategic level, Legal Adviser [LEGAD][36] at the operational and tactical staff level). To do so, the legal context of an operation and terms of a mission should be carefully analysed. The adversary must also be well characterized from a legal point of view.

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[30] *CPCO: Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations.*
[31] *EMA: État-major des armées.*
[32] *JUROP: Section juridique opérationnelle; DAJ: Direction des affaires juridiques.*
[33] The French term *"judiciarisation"* is defined as "the submission of military acts to the supervision of the judicial authority [...]; the possible effective confrontation of a military with a magistrate accordingly with the rules of the judicial procedure [...]" by Christophe Barthélemy in *La "judiciarisation" des opérations militaires*, January 2013.
[34] Cf. LBDSN-2013, p. 123 (English version: p. 117).
[35] Provisions introduced by Law no. 2013-1168 of 18 December 2013 relative to military planning.
[36] France provides LEGAD in compliance with Article 82 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

151.   Technical provisions (records of tactical situations and scenes, operational archives[37], etc.) will enable a legal authority to complete and meet, as needed, its possible requests, as thoroughly as possible.

Section IV − Basic Rules of Operations

152.   Six basic rules govern the conduct of operations:

    a.   a unique command, which ensures unity of effort;

    b.   a three-level command structure, which meets three different levels of concern: the strategic level at the politico-military echelon, the operational level responsible of the campaign's consistency and efficiency in the theatre, and the tactical level which locally conducts the combat of the forces;

    c.   the joint, interdirectorate, and interservice dimension;

    d.   the multinational dimension;

    e.   the military actors' need to know, master and apply NATO doctrines and procedures;

    f.   the necessary coordination of military action with the other dimensions of crisis management (comprehensive approach).

Three Levels of Command

Strategic Level

153.   As close as possible to the political authority, the strategic command translates political decisions into security objectives. It develops the military response options that have been suggested, provides resources and defines the constraints and caveats in the use of force.

154.   The strategic command also develops military strategic objectives and defines operational objectives based on the political agenda and Desired End State (DES).

155.   As the military adviser of the government and as the Operational Commander (OPCOM) of the engaged forces, the *CEMA* takes responsibility for the two functions of the strategic level:

    a.   the strategic direction, i.e. the development and definition of the overall military strategy ad hoc to a given engagement. This "high-level strategy" role is addressed to the political authorities. Its primary purpose is to define military response options;

    b.   the strategic command, i.e. the implementation of the overall military strategy validated at the political level. This "operational level strategy" role is addressed to the alliance, coalition, theatre and Force. It is expressed through the Operation Commander (OpCdr) whose mission is to translate governmental directives and guidelines in terms of planning and operational response.

156.   In addition, as part of multinational operations (especially under NATO command), the *CEMA* plays a "horizontal strategy" role towards the strategic level of the coalition. Once an operation is launched, the "operational level strategy" role is no longer entirely within the control of the national strategic echelon, especially with regard to the forces placed under multinational Operational Control (OPCON)[38].

Operational Level

157.   The operational level is derived from the strategic level on the theatre of operations. This level ensures the necessary continuity between the strategic and tactical levels, as well as interoperability with allies.

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[37]   Cf. PIA-7.7.6(A)_ARCHIVES-OPS(2013), *Archives opérationnelles*, no. 001/DEF/EMA/SCEM-OPS/CAOA/NP as of 25 April 2013.
[38]   The notion of OPCON is defined in Chapter 4, Section I.

158. In the theatre of operations, this command is the level of integration, combination and assessment of the impact of the Force's action. It aims to reach the objectives set by the strategic commander and contributes to the establishment of the desired concrete situation at the end of the operation (desired end state).

159. The operational level is therefore the level of integration and manoeuvre of designated military capabilities so as to produce the effects expected by the strategic level within a given zone, campaign or environment.

160. The operational level is less a strictly geographical responsibility in comparison to the level of coordination and of the synthesis of action of the Force engaged in its different components. The operational level especially manages the overall interaction of the Force with the environment. This level covers military, politico-military and civil-military dimensions. It is naturally joint, and most often allied and interministerial.

161. Practice gives strategic design its substance by combining the effects and actions carried out at the tactical level in order to reach the military pillar of the desired end state. The operational level is therefore integrated as soon as possible to strategic-level operations planning.

162. The increasingly joint nature of many functions (intelligence, support, 3D coordination, frequency management, information operations, targeting, etc.), as well as the consistency of the implementation of a comprehensive approach at the level of the theatre of operations, reinforce the importance of the operational level, and of its own responsibilities and functions, during the planning phase as well as during the conduct phase.

163. It is important to note that within a coalition, there might be differences of opinion as to the participating nations' perception of the operational level perimeter of responsibility. These differences might result from converging, but conflicting, level of commitment or strategic objectives, since they are always defined by the nations' own contingencies.

Tactical Level

164. The tactical command is the one which implements the means of the land, air, sea and special operation components that are under its command so as to reach the military objectives that have been set.

165. The tactical level is the local level of implementation of the allotted military capabilities, so as to achieve the missions and specific tasks entrusted by the operational level on a given theatre or zone of operations.

166. The tactical level operates in one or several operational fields (joint) or specific environments.

Complementarity and Juxtaposition Among Levels

167. Generally, the nature of the functions assigned to each of the command echelons and their specificities justify a three-level structure, based on the OPCOM (Operational Command), OPCON (Operational Control) and TACOM (Tactical Command) approach.

168. The organization of the "Command and Control" (C2) structure around the three levels of command seems to be the one that provides the most guarantees for:

   a. the taking into account of the political will and its translation into concrete and measurable effects on the theatre of operations;

   b. the synchronization of all the effects that can be obtained on the theatre;

   c. the required interoperability with the main allied nations (US, UK) and with NATO doctrine;

   d. the assessment of the operational situation in the light of the achievement of the political objectives, the sum of which results in the desired end state.

169.	However, the respect of this principle does not exclude contingency combinations that are appropriate to the constraints of the operation. In that case, it is recommended to make a distinction between command levels and functional levels.

170.	Indeed, regardless of the nature of the operation, operational functions—just as strategic and tactical functions—have their specificities and should be fully exercised and identified. The consistency and success of our operations depend on it.

171.	So, in some circumstances, operational functions may be exercised directly at the strategic level, which, in that case, keeps OPCON.

172.	Likewise, operational and tactical functions may be both endorsed within a same force Command Post (CP), as necessary. This is a juxtaposition, not a merger, of the operational and tactical levels placed under a single command. In that case, the necessary distribution of responsibilities within a CP requires an organization that distinguishes positions of operational-level functions from positions of tactical-level functions. Juxtaposition enables the reduction of the logistics footprint and optimization of protection, logistics support and Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The pooling and sharing of some functions within HQ may be considered, on a case-by-case basis, to gain manpower.

173.	A sometimes observed phenomenon of delayering translates to a contingent reality, which does not imply the suppression of one level for the benefit of the others. This concept illustrates, in the case of contingencies related to emergencies and politico-strategic sensitivities, that a superior level exercises responsibilities and tasks that are usually entrusted to the subordinate level(s).

Joint and Combined Operations

Coalition

174.	LBDSN-2013 underlines the importance of coalition operations. There are different types of coalitions: NATO, EU, contingency coalition. Contingency coalitions are the most frequent. There are often based on NATO standards, even though specific mechanisms enable to associate partners not subject to NATO standards. Finally, integrated combined joint forces are a more precise form of coalition. For France, it is the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF)[39], the operational capability of which is expected for 2016[40] (see Annex I for more details).

Synergy

175.	CIA-01 considers synergy[41] as a concept formally contributing to innovation in terms of force commitment.[42]

176.	At the level of the conduct of military operations, only strong coordination, in relation to the model armed force in effect, between the joint, allied or local forces and interministerial or non-state actors, enables them to reach the strategic objectives set, in the current context of military commitments.

177.	Concentration of efforts, such as defined in CIA-01, is not just confined to a one-off and localized concentration of forces, but means combining complementary efforts, aiming to the rational achievement of a shared objective through actions of a different nature. This implies to go beyond the administrative approach to assemble ad hoc forces down to the tactical echelon. Synergy can be achieved through:

   a.	the combination of effects, in space and time, in the different environments and fields of confrontation (e.g. integration of a composite air and ground capabilities);

   b.	mutual appreciation of the actions carried out by the varied actors contributing to the comprehensive approach[43];

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[39]	Franco-British.
[40]	Cf. common letter *CEMA*/UK CHOD of 16 February 2012.
[41]	From the Greek *synergía*, meaning cooperation, i.e. coordinated action of several elements.
[42]	Cf. CIA-01, p. 7.

  c. reorientation during action of the capabilities in the light of priority needs of the moment.

Interoperability

178. Interoperability is defined as the ability of several systems, units or organizations to operate together thanks to the compatibility of their respective systems, doctrines, procedures, equipment, and relationships. Interoperability covers operations, material, services and administration. There are three increasing levels of interoperability: accounting, interchangeability and community.

179. At the military level, NATO (AAP-6) defines interoperability as *"the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives."*

180. Interoperability between member nations and within NATO is now the reference to meet the required increase of capabilities. Within a bilateral framework, France develops specific autonomous programmes with the allies the most likely to be at its side as part of a coalition (Combined Joint Expeditionary Force or CJEF). However, the context requires the French Armed Forces to consider regional interoperability (bilateral interoperability with nations that are not NATO members and sometimes that are far from the national norms or model of the Alliance). To this end, anticipation is crucial so as to guarantee upstream the identification of possible partners, cooperation and mutual knowledge.

181. The European Union (EU) mainly uses NATO standards to build its military referential. By doing so, it is perfectly consistent with the interoperability approach as part of the military operations it conducts.

182. With other regional partners or during the constitution of ad hoc coalitions, France may have to implement ad hoc or contingency interoperability. This is translated as an interaction between partners (such as described in § 232 *et sqq.*).

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[43] Cf. RDIA-2011/001_AG-CM, *Approche globale (AG) dans la gestion des crises extérieures (contribution militaire)*, no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011. English version available: (FRA) JDN-2011/001_CA-CM, *Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crisis Management (CM) (Military Contribution)*.

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201. Armed forces are similar to a system, i.e. a group of elements in dynamic interaction, organized and prepared around a purpose. Such system includes specific operational capabilities, i.e. specific competences and means organized, in compliance with standards, to fulfil a given military action.

202. In this system, operational innovation, in bringing new ideas into practice, enables the Armed Forces to shed light on the future and on military operations to come. In a world of constant and rapid evolution, this is essential so as to maintain the initiative and operational advantage. Innovation should focus on capability and operational areas. It must be based on several processes, among which are long-term operational planning and Lessons Learned (LL).

Section I – Guiding Principles

203. Any operational capability relies on a doctrine, organization, human resources, equipment, specific support and ad hoc training. This is known as the *DORESE*[44] process.

Doctrine[45]

204. A doctrine is a collection of best practices. It provides a "manual of instructions" to: organize, structure, provide a framework, principles and tools for action, as well as keys for interoperability. The main objective of a doctrine is to ensure the forces a common understanding of operational issues. A doctrine is intrinsically dynamic in that it is constantly evolving—by taking into account lessons learned from past experiences, for instance. It also aims to have the Armed Forces ready for the first day of the next operation.

205. French military doctrine is based on and relates to NATO doctrine, or to the specific EU doctrine, if there is one[46], especially in fields covered by interoperability objectives. This implies that a national doctrine is developed only to fill a gap or lack of documentation in the NATO or EU corpus, in order to meet a need or a specifically national objective (e.g. French supplement to a NATO or EU document) or to be used as a national reference and foundation for the advances in allied doctrine.

206. Doctrine is enriched by both innovation and lessons learned. It evolves in order to be adapted and ensure the success of operations. Adaptations to a doctrine always result from a prior confirmation during an exercise, under the regulation of the "doctrinal experimentation" process. This process enables the Armed Forces to implement the evolutions of a doctrine, resulting from long-term operational planning works conducted or steered by the *CICDE*.

Organization

207. LBDSN-2013 introduces the concept of differentiation in the definition of the armed forces model. This concept is still underdeveloped. It implies that the Armed Forces can face extremely diverse situations in an almost concomitant time-space framework. This requires the Armed Forces to adopt a new organization refocused on a joint, interministerial and international synergy, and on skills, so as to optimize overall efficiency.

Human Resources[47]

208. Human resources, i.e. the military, their status[48] and their morale qualities, are one of the main pillars of the Armed Forces' operational potential.

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[44] *DORESE: Doctrine, organisation, ressources humaines, équipements, soutien, entraînement* (doctrine, organization, human resources, equipment, support, training). NATO uses the DOTMLPFI process: Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership development, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability.

[45] Cf. DC-001(A)_DOCTRINE(2013), *La doctrine : Pourquoi ? Comment ?*, no. 053/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 02 April 2013.

[46] There is no EU duplication of the NATO doctrine.

[47] Cf. DIA-1.0_PERS(2013), *Personnel en opérations*, no. 163/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 September 2013.

[48] *Loi n°2005-270 du 24 mars 2005 portant statut général des militaires, intégrée au Code de la Défense, partie 4 – livre 1er.*

209. Human resources are measured in terms of quantity (manpower, number of units, etc.)[49], but also in terms of inherent qualities. Indeed, their quality shapes the considered military action.

210. Morale is based on individual and collectives values; it is a key factor for successful operations. It also is an operational efficiency multiplier, which increases the forces' performance, as long as the latter are in sufficient number.

211. Although the quality of human resources and a high morale are crucial, they are not sufficient. Indeed, only the combination of these resources with proper and robust equipment will develop, through training, operational competences, which are essential to the success of a mission.

Training[50] and Operational Readiness

212. Training and operational readiness are crucial to the success of engagements. In order to adapt to the imperatives of some engagements, they vary accordingly with the services, forces (in compliance with the principle of differentiation) and missions entrusted to units.

213. Depending on units, operational readiness is based on a succession of iterative phases covering: individual preparation, collective preparation, specific preparation (accordingly with the next deployment planned), preparation before projection, operational training of the operational-level HQ.

214. The adequacy of the training to the reality of operational engagements is one of the key factors to efficient operational readiness. However, it is recommended to systematically seek the pooling and sharing of exercises and the integration of increasingly realistic simulation, at the joint or international level, in order to optimize the utilization of resources allotted to operational readiness.

Support (*soutien*)[51]

215. Support (*soutien*) is a major operational function. Within a joint framework and as early as the beginning of an operation, support ensures the combination and scheduling of the different activities set up to sustain the engaged forces in order to facilitate their deployment, life, combat, regeneration, recovery and duration.

216. Since support is organized according to a functional inter-environments approach and is based on the forces' needs ("from end-to-end"), it is inherently joint. In operations, each of the thirteen support sub-functions[52] is part of a single chain of command.

217. Support must constantly ensure continuity between the functional structure of cost-efficiency-oriented sectors (national territory) and the forces engaged, towards the success of the mission (theatre). It is organized around three imperatives:

   a. meet the proper needs of the forces at the right time, accordingly with the stages of the engagement: services, flows, asset visibility, regeneration ability, movement and transport;

   b. stocks and flows organization procedures, consumption monitoring, asset visibility at the three levels of command;

   c. proper size of resources (support units, movement and transport, transit) in the view of saving on personnel, material and budgets.

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[49] Cf. *Instruction ministérielle n°10100/SGDSN/PSE/PPS/CD du 03 mai 2010 relative à l'engagement des armées sur le territoire national en cas de crise majeure est cependant bien assortie d'une norme quantitative de 10 000 militaires.*
[50] Cf. PIA-7.1(B)_DPOIA, *Directive de préparation opérationnelle interarmées pour la période 2014-2018*, no. D-13-006349/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR as of 17 July 2013. Training is defined as *"the generic term for the permanent process of preserving and improving the ability of military individuals, staffs and forces to conduct sound military operations. It encompasses individual and collective training, education and exercises"* (Bi-SC 80-90, *NATO Task List*, 18 June 2014).
[51] Cf. DIA-4(B)_SOUT(2013), *Doctrine du soutien*, booklets 1–3, no. 191/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 14 March 2013.
[52] Cf. ibid., booklet 1, p. 19. See Annex E, § E09a-b.

Equipment

218. One of the main challenges to face identified by CIA-01 is the necessity to efficiently fight tomorrow with today's equipment and systems. Therefore, the implementation of these technical systems should be optimized.

Section II − Standards Required of our Forces

Strategic Assessment

219. CIA-01 reaffirms as an objective the ability to be a framework nation for a medium-scale allied operation. To this end, self-sustaining capacity in the fields of strategic assessment and intelligence is crucial.

220. This capacity combines with additional capabilities aiming to take (initial entry capability[53]) then maintain the initiative (operational-level C2), especially in risky situations.

Adaptability

221. There is no doubt about the expeditionary culture of the French Armed Forces as being an historical fact. The ability to maintain a capability for long-distance action implies constant adaptation in order to rapidly apprehend the characteristics specific to each theatre, or changes in the environment within a same campaign.

222. The differentiation mentioned above contributes to the achievement of this status by refocusing the Armed Forces on a model which is more condensed and less prone to over-specification, but which has the human and material force to adapt to the requirements of a mission, including those of high intensity.

Action

223. High responsiveness is necessary to strengthen the foundation for France's ambitions.

224. At the strategic level, responsiveness is reinforced by the dynamic management of the build-up of forces, under the direction of the *CPCO*. The graduated readiness of the forces results in different postures and warning orders (characterized by more or less short time-frames, from a couple of hours to several days or weeks), and in the operational readiness level that has been reached.

225. At the operational level, the operational modules on alert (managed by *EMIA-FE*[54] and formed from the operational pool) provide the strategic level with the guarantee of an initial response capability, especially as part of initial entry.

226. These operational modules are formed accordingly with the nature of the mission. Thanks to their expertise in operational matters and planning processes, the multidisciplinary teams that have been formed provide the added-value necessary to the HQ that has been established. The commitment of cohesive modules is properly tailored to meet exactly the operational need. It ensures optimal and efficient contribution to the operations, regardless of the framework of employment.

227. Their employment guarantees operational consistency and enables, at the theatre level, to optimize situation intelligence in favour of the strategic level, by fully investigating the five following fields of activity:

    a.   situation assessment;

    b.   combination of effects;

    c.   synchronization of efforts (components, military influence strategy, logistics, CIS, etc.);

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[53] Cf. RDIA-2014/002, *Entrée en premier*, no. 85/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 01 April 2014. English version available: (FRA) JDN-2014/002, *Initial Entry*.

[54] *EMIA-FE: État-major interarmées de force et d'entraînement* / joint force and training headquarters.

d.   coordination and conduct of actions within the physical and immaterial fields (targeting process and integrated Information Operations [Info Ops]);

e.   assessment of the campaign.

228.   A system such as the national emergency force (*ENU*)[55] represents the backbone of the national intervention and response capability. It includes an operational level (*PCIAT*[56], a joint theatre command post) and a tactical level, which is constituted, in particular, by the Tarpon, Rapace and Guépard modules[57], including structures and joint logistic capabilities.

229.   In addition, the sovereignty and presence forces spread over selected geographical areas[58] provide an immediate response capability as part of the *ENU* framework which could, according to the situation, be reinforced with operational and tactical capabilities.

Sustainability

230.   On account of its very essence, the duration of a military operation corresponds less and less to the political tempo, which is cadenced by the level of acceptance of the intervention by public opinion and risks of the situation becoming bogged down. To guarantee consistency of action and more broadly, to enable the accomplishment of the desired end state, the Armed Forces must have both endurance and continuous supply, which will enable them to fulfil their mission.

231.   The aptitude of the Armed Forces to last in a non permissive, deteriorated or clearly hostile environment is imperative at the human (importance of operational readiness), material (hardening and strength) and force level (ability to command and act in an autonomous or decentralized manner). Force protection supports this objective[59].

Versatility

232.   Two strategic factors compel the Armed Forces to guarantee their versatility no matter what, i.e. their ability to achieve a wider range of missions:

a.   the relevancy of the national security concept, reaffirmed in LBDSN-2013. It implies a defence/security continuum and the involvement of the Armed Forces within the national territory for crisis management or protection missions[60];

b.   on external theatres; the diversity of enemy courses of action generates various threats during one same operation.

233.   Versatility is also necessary to the dynamic synergy of efforts (shift between missions).

Interoperability and Interaction

234.   In addition to the necessary interoperability already mentioned, both at the national and joint level, and within coalitions, the ability to interact with nations is recommended. It involves a particular effort when nations have not adopted NATO standards yet.

235.   This objective requires the ability to gather nations, then to work efficiently as part of an ad hoc coalition. In a theatre, it also implies the capacity for mentoring and monitoring, education and training (military assistance), and interaction with foreign security forces, based on NATO or ad hoc standards.

236.   Interoperability varies according to a double ladder linked to the duration of the mission and intensity of the desired or possible cooperation.

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[55]   Cf. PIA-7.0.1, under development. *ENU: Échelon national d'urgence.*
[56]   *PCIAT: Poste de commandement interarmées de théâtre.*
[57]   Cf. PIA-7.0.1.1_GUÉPARD(2013), *Directives de mise sur pied du dispositif GUÉPARD*, no. D-13-010873/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/DR as of 12 September 2013.
[58]   Cf. PIA-3.36 *Commandement interarmées permanent hors du territoire métropolitain*, no. D-116006137/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP as of 10 August 2011.
[59]   Cf. DIA-3.14, *Protection de la force*, under development.
[60]   Cf. DIA-3.32; PIA-3.31; PIA-3.32_CONTRAT-OPS-PROT(2102); PIA-3.33_PPS-A(2014).

237.   To put it simple, actions can range as follow:

        a.   operational military assistance (in the context of a crisis) through education and training, and through the supervision on the ground of military forces at the tactical level, then through partnership;

        b.   technical military assistance (in the long term);

        c.   regional interoperability (as part of ad hoc coalitions);

        d.   extensive operational and technical interoperability within NATO or with nations that have adopted the standards.

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Section I – Theory

301.   In brief, a military engagement may be divided into several successive or concomitant stages:

a.   knowledge of the theatre / "intelligence" preparation, including in the information environment and cyberspace (in conjunction with the *FIR*[61], i.e. the joint intelligence function);

b.   preventive actions;

c.   advance planning[62];

d.   pre-decision works (within the framework of the desired end state set out at the strategic level); these works include the study of the logistic and financial viability of the action considered;

e.   build-up, pre-movement and transport of the force and of its resources before projection;

f.   operations planning[63];

g.   initial response to the crisis: force projection and/or power projection (sometimes with the "initial entry" course);

h.   intervention;

i.   stabilization and transition[64];

j.   withdrawal of the force[65]; transfer of responsibility to another organization;

k.   monitoring of the actions conducted and Lessons Learned (LL).

Section II – Course of an Engagement

302.   Actually, military action is always part of a broader framework, and the adversary's behaviour does not follow any predetermined pattern. Consequently, any linear approach to the conduct of operations is irrelevant, or dangerous, since backing up is always possible, even after an initial unstable phase[66].

303.   Among the factors of operational superiority listed in CIA-01, and due to the almost systematic difference of the recent engagements with a stereotyped pattern such as prevention–coercion–stabilization–standardization, forces cultivate agility more than ever in order to adapt to highly volatile situations and to be able to *"combine joint actions, from the lowest tactical levels, without being confined to preconceived patterns"*.[67]

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[61]   *FIR: Fonction interarmées du renseignement.*
[62]   Taking into account the technical availability of resources, as well as the availability of logistic stocks.
[63]   In France, Systems Analysis is used. Cf. RDIA-008_AS(2012), *Éléments d'analyse systémique pour la planification opérationnelle*, no. 148/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 28 June 2012.
[64]   Cf. DIA-3.4.5_STAB(2010), *Contribution des forces armées à la stabilisation*, no. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 02 February 2010.
[65]   Cf. DIA-4.2.1_DESENGAGEMENT(2013), *Désengagement*, no. 199/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 25 November 2013. English version available: (FRA) JD-4.2.1_REDEPLOYMENT(2013), *Redeployment*.
[66]   Few recent crises (Kosovo, 1999) have opened with an episode of intense coercion, followed by a long stabilization period. The engagement in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force or ISAF, 2002–2014) is characterized by the regular increase of the level of violence, after several years of stabilization. Likewise, *Opération Licorne* (Ivory Coast, 2002–2013) initially aimed to initiate a process of pacification of the theatre without fight: however, peaks of military violence occurred towards the end. Conversely, the intense initial phase of *Opération Harmattan* (2011) was not preceded by a period of recovery and reconstruction by civil actors.
[67]   Cf. CIA-01, section 61, p. 21 (English version: p. 20).

304. Agility results from initiative, responsiveness and adaptability. It can be reached in the engagement thanks to different processes such as (non exhaustive list):

a. the expression of intelligence requirements, to steer the military-related intelligence cycle and acquire a deep understanding of the operational environments;

b. pre-positioned units and shift of efforts (physical environments and geography);

c. the combination or alternation of physical and psychological actions;

d. resources in reserve;

e. management of stocks and logistic flows;

f. fluidity of the joint combinations;

g. command delegations (decentralized planning, command by objectives) and evolving C2 structures.

305. Agility does not exclude planning and anticipation. It is mainly based on the ability to take a step back from the plan, make it evolve or shift effort from one line of operation to another, while remaining faithful to the spirit of the mission.

Section III – Assessment of an Engagement

306. Assessing an engagement is a complex task that includes several phases:

a. a prior evaluation, focused on the acceptable level of risk to conduct a given operation;

b. an assessment of the overall efficiency of the military action; this measure aims to check continuously if the course of the operation complies with the plan. Adaptations during the conduct of the operations enable to get closer to the desired effects. To do so, it is important to remind that the desired end state[68] is global, and that the military should not carry the entire responsibility of the result of the campaign, of which they were just one of the actors.[69] The characterization of military actions should be favoured at the tactical and especially at the operational level, not for their modalities but for their effects and the measure of the degree of achievement of these effects.

c. an assessment of the performance in the course of the engagement, based on technical criteria: for instance, an operation's cost-effectiveness, lessons learned from the choices made in terms of command organization and of the implementation of weapons systems, etc.

d. a final assessment of the results.

307. Overall, the dynamic and uncompromising analysis of the lessons learned is not a goal in itself. As recommended by CIA-01[70], it must contribute to the development of the forces' ability to cope with complex and rapidly changing operational environments.

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[68] Cf. DC-004_GIATO(2013) defines a desired end state as *"a situation to obtain at the end of an operation, giving practical shape to the achievement of the political objective [...]. It is included to the mandate given to the Armed Forces. It is stated before operations planning and is approved by the authority initiating the planning, which enables to determine success criteria."*

[69] Therefore, the securing of maritime routes in a given area (Horn of Africa) has been successfully and efficiently accomplished, as part of a general operation of counter-piracy and reinforcement of the security of the riparian states, whose performance can only be precisely assessed in the medium/long term.

[70] Cf. CIA-01, section 65, p. 22 (English version: p. 21).

Chapter 4
Operating Principles for the Employment of Forces

401.   This chapter lays out principles to respect for the employment of forces, in compliance with the factors of operational superiority listed in CIA-01, especially agility and the ability to cope with evolving environments.

402.   A campaign is planned around main actions to accomplish during an engagement (command, prepare an intervention, intervene). Nonetheless, the eight joint functions[71] of the NATO doctrine[72] are all integrated in the course of the next developments, as well as their implementation imperatives.

403.   The military chief is involved well upstream of the decision process leading to a military action. To do so, he first analyzes the initiating directive received from the higher level, and the specific context of the operation under his responsibility. In this regard, the knowledge of the potential opponent(s) (see Annex A), as well as of all the actors of the theatre is crucial.

404.   The operation chief coordinates at his level, and then he orders each component to execute missions and associated tactical objectives in order to reach operational-level effects. Their combination and synchronization leads to the achievement of the strategic objectives. The respective HQ's implement collaborative planning[73] processes.

405.   Below is a list of a family of generic effects:

   a.   intimidation: threaten the adversary with the use of force. This effect relies on a high level of credibility, which is based on the capacity for action, level of operational readiness, pre-deployment, quality of logistic support and stocks level;

   b.   containment: contain a threat while avoiding an entanglement with the adversary's postures;

   c.   neutralization: paralyze a threat or eliminate neutralizing actors through destruction or capture. This multifaceted fight for superiority (physical, electronic, information technology, psychological) enables the controlled use of force;

   d.   security: prevent the emergence or re-emergence of a threat, focus on the control of the environment, lines of communication, weapons and public order, in substitution or complement of local police forces. This effect implies a measured use of force;

   e.   facilitation: support the civilian actors of crisis management, as well as the local armed forces. Physical force is used in support of an external authority, within the national territory or as part of an intervention.

406.   The analysis of the operation chief isolates undesired (acceptable or non-acceptable) effects that should be anticipated or contained during the intervention, accordingly with the level of risk assumed by the chief.

407.   The campaign plan arranges the continuity of the effects chosen accordingly with logical lines of operation, characterized by decisive prerequisites that are necessary to reach the objectives and finally, the desired end state.

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[71]   Manoeuvre, fires, command and control, intelligence, information operations, sustainability, force protection, and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

[72]   Cf. AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

[73]   Collaborative planning is an expression used in the NATO COPD. It translates the reality of the planning work, namely based on interactions between the different contributors to the planning, given the volume of information to process and the complexity of the crisis factors.

Section I − Command and Control[74]

408. A single command structure guarantees unity of effort[75].

409. The employment of forces requires vertical and clear chains of command. It is therefore important that the authority in charge is clearly designated and that the relationship to the subordinate commanders is clearly specified, as well as the extent and limits of the authority exercised at each decision level. This verticality of command does not reflect a right of ownership on the resources, but rather a functional approach.

410. To this end, the *CEMA* exercises, and never delegates, Operational Command (OPCOM)[76] of military engagements.

411. This arrangement applies to the contingents of the *Gendarmerie Nationale* deployed in overseas operations along with the Armed Forces[77].

412. The *CEMA* may delegate Operational Control (OPCON)[78] to the operational-level Force Commander (FCdr) within a multinational framework, or *Commandant de la force* (*COMANFOR*) at the French national level.

413. Usually, the Special Operations component remains strictly under operational command of the *CEMA*. The *CEMA* may delegate OPCON to the Special Operations Commander (*GCOS*)[79], or to a *COMANFOR* in the case of a national operation. If OPCON is delegated to an authority other than the *GCOS* within the framework of a joint or multinational operation, the *CEMA* keeps a direct, on-going and specific liaison with the deployed units, via the *GCOS*, so as to ensure the validation of the utilization of the committed assets, the reversibility of postures and actions, and the ability to take OPCON back any time.

414. Tactical Command (TACOM) represents the authority delegated to a commander to distribute tasks to the forces placed under his command, with the view of the accomplishment of the mission ordered by the superior authority. The tactical commander utilizes his assets in a strictly defined action–space–time–organization framework.

415. Tactical Control (TACON)[80] aims to precisely guide the execution of elementary missions and tasks, within a limited area.

416. The centralization of command reaches its full efficiency when combined with subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity aims to provide at each level of command the necessary freedom of action to successfully achieve the given mission. Subordinates are encouraged to take a wider initiative while respecting the spirit of the mission. This is referred to as mission command[81].

417. At the tactical level, relationships between component commanders are regulated by the principle of "supported commander/supporting commander"[82]: assistance provided through fire, manoeuvre, provision of resources or services (e.g. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [ISR]), or combination of these four elements. There is no hierarchical relationship in this principle; it is rather a functional relationship by which the needs of the supported commander, within the framework of a mission, are met. Be that as it may, a joint integration at the lowest level and fluidity of the joint combinations are recommended so as to achieve an effect on the adversary.

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[74] Cf. DIA-3 *Le commandement des engagements opérationnels*, booklets 1–4, no. 217/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 30 July 2010.
[75] Unity of effort: in military operations, coordination and cooperation among all actors in order to achieve a common objective. (AAP-6[2014], *NATO Glossary Of Terms And Definitions [English And French]*, 2014)
[76] Operational Command (OPCOM): the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. (AAP-6)
[77] Cf. DIA-3.18_GEND-OPEX(2013), *Emploi de la gendarmerie nationale en opérations extérieures*, no. 126/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 July 2013, amended on 17 October 2013. English version available: (FRA) JD-3.18_GEND-OPEX(2013), *Deployment of the Gendarmerie Nationale in Overseas Operations.*
[78] Operational Control (OPCON): The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)
[79] *GCOS: Général commandant des opérations spéciales.*
[80] Tactical Control (TACON): The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned" by the operational controller. (AAP-6)
[81] In French, "*commandement par objectifs*". Cf. CICDE/RED paper of 16 October 2013.
[82] Cf. AAP-6.

418. These command/control relationships are applicable within a multinational framework. In any case, a national authority exercises control on the employment of the French Armed Forces and on the missions or objectives they've been assigned to. To this end, a French (Senior) National Representative (FRA NR or SNR)[83] ensures that the employment of the French forces and assets complies with the national directives. The FRA SNR is the *CEMA*'s representative to the Operation Commander (OpCdr) or to the Force. He has no operational responsibility with respect to the French forces under OPCON of the OpCdr and, by delegation, of the FCdr in most cases. A French National Contingent Commander (FRA NCC) exercises, by delegation from the *CEMA*, OPCON on the National Support Elements (NSE) and National Specific Units (*USN*)[84], except for the special case of capabilities kept under OPCON of the national strategic level. He coordinates the commitment of all the national assets. The FRA NCC relies on a synthesis assessment cell, three assistants—an intelligence assistant, a joint support assistant chief of staff (*ASIA*)[85] commanding French National Support, and a CIS assistant—and advisers.

419. France may be appointed as the framework nation[86] of a coalition: if so, it has to provide the ad hoc command structure and, usually, the most important contingent with regard to the volume of engaged forces. The planning and conduct of the operation are executed according to the current methods of the French Armed Forces, via the national CIS.

420. The analysis of the mission shapes the composition of the force and its C2 structure: the adaptation of C2 to the needs of the chief is the keyword for the organization of the command structures.

421. In this regard, it is recommended to base the organization of the HQ on a J1–J9[87] structure. Indeed, it ensures unity of command, information flow speed and joint interoperability, as well as unity with allies, in so that it reproduces NATO (and EU) standards.

422. It is important to implement a coordination system with the key actors of crisis management or external partners. Indeed, most of the time, the force's contribution is only the military component of a multidisciplinary effort, taking part in a comprehensive approach to crises management. Military objectives can rarely be achieved and maintained without civilian actors, with whom military chiefs continuously communicate with, so as to ensure coordination of the respective actions.

423. **For more details, confer to Annex D (J3 – Operation).**

Section II − Knowing and Understanding, Preparing an Intervention

424. Prior to the engagement of the force, it is important to acquire knowledge of the environment and adversary. Several fields are to be exploited:

    a. the physical and cultural characteristics of the area of operations;

    b. the political context, but not limited to the theatre only;

    c. relationships between the actors of the crisis: adversaries, populations, allies, organizations and civilian agencies;

    d. evolution of these fields over time.

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[83] Cf. DIA-3, *Le commandement des engagements opérationnels*, booklets 1–4, no. 217/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 30 July 2010.

[84] *USN: Unité spécifique nationale.*

[85] *ASIA: Adjoint soutien interarmées.*

[86] Cf. DIA-3. Framework nation: nation which, after having volunteered, receive a political and/or military mandate to take charge, at the strategic, operational or tactical levels of war, of the command responsibilities.

[87] The organization of HQ, in addition to joint branches J1 to J9, may include a JMED (Joint Medical, individualized J4 cell). This cell is implemented if the deployed medical support is superior to Role/Echelon 1 (first aid, immediate lifesaving measures, and triage). In a structure such as a multinational HQ, the term used is JMED, whereas in the framework of the French National Support structure, the term used is *DIRMED (Directeur médical)*. The *DIRMED* or JMED is always subordinate to the DCOS Sp (Deputy Chief of Staff Support) or *ASIA* (joint support assistant chief of staff).

425.	Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)[88] and Military-Related Intelligence (MRI) feeds into situational awareness, which in turns leads to better understanding[89]. Understanding highlights the necessary prerequisites to successfully obtain the desired effect and arrangement of the military or any other activities. In that area, the OSINT available in real time leads to significantly accelerate the cycle of production and dissemination of MRI, to which it contributes.

426.	By its very nature, military action consists in understanding and managing risks, rather than removing threats. It is an ongoing continuous process which requires the constant re-evaluation of the environmental factors to which the force is subject.

427.	However, the efficient management of ever growing flows of information is imperative, as it could overload or inhibit the decision-making capacity of the military chief and his Force Headquarters (FHQ). The objective is to acquire information superiority: knowledge of the battle space, security of the information flows, cyberdefence.

428.	In parallel to the acquisition of knowledge, the military chief has to generate a force, then to intellectually, morally and materially prepare it. This includes an effort of acculturation to the conditions of the theatre, and, in a multinational campaign, to the practices and procedures of the partners integrated to a coalition (military cultural awareness).

429.	Operational training also includes actions in the information environment, as part of the influence military strategy specific to the operation (compatible with the NATO concept of strategic communications) and applied at the operational level (Info Ops processes). The objective is to shape, as early as possible, the behaviours of the adversary and other actors on the theatre, and with whom the force will interact, in order to increase the efficiency of friendly actors, reduce the freedom of action and bend the will of the adversary, while increasing the population's level of acceptance to the deployed coalition and its objectives.

430.	Achieving and maintaining decisional superiority is another imperative[90], in that the decreased ability of the adversary to make timely and well-grounded decisions greatly reduces or paralyzes its capacity for action. This implies a faster decision and order dissemination process than that of the opponents to the coalition.

431.	**For more details, confer to Annex C (J2 – Intelligence and Security) and Annex G (J6 – Signal).**

Section III − Intervening

432.	First, it is necessary to deploy and build up the force in a given space and time frame. The projected components gradually complete the disposition of the pre-deployed elements (land or air forces of presence, assets positioned in high seas or in the space, CIS, cyber, etc.) and of those operating from France.

433.	Acquiring, then maintaining air and maritime superiority is a prerequisite to any deployment of the force on the ground. This superiority may be already acquired or obtained with arms within a variable timeframe.

434.	Finally, if the family of effects is set on neutralization (see § 405c.), the decisive joint engagement uses at best: the tempo given to the action, simultaneity of effort, surprise, the exploitation of initiative and the ability to dictate the course of events to the adversary[91]. It is also recommended to prevent the adversary from reorganizing itself while maintaining a high level of uncertainty regarding the intents of the friendly coalition.

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[88]	Cf. DIA-2, *Renseignement d'intérêt militaire et contre ingérence (RIM & CI)*, no. 240/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 10 of October 2010.
[89]	*"Within a military context, understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making."* AJP-2(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine For Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence And Security*, under ratification.
[90]	Cf. DIA-3.9_CIBLAGE_SUP-FR-AJP-3.9, *Ciblage interarmées: Supplément national à la doctrine OTAN Joint Targeting*, no. 006/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 10 January 2014.
[91]	The fundamental qualities to possess can be summarized as "neither slow, nor heavy, nor predictable".

435.	To this end, the process of the joint manoeuvre concentrates the combat potential on where it can break down the enemy defences. However, the inherently asymmetric nature of the opponent faced in the most likely engagements, enables it to preserve its living forces from friendly offensive actions. The manoeuvre focuses the use of force on identified vulnerabilities in order to weaken centres of gravity[92], as well as the intellectual and morale components of the adversary's combat potential.

436.	Indirect approach offers the prospect of obtaining results that are out of proportion with the volume of friendly forces engaged. Therefore, it is possible to send strong signals to the adversary through the reinforcement of pre-positioned units (creation of a favourable balance of power). This approach clearly states the risks to which the adversary is exposed if it pursues its intents.

437.	In most cases, at the tactical level, no component is capable of achieving a mission by its own means. Consequently, a joint operation is the rule, as well as the corresponding combinations. More than a mere coordination, the integration of effects proposed by the components is recommended down to the lowest tactical echelons, to support the engaged forces.

438.	Joint operations are usually deployed in all physical environments and immaterial fields (land, air, sea, under the sea, extra-atmospheric space, cyberspace, electromagnetic space and information environment). The use of a synchronized combination of actions of the different components is imperative in order to ensure certain operational functions. So, in both the planning and conduct of an operation, the objective is to set up processes to limit any risk of a friendly fire incident and of interference, in any physical and immaterial field, between the actors of the operation, should they be military (land, sea, air, Special Operations and *Gendarmerie Nationale* components) or civilians, down to the lowest tactical level. This is the responsibility of the FCdr (operational level). He may delegate it to some component commanders.

439.	The employment of forces cannot be modelled. However, operational tasks can be sorted into four different types based on desired effects:

a.	offensive missions that aim to neutralize an adversary or chase it from a given geographical area;

b.	defensive missions that aim to prevent, counter or reduce the scope of an adversary's action;

c.	intelligence, surveillance and security missions in a given space, for knowledge and anticipation purposes, that aim to detect any threat as soon as possible, and to actively counter it if needed, in order to preserve freedom of action;

d.	logistics and combat support missions that aim to intervene in favour of other forces, or governmental or non-governmental organizations, through combat, protection or the provision of services and resources.

440.	Missions are combined in time and space so as to produce the desired operational effects. These combinations provide operational and tactical courses of action. A course of action is characterized by:

a.	the choice of a direct, indirect or mixed approach;

b.	the balance between physical effects and effects on behaviours;

c.	the coordination of actions;

d.	the operational tempo.

441.	A key function is to protect the force[93] by preserving its potential while facing technological threats (especially cyber actions[94], CBRN attacks[95]), human threats (insurrection, attacks from within), and natural disasters.

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[92]	Cf. Annex J, Lexicon.
[93]	Cf. DIA-3.14, *Protection de la force*, under development.
[94]	Cf. DIA-3.40_CYBER(2014), *Cyberdéfense*, no. 82/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 18 March 2014.
[95]	Cf. DIA-3.8(A)_NRBC(2012), *NRBC*, no. 015/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 11 January 2012.

442. It is necessary to support the force during the engagement. It ensures the freedom of action that the military chief aims to maintain under all circumstances. Indeed, a badly organized or integrated logistics support is likely to slow down the tempo of operation. Joint (as much as possible) support combines logistics and administration support. As a result, it contributes to the reconfiguration capacity, which is a prerequisite to the dynamic conduct of the engagement and ensures agility.

443. Supporting a force in the long term requires the maintenance of a sufficient logistics flow. This flow depends on the force's ability to secure the air, sea, and land supply and transport routes, as well as port and airport infrastructures.

444. In operation, the logistics of a unit is a national responsibility. Therefore, each nation exercises Administrative Control (ADCON)[96] with regard to the provision of logistics and administrative support to its units. However, in a coalition, for synchronization and consistency purpose, the FCdr exercises Logistic Control (LOGCON)[97] on the logistic assets deployed in his area of responsibility.

445. **For more details, see annexes D (Operations), E (Logistics) and H (Military Influence Strategy and Info Ops).**

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[96] Administrative control (ADCON): Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (AAP-6)

[97] The authority delegated to a commander (of a NATO or EU operation) over logistic units and services within his joint operations area, including National Support Elements (NSE), and which enable him to synchronize, set priorities and integrate their logistic activities and functions so as to fulfil the theatre joint mission. LOGCON does not give authority over the NSE's own national resources, except if they are the object of agreements and specific employment principles. (AAP-6)

Different Forms of Military Strategies of Enemies or Potential Opponents

A01. Military strategies are the art of employing forces so as to impose one's will on an opponent. They particularly aim to submit the latter to a given operational tempo. There are two categories of military strategy:

    a. direct confrontation: when confronted with symmetric or asymmetric adversaries (direct confrontation between adversaries, one of them with less important operational capabilities compared to the other);

    b. indirect confrontation: this field covers confrontation with an asymmetric adversary (guerilla or harassment combat).

A02. An asymmetric adversary may shift from direct confrontation to indirect confrontation according to circumstances.

A03. These two types of confrontation include various operation modes.

Conventional Combat

A04. The enemy follows a conventional confrontation approach. The military potential of the adversary, its ability to mobilize its resources, and the denial of the utilization of physical environments and immaterial fields to friendly forces determine the context and configuration of a military campaign. Conflict is settled before all by a military equation, since the desired end state will primarily be achieved through the engagement of military forces.

Combat Refusal (Avoidance Strategy)

A05. In order to reach its objectives, an adversary refuses conventional military confrontation and rather prefers exploiting non-military vulnerabilities, especially those linked to the political will of the commitment. Confrontation mainly occurs in the information environment. The adversary adopts a long-term strategy. It favours craftiness, terror, manipulation, and disinformation so as to:

    a. weaken the political determination of the governments;

    b. delegitimize the action of the military forces in the eyes of local populations;

    c. weaken support from public opinions and the international community;

    d. weaken the coalition's cohesion.

A06. Against this type of strategy, the political dimension is significant: definition of the purposes of the war, political support to military action, comprehensive approach. Military action supports this will.

Limited Combat (Preserving One's Gains)

A07. If after an initial military action, the full victory doesn't seem realistic, the adversary limits its ambitions by accepting to freeze the combat to:

    a. save time, reconstitute and retake the initiative later on;

    b. sustain the situation to its advantage, by building on weariness and a decline of determination;

    c. limit the engagement of its forces in combats of uncertain outcome.

A08.   Crisis continues as long as military successes are not strengthened by a long-term political solution.

Access Denial

A09.   The adversary develops and implements superiority military capabilities (air, submarine, ballistic, or nuclear) or dual capabilities (cyber, space) in order to make the initialization of a military conflict risky or costly. This strategy can be part of a purely regional framework or of a larger international vision.

A10.   Highly challenging access to physical environments and immaterial fields requires a strong military engagement with crucial initial entry capabilities. Preventive political action (control of the proliferation of weapons) is of paramount importance.

Transfer

A11.   In order to achieve its political objective, the adversary evades military confrontation by transferring to a third the political irritation which might lead to a conflict. It can reinforce its legitimacy by involving a third to a conflict of another nature. The resolution of the crisis is mainly achieved by a strong political commitment.

Grey Area

A12.   The adversary takes advantage of the hosting by a friendly nation, failed state or grey area (or global commons, particularly in high seas) to hide, develop and implement its nuisance capabilities.

A13.   Confinement, and possibly the overall resolution of the crisis, requires a double political and military action. The complex issue of the adversary and possible grey areas requires a determined political commitment.

Importation of the Conflict

A14.   The adversary uses diaspora and other lobby groups to activate or neutralize the political or military will of the friendly force towards a direction that is in its favour, so as to develop and implement its nuisance capabilities. A long-term political commitment is necessary to develop the resilience of the population and national cohesion, so as to limit the adverse effects of this course of action.

Destabilizing Combat (Limitless War)

A15.   The enemy paralyses the friendly action by conducting a war following rules that do not fit with any Western standards, in terms of legislation as well as of strategy and tactics. The solution is complex and requires politico-military adaptation skills. The education and training of the political and military executives is the only guarantee of the necessary reaction capabilities.

"Delegitimization/Demonization"

A16.   The adversary tries to undermine the legitimacy of the military action in order to reach its goals without intervention or military response from the Force. To do so, it can:

    a.   block the political process authorizing the use of force thanks to a game of alliances or support, mainly within the Security Council. The exit of crisis results from a political commitment;

    b.   compel the Force to a premature withdrawal by manipulating an incident (unacceptable collateral damages, blunders, unbearable friendly losses, etc.) after the setting of a media trap or after a tactical mistake of the friendly forces. The solution is first, military, and then, quickly political in order that the resolution last. The establishment and respect of an indisputable legal framework, and strict rules of engagement and of behaviour are essential guarantees. Without these principles, then mutual trust and the determined commitment of politicians in conjunction with the military are needed to ensure the control of such incidents.

J1 – Personnel and Administration

Guiding Principles

B01.   The military is likely to be deployed anytime, anywhere, and fight in the name of the Nation. The military apply lethal force against an opponent who does not hesitate to use it. The legitimate power to fight and cause death is vested in no other state agent, since it is more powerful than the exercise of self-defence as understood in the case of internal security forces, for instance.

B02.   War is a confrontation of wills. The human factor is therefore at the core of the conduct of operations and of their success. To this end, it must be properly assessed.

B03.   Human resources and a high morale are two of the three pillars of the Armed Forces' operational potential[98].

Human Potential

B04.   Human potential results from the interaction between human resources and high morale. As a key factor to operations, it is an operational efficiency multiplier which increases the performance of forces.

B05.   Military in operations are subject to constant operational stress, the intensity of which varies from one theatre to another, type of mission and associated risks. Confronted with death, physical risks (wounded), psychological risks affecting individuals, and psycho-social risks affecting groups, the military develops stress responses which may have significant consequences on the operational potential.

J1 Scope

B06.   J1 gathers a set of functions, actions, and processes to benefit the human dimension of operations:

    a.   the objective of the function Manpower is the rational distribution of resources in qualified personnel, in order to efficiently man operational posts (HQ, forces in being, detachments);

    b.   the objective of psychological support is the prevention, control and resolution of anxiety-provoking situations, and the preservation of individual and collective psychological balance, in order to sustain the forces' operational capabilities. Psychological support is a coordinated action of command, and is especially based on the medico-psychological expertise of the military health service;

    c.   religious support is ensured by military chaplains. Its objective is to provide cultural, spiritual and morale support to the personnel deployed in operation asking for it. It is a legal obligation required from the command, even though the latter retains the prerogative to its implementation;

    d.   social support aims to best accommodate the familial life of the personnel and particular constraints of the military condition, especially in case of deployment or projection.

B07.   In the context of a deployment of personnel in operations, J1 is part of a cycle: from the preparation to a mission to the follow-up of individuals after a mission, and to the different dimensions of support (morale, psychological, material, religious and social).

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[98]   The third pillar is material resources.

Responsibilities

B08.   The J1 doctrine addresses all the hierarchical levels of the administrative and operational chain of command, as well as the specialized services and directorates involved in the preparation, support and follow-up of the personnel in operation, before, during and after a deployment.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

B09.   The J1 reference document is DIA-1.0_PERS(2013), *Personnel en opérations*.

B10.   This document fills a gap in terms of doctrine regarding the human component of our forces in operations. It structures J1 knowledge and gives it more doctrinal importance, so that it can be properly taken into account. The document focuses on personnel issues during operations.

B11.   DIA-1.0_PERS(2013) is complemented by some joint publications. It will be amended to integrate issues on harassment[99] and on the personnel welfare during operations.

At NATO Level

B12.   J1 seems to be poorly addressed since there is no AJP or main publication. It is currently limited to a few handbooks in terms of psychological support.

At EU Level

B13.   The joint branch is shortly addressed in section 'J1 – Personnel and administration' of the *EU HQ Manning Guide*.

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[99]   In compliance with the ministerial action plan on sexual harassment, discrimination and violence within the Armed Forced, as presented on 15 April 2014.

Guiding Principles

C01.   The action of forces in the military-related intelligence field is organized through the implementation of a transverse joint function to the operational and administrative chains: the intelligence joint function or *FIR* (*Fonction interarmées du renseignement*), commonly referred to as the Intelligence Function.

C02.   The *FIR* is based on permanent and contingency structures, connected as chains, as well as through a network of partners. These structures may be dedicated to intelligence or have other main missions. This function includes the range of staff, assets (material, doctrines and regulatory texts) and organizations under the authority of the *CEMA*. They all contribute to the development process of military-related intelligence.

Intelligence Function

C03.   **At the strategic level**, the *FIR* continuously supplies national decision-making bodies on defence matters. It provides support to the design and conduct of foreign policy, especially with respect to possible crises, ongoing conflicts, military balances and proliferation of weapons. It actively participates in the work of the strategic anticipation group or *GAS* (*Groupe d'anticipation stratégique*) and contributes to the launch of the pre-decision-making process of the strategic planning of the engagement of forces.

C04.   **At the operational level**, the *FIR* provides an evaluation of the capabilities and intents of the adversaries, decision-makers and main actors that are involved. It evaluates the effects of the environment on both enemy and friendly operations. It intervenes in the decision-making process to:

   a.   contribute to the definition and choice of possible options based on the mission, environment, and adversaries;

   b.   enlighten the commander on the criteria for success or efficiency of the action;

   c.   determine the enemy's capabilities to counter or control;

   d.   identify and characterize the objectives (in both the physical environments and immaterial fields) to favour with regard to the adversary.

C05.   In addition, it enables the FCdr to assess the level of acceptance of the force by the population.

C06.   **At the tactical level**, during the engagement, the *FIR* provides the data necessary to the conduct and evaluation of ongoing actions, and to the planning of future actions.

J2 Scope

C07.   J2 develops and sustains the necessary knowledge to the course of the predictable or planned operations. The chief addresses questions via the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) in order for J2 to respond.

C08.   It ensures the protection as far as possible of the national high command from strategic surprise.

C09.   It evaluates the capabilities and intents of the adversaries, decision-makers and actors involved. To this end, it assesses the environment and its evolution regarding the current and future operations.

C10.   J2 supports the planning and force protection (Systems Analysis, targeting-related intelligence).

C11.	It leads to the collection and exploitation of information on the adversary's living forces and on the operational environment (security evaluation, management of the CCIR).

C12.	It contributes to the preservation of initiative by anticipating the actions of conventional or irregular adversaries.

C13.	It assesses the extent of the necessary measures to force protection. To this end, J2 is strongly coordinated to the Counter-Intelligence (CI) branch.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

C14.	The reference document is DIA-2 (2010), *Renseignement d'intérêt militaire et contre-ingérence*, which will be updated in 2014.

C15.	J2 fields are subject to specific documents (HUMINT, ISTAR,[100] etc.).

C16.	Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and knowledge development are not formalized by doctrines; they are addressed in joint doctrine notes (*RDIA*[101]).

C17.	Cyber-related intelligence is currently under development so as to determine if it could integrate J2.

At NATO Level

C18.	AJP-2(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*, 2014 (under ratification) is the J2 reference document.

C19.	It is complemented with the following documents:

  a.	AJP-2.1, *Intelligence Procedures* (NR);

  b.	AJP-2.2, *Counter-Intelligence and Security Procedures* (NR);

  c.	AJP-2.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Human Intelligence (HUMINT)* (NR);

  d.	AJP-2.5, *Handling of Captured Personnel, Equipment and Documents*;

  e.	AJP-2.7, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance*.

C20.	In addition, NATO is currently developing doctrines on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).

At EU Level

C21.	As a main document: *EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-Led Military Operations*, Council Doc. 14092/10, 27 September 2010.

C22.	*ISTAR Concept for EU Crisis Management and EU-led Crisis Management Operations*, Revision 1, 7759/07, 23 March 2007.

C23.	*EU concept for Geospatial Information*, Council Doc. 11124/08, 25 June 2008.

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[100]	HUMINT: Human Intelligence; ISTAR: Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.
[101]	*RDIA: Réflexion doctrinale interarmées.*

Guiding Principles

D01.   J3 addresses the main organizational and operating principles of the national command of operational engagements, i.e. the politico-military orientation, planning, coordination, conduct and operational assessment of the French forces engaged in operations and operational missions, in a national or multinational context, within the French territory or abroad.

C2 Function

D02.   J3 is structured by the national, enlarged, or multinational joint "Command and Control" (C2) function.

D03.   C2 engages and manoeuvres military action capabilities in the physical, human or immaterial (cyberspace) environments, most often within a multinational and interministerial framework, so as to contribute to the achievement of long-term or short-term political objectives.

D04.   The permanence and continuity of the C2 function are ensured by the military chain of command.

D05.   Terms used for the relations of command/subordination should exclusively belong to the military vocabulary defined by AAP-6 and DIA-3 (see Chapter 4, Section I of the present document).

Operational Engagements

D06.   J3 covers all the types of engagements described in CIA-01.

D07.   These operational engagements are:

    a.   overseas operations;

    b.   missions on the national territory or homeland missions;

    c.   operational missions of all type, placed under the *CEMA*'s command (missions under the permanent postures for security, prevention, cooperation, contribution to the state action, etc.).

Fundamentals of the Operational Level (Joint Force Commander)

D08.   Interoperability of the national operations command structures (C2) with, for instance, NATO C2 structures, is necessary, even imperative.

D09.   In any case, the operational level should have capabilities to:

    a.   take into account the political will and its translation in concrete and measurable effects on the theatre of operations;

    b.   assess the operational situation in the light of the achievement of political objectives, which results in the desired end state;

    c.   define the acceptable level of risk for the force and the mission;

    d.   coordinate and integrate operations with other power tools;

    e.   synchronize all the effects (physical and immaterial) likely to happen in the theatre;

    f.   coordinate the efforts by assigning missions and operational tasks to the subordinate commanders and by allotting them forces and resources;

g. conduct some actions chosen at this level, but not delegated at the tactical level;

h. define the logistic needs and the setting of priorities, as well as the conduct of the logistic manoeuvre;

i. define information requirements and the setting of priorities, as well as the conduct of the intelligence manoeuvre;

j. manage and employ the operational reserve.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

D10. The J3 reference document is DIA-3 *Le commandement des engagements opérationnels* (currently being updated).

D11. J3 fields are subject to specific documents.

At NATO Level

D12. The NATO J3 reference document is AJP-3 (B) *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* (2011).

D13. It is complemented with the following documents:

a. MC 324/2 (Final), *The NATO Military Command. Structure (NCS)*, 16 February 2010;

b. *Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations*, 26 July 2013 (NATO restricted): it completes the description of the NATO Command Structure for the deployable force.

D14. In addition, the doctrinal corpus of J3 fields is particularly developed.

At EU Level

D15. One key document: MIL C2 010688/08.

Guiding Principles

E01.   In France, J4 refers to support (*"soutien"*), a major operational function. It ensures the combination and scheduling of the different activities set up to sustain the engaged forces in order to facilitate their deployment, life, action, combat, regeneration, recovery and duration.

Support Cycle and Categories

E02.   Support is inherently joint. There are two main types of context:

   a.   a cycle divided into three phases:

      (1)   acquisition logistics, which covers the search, design, development, building and reception of material;

      (2)   production logistics, which intervenes after acquisition essentially for the reception, storage, transport, distribution and maintenance of the equipment and resources necessary to the forces. This type of support includes daily military administration tasks;

      (3)   consumption logistics, which uses the means acquires and prepared during the two phases mentioned above. It intervenes between the preparation of an action and the operational engagement.

   b.   a cycle made of two categories of support:

      (1)   specialized support (*soutien spécialisé*): one of the three categories of production logistics that is exclusively provided by a certain number of organizations, which may be functional, joint or interministerial, usually specialized around a logistics or military administration sub-function;

      (2)   specific support (*soutien spécifique*): one of the three categories of production logistics that ensures the maintenance of operational readiness of the materiel specifically dedicated to the three environments (land, sea, air).

Responsibilities

E03.   The *CEMA* is responsible for the support function and is assisted by the *MGA*[102] (vice-chief of the Defence Staff). To this end, a governance and steering system is implemented under his responsibility, especially via the deputy chief of staff Performance. The latter ensures the consistency of joint support in conjunction with the Armed Forces, directorates and services.

Support to Operational Engagements

At the Strategic Level

E04.   To support operational engagements, it is necessary to mobilize and transport production logistics' assets and resources to make them available to consumption logistics. This process is ensured by a joint organization. In this framework, joint visibility and tracking of critical resources are necessary to the continuity of the support chain in favour of operations. This especially applies to supplies.

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[102]   *MGA: Major général des armées.*

E05.   Strategic-level command is ensured by the *CEMA*, via the *CPCO* (defence operations centre) which relies on and takes advice from the *CSOA* (operations and movement and transport support centre)[103], responsible for the joint conduct and coordination of support in operational engagements, in conjunction with the FHQ and other specialized organizations and cells.

At the Operational Level

E06.   The operational level is the key echelon for the coordination of support provided to an operation. The designation of an *ASIA* (joint support assistant chief of staff) next to a FCdr is necessary when engagements are taking a significant dimension in terms of geographical area, duration and resources deployed, including on the national territory. The *ASIA* is responsible for the organization and conduct of support at the operational level. He exercises this responsibility as early as the launch of the operation.

E07.   Likewise, as early as the operation planning phase and so as to anticipate the upgrading of operational readiness of the force, *EMA/CPCO* assigns one of the three services as a main supporting contributor.

At the Tactical Level

E08.   Each component HQ has a support/logistics chief who relies on J1, J4 and J8.

Support Functional Scope

E09.   The key function Support covers two operational sub-functions:

a.   the operational function "logistics", which includes ten sub-functions: movement control and transport, personnel welfare during operations, hygiene and security during operations, maintenance of operational readiness, environmental protection during operations, individual support, medical support, ammunition support, Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant (POL) support, infrastructure support;

b.   the operational function "military administrative support", which includes administrative support, financial support and legal support.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

E10.   The J4 reference document is DIA-4(B)_SOUT(2013), *Doctrine du soutien*, made of three booklets: support to operational engagements, support sub-functions, and annexes.

E11.   This doctrine overlaps the joint doctrine note RDIA-2013/003_SOUT(2013), *Soutien*, no. 101/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 17 June 2013.[104]

E12.   DIA-4(B)_SOUT(2013) is complemented by specific doctrines on the logistic sub-functions or transverse functions, issued or to be issued during the 2014–2016 cycle.

At NATO Level

E13.   The reference document is AJP-4(B), *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*, which is currently being updated. It is complemented with more recent documents:

a.   MC 319/2, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*, edition 2004, currently under revision;

b.   *Bi-SC Allied Joint Operational Guidelines for Logistics*, 15 February 2013;

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[103]   *CSOA: Centre de soutien des opérations et des acheminements*. The *CSOA* is the *maître d'ouvrage délégué* (deputy foreman) of the support to operational engagements, movement and transport. Its official creation is planned for 01 July 2014.
[104]   English version available: (FRA) JDN-2013/003_SUP(LOG)(2013), *Support (LOG)*.

c.   MC 586/1, *MC Policy for Allied Forces and their Use for Operations,* 2012, which covers logistics at the operational level;

d.   *Bi-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations (CFAO)*, 26 July 2013, which will be the reference document for logistics at the tactical level (theatre).

At EU Level

E14.   In terms of doctrine, the EU is in line with NATO. The EU publishes only complementary documents specific to its needs. In terms of support, the reference document is *EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations*, of 04 April 2011.

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Guiding Principles

Types of Planning

F01.   There are two main types of planning: advance and implementation (or execution) planning.

Advance Planning

F02.   Advance planning is the planning process established without a declared crisis, either to face a possible or likely threat, or as a study to strengthen or feed politico-military guidelines, without implying an operational engagement at this stage.

Implementation (or Execution) Planning

F03.   To respond to an imminent or declared crisis, implementation or execution planning aims to prepare an operation plan which is most likely to be implemented in the short term.

F04.   Emergency planning, executed in the event of a sudden crisis, is a particular case of implementation planning.

Operations Planning

F05.   Strictly speaking, operations planning is a process defining the military channels, means and modalities to reach the expected situation at the end of an operation or desired end state. It usually results in an operation plan.

F06.   Operations planning is a constant collaborative process between the decision-making levels (strategic, operational and tactical), and is translated at each level into specific plans and orders.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

F07.   The reference document in terms of strategic level operations planning is DIA-5(B)_A&PS(2013), *Anticipation et planification stratégiques*, no. 134/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 16 July 2013.

F08.   A joint publication on operational level operations planning (PIA-5) is currently being rewritten for summer 2014.

F09.   National documents in terms of planning, both at strategic level (DIA-5) and operational level (PIA-5), refer to the NATO planning processes and methods, in line with the EU and UK practices.

At NATO Level

F10.   The J5 reference document is AJP-05, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*, 2013, although it addresses planning at the operational level only.

F11.   It is complemented with the following documents:

   a.   MC 133/4, *NATO's Operations Planning*: exposes the different phases of the Operations Planning Process (OPP) to apply to any type of operations planning;

b.   *Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD)*, 2013: describes the procedures and planning tools implemented at the strategic and operational levels;

c.   *NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH)* precisely develops the operations assessment processes.

At EU Level

F12.   In terms of planning, the EU uses NATO methods and adapts them to its decision-making processes. It publishes only complementary documents to address its own specificities.

Guiding Principles of the CIS

G01.   Communication and Information Systems (CIS) are closely linked to the overall organization of the operational command (C2). CIS structures are defined on the bases of the command functional organization chosen for the conduct of an operation.

G02.   CIS mainly ensure the availability of secured data (Information Assurance [IA]) that are channelled through communication systems. CIS enable the efficient use, exchange, storage and aggregation of operational data via some deployed operational information systems, HQ in France, down to the smallest tactical element deployed on a theatre.

G03.   Current operations are characterized by increasingly complex architectures, rapid technological advances and exponentially increasing data exchanges that are more or less protected. The CIS field of action widens due to the increase in information requirements of different nature, tempo of military activities, expansion of weapons systems digitization, and interoperability of equipment.

G04.   CIS must also meet the requirements of multinational operations, especially NATO-led and EU-led operations, which calls for technical and doctrinal convergence.

G05.   CIS are based on fixed or mobile communications networks, from telecommunication satellites to radio equipment, by interconnecting with weapons systems.

G06.   CIS cover all the forces' needs in operations, by deploying a structure and systems enabling the exchange of information or data, ensuring their security, and contributing to their dissemination.

CIS Organization

Responsibilities

G07.   The *CPCO* J6 designs and conducts the overall manoeuvre of the CIS with the support of the *DIRISI*[105] (joint directorate for defence infrastructure networks and information systems), which is the CIS operator of the Ministry of Defence in conjunction with the service OHQ responsible for CIS units and resources.

At the Strategic Level

G08.   Strategic-level command is ensured by the *CEMA* via the *CPCO/*J6, which takes advice from the OHQ and their CIS-specialized cells. The *DIRISI* provides technical support for both planning and CIS conduct of operations, via its *CMO*[106] (implementation centres). The CIS structures projected in operations rely on ongoing systems and are part of a time of peace–times of crisis continuum.

At the Operational Level

G09.   The operational level is the key echelon for the coordination of an operation's CIS. The designation of a *COMSICIAT*[107] (information system and joint theatre command commander) next to a FCdr is necessary when engagements are taking a significant dimension in terms of geographical area, duration and resources projected, including on the national territory.

G10.   The *COMSICIAT* is responsible for the organization and conduct of CIS at the operational level, and exercises this responsibility as early as the launch of an operation.

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[105]   DIRISI: *Direction interarmées des réseaux d'infrastructure et des systèmes d'information.*
[106]   CMO: *Centres de mise en œuvre.*
[107]   COMSICIAT: *Commandant des systèmes d'information et de commandement de théâtre.*

G11. Likewise, as early as the planning phase of an operation and so as to anticipate the upgrading of operational readiness of the force, *EMA/CPCO* assigns one the three services as the *ARC*[108] (service responsible for CIS). The appointed *COMSICIAT* participates in the planning works before projection.

G12. During the projection phase, the *COMSICIAT* ensures the conduct of the CIS manoeuvre. He uses a CIS *CMO*.

At the Tactical Level

G13. Each component HQ has a CIS chief (X6) subordinate to the *COMSICIAT* for the technical dimension.

G14. He has the CIS means specific to his component and mission.

CIS Functional Scope

G15. The CIS function is mainly build around three functionalities:

    a. Communication Systems (CS): it implements the telecommunication networks, mainly with the strategic networks of the Ministry of Defence in France, satellite networks, area network and radio networks;

    b. Information Systems (IS): it implements the different systems for the management and processing of data used within the HQ;

    c. Information Assurance (IA): it covers capabilities for data protection and confidentiality.

G16. CIS must take into account cyber protection. In the theatre, the *COMSICIAT* is responsible for the implementation of measures relative to cyber protection. In the lack of a cyber cell on the theatre, he is responsible for the defensive cyberwar strategy.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

G17. The J6 reference document is DIA-6, *Les SIC en opérations* (to be issued).

G18. DIA-6 is complemented by specific doctrine documents.

At NATO Level

G19. The reference document is AJP-6, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems*, under revision since 2014 (led by the USA). It is complemented with more recent conceptual documents:

    a. MC 0593, *Minimum Level of C2* (living document);

    b. STANAG 5048, *The Minimum Scale of Connectivity for Communications and Information Systems for NATO Land Forces*.

At EU Level

G20. In terms of doctrine, the EU is in line with NATO. The EU publishes only complementary documents specific to its needs. CIS utilized during EU missions are utilized in compliance with the NATO doctrine.

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[108] *ARS: Armée responsable des SIC.*

Military Influence Strategy and Information Operations

Guiding Principles

Definitions

H01. **Military influence strategy** is the expression of effects the Armed Forces should obtain on the information environment, within the framework of a nation or coalition. Its purpose is to lead the selected audience (individual, group or organization) to act in favour of our interests and of the desired end state.

H02. **Information Operations (Info Ops)** refer to the processes of analysis, planning, conduct and assessment of the effects resulting from actions of military influence strategy. It is implemented by the operational and tactical level.

Interoperability

H03. The definitions and implementation of military influence strategy and Info Ops are interoperable with the NATO strategic communications policy (PO 0141/2009) and Info Ops doctrine (AJP-3.10).

Military Influence Strategy

H04. Military influence strategy creates and maintains an information environment favourable to an operation, based on the legitimacy of the action and credibility of the force engaged. It mainly aims to counter opposing influence strategies, support and amplify allied strategies, and rally as many initially neutral actors as possible.

H05. A military influence strategy is anticipatory, on-going, and meets the requirements of a comprehensive approach to a situation. It covers all types of engagements, from high intensity to humanitarian response.

H06. A military influence strategy implies the full understanding of the role of actors, tailoring of the information environment as soon as possible in order to facilitate later actions, and then the conduct of an effect-based influence manoeuvre, when faced with enemy manoeuvres.

H07. Military influence strategy is a strategic-level responsibility endorsed by the *CEMA*. In the *CPCO*, the main actors involved in its anticipation, definition and implementation are: J5, Cyber/EW, J/military influence, etc. A general officer, who is the military influence strategy chief, ensures overall consistency.

H08. Consistency is based on the insertion in the annual planning directive of the preparatory work on: the military influence strategy; the development of internal and external coordination mechanisms; the integration of open source intelligence, military-related intelligence and cyberdefence-related intelligence; and the seeking of interministerial synergies in terms of influence on the theatres of operations.

Info Ops

H09. The Info Ops process is interdisciplinary. It is the responsibility of the Info Ops cell of the HQ, which steers the Working Group (WG) and Info Ops Coordination Committee (CC), under an Info Ops authority.

H10.   All the capabilities of a force contribute to the Info Ops process. Among these, some operate in non-lethal ways: special actions of influence of the Special Operations Command (SOC), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Psychological Operations (PsyOp), etc. In France, they are referred as activities on perceptions and within the operational environment (*APEO*)[109].

Role of the Different Operational Levels

H11.   The strategic level receives and disseminates military influence strategy directives.

H12.   The operational level "translates" the military influence strategy into orders which should be respected by the assets in the theatre under its OPCON, and by the components. This translation integrates data relative to both behavioural effects and physical effects in a full-spectrum targeting process.

H13.   Component commanders implement their capabilities to achieve Info Ops effects, according to the coordination measures elaborated by the operational level.

H14.   Differences between components result from the significant difference of the three services in terms of human environment, and from the disparity of assets and terms of employment.

Reference Documentation

At National Level

H15.   DIA-3.10, *SMI et Info Ops* (to be issued in 2014).

At NATO Level

H16.   PO(2009)0141/2009, *NATO Strategic Communications Policy*, dated 29 September 09.

H17.   *Info Ops* MC 422/4, *Military Information Operations* (MD, June 2012) and AJP-3.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, 2009 (under review for 2014).

At EU Level

H18.   *EU Concept on Military Info Ops.*

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[109]   *APEO: Actions sur les perceptions et l'environnement opérationnel.*

Combined Joint Expeditionary Force – CJEF

I01.   Elements set out in this annex are from *CJEF User Guide*[110], Edition 1, 20 November 2012, which is coedited by the British Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and French joint centre for concepts, doctrine and experimentation (*CICDE*)[111].

I02.   The Lancaster House treaty signed by France and the United Kingdom in November 2010 has significantly reinforced the relationships between these two countries in terms of security and defence. The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) is one of their main projects. It is formed from elements of forces provided by the two nations and operating side by side, so as to respond jointly to a wide range of crises, including high-intensity operations, if needed.

I03.   The CJEF is a rapidly deployable force and is formed based on specific needs. It can gather up to two land battlegroups, one mixed air wing, and one maritime component based on a capital ship (aircraft carrier or amphibious ship). It can act within a bilateral framework or in support to NATO-led, UN-led or EU-led operations.

I04.   Although the CJEF is an early entry force, it is not meant to ensure long-term peacekeeping, interpositions or other actions by it-self. The CJEF will handover to other forces, better adapted to these tasks, after up to three months.

I05.   The strategic-level direction remains established upon agreement of the corresponding national echelons. Once the CJEF is activated, an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is set up in France or in the UK, along with a CJEF HQ and, if needed, a component HQ, is deployed on the theatre.

I06.   For each formed echelon, a supporting nation is assigned: it provides the human and technical structure of the HQ, and is complemented by the personnel provided by the other party. It was agreed that the overall costs of a joint operation between the two nations be balanced.

I07.   Interoperability, both between the different HQ and deployed units, is ensured by an extensive use of NATO doctrines and procedures complemented, when needed, by bi-national ad hoc measures.

I08.   Since its decision in 2011, the build-up of the CJEF has been gradual. In addition to the many joint works conducted by the HQ, its build-up relied on real or synthetic exercises, organized by component during the 2011–2014 period, a major joint staff exercise in June 2015 (CPX Griffin Rise, declaration of initial capacity), and a main exercise with deployment of forces planned for 2016 (LIVEX Griffin Strike, declaration of full capacity). Parts of the organization of the CJEF could already be used in operations, should the circumstances so require.

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[110] Document available on the *CICDE* website.
[111] *CICDE: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations*.

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J01.   This lexicon explains several terms and concepts, the understanding of them should be the same for all joint actors.

J02.   Most of the following terms and definitions are drawn from the French joint glossary of operational terminology[112]—which is annually updated, including NATO document sources such as AAP-6.

> **The explanatory notes are an integral part of the definitions given in the joint glossary; they are not comments or interpretations provided by the authors.**

administrative command: Authority responsible for:

a. the preparation of the forces;

b. the organization, education, training of the forces;

c. the definition and requirements to meet in all the areas contributing to the set-up and operational readiness of the forces;

d. the support to the forces;

e. the management and administration of the personnel, as well as the enforcement of the regulations regarding living conditions. It contributes to the development of the doctrine for the employment of the forces under its authority and ensures consistency between their preparation and their employment.

Note: This is usually not a joint command.

armed forces: The entire military forces of a nation. (AAP-6)

(For some nations such as France, the armed forces also include the gendarmerie.)

campaign: A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)

commandement organique : Autorité responsable :

a.   *de la préparation des forces ;*

b.   *de l'organisation, l'instruction, l'entraînement des forces ;*

c.   *de la définition et l'expression des besoins à satisfaire dans tous les domaines qui concourent à la mise et au maintien en condition des forces ;*

d.   *du soutien des forces ;*

e.   *de la gestion et de l'administration du personnel ainsi que de l'application de la réglementation relative aux conditions de vie. Elle participe à l'élaboration de la doctrine d'emploi des forces placées sous son autorité et s'assure de la cohérence entre leur préparation et leur emploi.*

Note : *Ce commandement n'est normalement pas interarmées.*

forces armées : Ensemble des forces militaires d'un pays. (AAP-6)

(Pour certains pays, dont la France, la gendarmerie fait également partie des forces armées.)

campagne : Ensemble d'opérations militaires planifiées et conduites pour atteindre un objectif stratégique dans un délai et une zone géographique donnés, impliquant généralement des forces maritimes, terrestres et aériennes.

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[112]   DC-004_GIATO(2013), *Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle*, no. 212/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 16 December 2013. Available on the *CICDE*'s website.

centre of gravity (COG): Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6)

Note:

a. The centre of gravity may be, depending on the analysis level, strategic, operational or tactical, and with a strictly military, economical, political, geographical or psychological dimension.

b. The strategic centre of gravity provides freedom of action, physical strength and the will to reach strategic objectives, whereas the operational centre of gravity provides freedom of action and the means to reach the operational objectives.

c. It can be an abstract concept (especially at the strategic level) (popular support, alliance, etc.) or a concrete concept (most of the time at the operational and tactical levels) (expeditionary corps, strategic reserve, command network, military base, etc.).

comprehensive option: Response to a crisis or conflict which includes the use of all available power instruments (diplomacy, military, information, economy).

Note: The decision of a comprehensive option is usually made during a restricted council session or within the political decision-making bodies of international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, etc.).

context of use: Defines the environment in which the forces' action is taking its course. There are two types of context:

a. a national context, in which the forces of a state operate under national command to defend the sovereignty or interests of their state, or to honour its defence agreements;

b. a multinational context, in which forces operate as part of a coalition, alliance or security organization.

This notion is different from the employment of forces in the framework of:

a. the defence of the national territory and vital interests;

b. the defence of Europe;

c. the defence of the state's worldwide strategic and power interests.

centre de gravité : Élément, matériel ou immatériel, dont un État, ou un ensemble d'États, une collectivité, une force militaire, tire sa puissance, sa liberté d'action ou sa volonté de combattre.

Note :

a. *Le centre de gravité peut être, selon le niveau d'analyse, stratégique, opératif ou tactique, et d'ordre strictement militaire, économique, politique, géographique ou psychologique ;*

b. *le centre de gravité stratégique donne la liberté d'action, la puissance ou la volonté d'atteindre les objectifs stratégiques, le centre de gravité opératif donne la liberté d'action et les moyens d'atteindre les objectifs opératifs ;*

c. *il peut être une notion abstraite (en particulier au niveau stratégique) (soutien populaire, alliance, etc.) ou concrète (ce sera le plus souvent le cas aux niveaux opératif et tactique) (corps expéditionnaire, réserve stratégique, réseau de commandement, base militaire, etc.).*

option globale : Réponse à une crise ou un conflit qui intègre l'emploi de tous les instruments de puissance (diplomatique, militaire, information, économique).

Note : l'option globale est décidée généralement en conseil restreint ou bien au sein des instances politiques des organisations internationales (OTAN, UE, ONU…).

cadre d'emploi : Définit l'environnement dans lequel se situe l'action des forces. On distingue :

a. *un cadre national, dans lequel les forces d'un État agissent sous commandement national pour défendre la souveraineté ou les intérêts de leur État, ou pour honorer ses accords de défense ;*

b. *un cadre multinational, où ces forces agissent au sein d'une coalition, d'une alliance ou d'une organisation de sécurité.*

Cette notion doit être distinguée de l'emploi des forces dans le cadre de :

a. *la défense du territoire national et des intérêts vitaux ;*

b. *la défense de l'Europe ;*

c. *la défense des intérêts stratégiques et de puissance de l'État dans le monde.*

course of action (COA): In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6)

Note: The course of action is characteristic of the operational level. However, courses of action are developed at each level accordingly with the mission.

criteria for success: Precise indicators measuring the accomplishment of a mission and defining that the desired end state has been achieved.

desired end state (DES): Situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the political objective has been achieved. It is comprehensive and includes social, military, economical, humanitarian, institutional, security, and other aspects.

Note: The criteria of success of an operation are based on the end state. At the political and strategic level, the end state covers several aspects: legal, military, economical, humanitarian, social, institutional, and security matters. The DES is part of the mandate given to the Armed Forces. It is laid down before the operations planning and approved by the authority initiating the planning, which determines criteria for success. A constant comparison is made between the situation at the moment and the DES. This assessment requires means to investigate and analyze each pillar of the crisis. The DES is comprehensive and includes a military pillar.

direct approach: In a theatre of operations, pursuit of military victory through the conduct of a frontal attack on the adversary's centre of gravity.

effect: A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (COPD, Draft Sep 09)

environment: (definition under development by the *CITA*) Set of conditions (material, morale, psychological, social) constituent of the environment of a person and defining his development and behaviour.

Note: Based on this definition, there are six physical environments: land, air, sea, extra-atmospheric space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace.

mode d'action : *Dans le processus d'appréciation, option qui permettra d'accomplir une mission ou une tâche et de contribuer à son accomplissement. De cette option découlera un plan détaillé. (AAP-6)*

Note : *Le mode d'action est caractéristique du niveau opératif. Néanmoins, les modes d'action sont développés à chaque niveau en fonction de la mission reçue.*

critère de succès : *Indicateurs précis permettant de mesurer l'accomplissement de la mission et indiquant que l'état final recherché a été atteint.*

état final recherché (EFR) : *Situation à obtenir à la fin d'une opération, concrétisant ainsi la réalisation de l'objectif politique. Il est global et recouvre plusieurs aspects : social, militaire, économique, humanitaire, institutionnel, sécuritaire, etc.*

Note : *Sa définition permet de déterminer les critères de réussite de l'opération. Au niveau politique et stratégique, l'état final recouvre plusieurs aspects (juridique, militaire, économique, humanitaire, social, institutionnel, sécuritaire). Inclus dans le mandat donné aux forces armées, il est arrêté avant la planification de l'opération et approuvé par l'autorité initialisant la planification, ce qui permet de déterminer les critères de réussite de celle-ci. L'EFR peut évoluer avec la situation. Une comparaison permanente se fait entre la situation du moment et l'EFR. Ce bilan nécessite des moyens d'investigation et d'analyse de chaque volet de la crise. L'EFR est global et comporte un volet militaire.*

approche directe : *Dans un théâtre d'opération, recherche de la victoire militaire au travers de l'attaque frontale du centre de gravité de l'adversaire.*

effet : *Résultat d'actions de force, d'autorité et/ou d'influence qui conduit à un changement de nature ou d'état de quelqu'un ou de quelque chose dans un ou plusieurs domaines ayant trait aux opérations.*

milieu : *(« environment ») - définition en cours d'étude par le CITA : Ensemble de conditions (matérielles, morales, psychologiques, sociales) constituant l'environnement d'une personne et déterminant son développement et son comportement.*

Note : *selon cette acception, il y aurait six milieux physiques : Terre, Air, Mer, Espace extra-atmosphérique, Espace électromagnétique, Cyberespace.*

FHQ key nucleus staff: Designated part of a parent administrative or operational staff, who can perform the main functions of a contingency Force Headquarters (FHQ). This nucleus includes trained and experienced personnel who master the procedures of an FHQ, and guarantee at once: the consistency and the efficiency of the staff's work and the technical functioning of each cell.

Note: This quite rigid concept of an FHQ nucleus is especially relevant as part of the multinational alert status. The use of operational modules ensures proper flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability. Since the new division of responsibilities between the forces, directorates and services, a parent HQ cannot provide all the necessary joint expertises by itself.

field, area, domain: (translation provided in LBDSN-2013) Definition under development by the *CITA*[113] (military terminology joint committee). Portion of a considered space; area, part of a space with some dynamic characteristics.

Note: A field/area/domain is a subset of an environment in which an action is conducted. For instance, a field of confrontation is part of the operational environment, where there is confrontation or risk of confrontation. The extra-atmospheric space is an environment, but not a confrontation field, since international treaties forbid the use of offensive military means in it. Battles of perceptions are conducted within the information environment.

force component: Part of a joint force or international force in operation, which corresponds to the range of capabilities provided by one of the three services.

indirect approach: In a theatre of operations, pursuit of military victory by an action on the critical vulnerabilities of an adversary's centre of gravity. This approach is part of a direct military strategy, i.e. the significant and decisive use of the military force to reach a political objective.

indirect strategy: In the military field, a strategy that consists in trying to achieve a political objective via back channels, such as the bypass and the gradual destabilization of the adversary. (EMP-60-641)

information environment: The virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. (MC 422/3)

noyau clé de PC opératif : Partie désignée d'un état-major parent, organique ou opérationnel, permettant d'assurer les principales fonctions d'un PC opératif de circonstance. Ce noyau clé comprend du personnel entraîné et expérimenté qui maîtrise les procédures d'un PC opératif et garantit d'emblée : la cohérence et l'efficacité du travail d'état-major, et le fonctionnement technique de chacune des cellules.

Note : le concept, assez rigide, de noyau-clé de PC opératif est surtout pertinent dans le cadre de la tenue d'alerte multinationale. L'emploi des modules opératifs permet souplesse, réactivité et adaptabilité au plus juste besoin. Depuis la nouvelle répartition d'attribution des armées, directions et services, un état-major parent ne peut pas à lui seul fournir l'ensemble des expertises interarmées nécessaires.

champ : (« field, area, domain » - c'est la traduction qu'en donne le LBDSN) - Définition en cours d'étude par le CITA : Portion d'espace considérée ; zone, portion de l'espace douée de certaines propriétés dynamiques.

Note : Un champ serait donc un sous-ensemble d'un milieu, dans lequel une action est menée. Par exemple, un champ de confrontation est une partie de l'environnement opérationnel, où il y a confrontation ou risque de confrontation. L'espace extra-atmosphérique est un milieu, mais non un champ d'affrontement, car les traités internationaux y interdisent l'emploi de moyens militaires offensifs. Dans l'environnement informationnel, on mène la bataille des perceptions.

composante de force : Partie d'une force interarmées ou d'une force internationale en opération, qui correspond à l'ensemble des moyens fournis par l'une des trois armées.

approche indirecte : Dans un théâtre d'opération, recherche de la victoire militaire par une action sur les vulnérabilités critiques du centre de gravité de l'adversaire. Cette démarche s'inscrit bien dans une stratégie militaire directe, c'est-à-dire un emploi prépondérant et décisif de la force militaire pour parvenir à un but politique.

stratégie indirecte : Dans le domaine militaire, stratégie qui consiste à rechercher la réalisation d'un objectif politique par des voies détournées, comme le contournement et la déstabilisation progressive de l'adversaire. (EMP-60-641)

environnement informationnel : Il « comprend l'information elle-même, les individus, organisations et systèmes qui la reçoivent, la traitent et la transmettent, et l'espace cognitif, virtuel et physique dans lequel cela se produit » (MC422/4 2012).

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[113] *CITA : Comité interarmées de terminologie militaire.*

key nucleus staff: Designated part of a parent administrative or operational staff, who can perform the main functions of a contingency Headquarters (HQ).

Note: This nucleus, which is deployable, includes among other elements the assets in terms of personnel and equipment to:

a. guarantee at once the consistency and the efficiency of the staff's work;

b. guarantee the technical functioning of each cell;

c. train the additional personnel deployed to reinforce the contingency HQ.

lines of operation: In an operation plan, a line connecting decisive points in order to reach the objectives, and ultimately, the desired end state.

main effect or major effect: To impose on the adversary or environment at a given place and time a range of effects, the result of which ensures the success of the mission. "Environment" is here to be understood as the physical, human, political and economical space.

manoeuvre:

a. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. (AAP-6)

b. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. (AAP-6)

c. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. (AAP-6)

d. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (AAP-6)

e. Combination of planned actions, in space and time, conducted within a specific domain and contributing to the achievement of the objective as part of the mission (e.g. media manoeuvre, logistic manoeuvre, etc.).

operation (Op): A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.

Note:

a. NATO operations are military.

b. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. (NTMS)

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noyau clé d'état-major : Partie désignée d'un état-major parent, organique ou opérationnel, permettant d'assurer les principales fonctions d'un PC opérationnel de circonstance.

Note : ce noyau clé comprend notamment les moyens en personnel et matériel pour :

a. garantir d'emblée la cohérence et l'efficacité du travail de l'état-major ;

b. garantir le fonctionnement technique de chacune des cellules ;

c. instruire le personnel complémentaire appelé à renforcer le PC de circonstance.

lignes d'opération : Dans un plan d'opération, lignes agençant les points décisifs entre eux en vue d'atteindre les objectifs, et, in fine, l'état final recherché.

effet majeur : Ensemble d'effets à obtenir sur l'adversaire ou le milieu en un temps et un lieu donnés et dont la réalisation garantit la réussite de la mission. Le « milieu » est ici considéré comme l'espace physique, humain, politique et économique.

manœuvre :

a. Mouvement destiné à mettre des bâtiments ou aéronefs en position favorable par rapport à l'ennemi. (AAP-6)

b. Exercice tactique effectué en mer, dans les airs, sur terre ou sur carte pour simuler des opérations de guerre. (AAP-6)

c. Mise en œuvre d'un bâtiment, aéronef ou véhicule de manière à lui faire exécuter les évolutions voulues. (AAP-6)

d. Emploi des forces sur le champ de bataille combinant le mouvement avec le feu effectif ou potentiel en vue de se mettre en position favorable par rapport à l'ennemi pour accomplir la mission donnée. (AAP-6)

e. Combinaison d'actions planifiées, dans l'espace et dans le temps, menées dans un domaine particulier, et contribuant à atteindre l'objectif fixé dans le cadre de la mission (ex. : manœuvre médiatique, manœuvre logistique, etc.).

opération : Série d'actions coordonnées ayant un but défini.

Note :

a. Les opérations de l'OTAN sont militaires.

b. Les opérations de l'OTAN contribuent à une approche plus large incluant des actions non militaires.

operational capability: Specific posture to fulfil a given mission in general terms. Operational readiness refers to competence, not to a precise volume of assets. This concept implies the existence of capabilities.

operational effect: Result obtained through the engagement of military assets faced with a given situation.

Note: There are five families of operational effects: intimidation, confinement, neutralization, security and assistance. The combination of operational effects in space and time contributes to the achievement of the different pillars of the desired end state.

operational function: Range of operational activities which are transverse to the hierarchical organization, and which require, at some levels, decisions to be taken and coordination in the implementation of a specific organization in order to guarantee the general performance of a force.

operational module: There are three types of generic modules, each with a specific purpose:

a. **planning module**: it provides a planning and decision support capability, e.g. the *ELRT*[114] (theatre liaison and reconnaissance team);

b. **reinforcement module:** it is part of an existing Headquarters (HQ) and provides added-value and expertise necessary at the operational level;

c. **framework module:** it ensures the operating of Force Headquarters (FHQ) by providing a force command capability at the operational level. An operational framework module aims to form the core of an FHQ key nucleus staff.

organic: Forming an integral part of a military organization. (AAP-6)

strategic option: Military pillar of the comprehensive option. It defines a certain number of channels, means and modalities to reach the strategic objectives and contribute to the achievement of the political objective. It also defines the national ambitions within an international framework. It is translated by the definition of a mission entrusted to the Armed Forces, so as to contribute to the achievement of the different aspects of the desired end state.

Concretely, a strategic option is divided into types of military operations. There are six different types of operations that are distinguished based on the desired operational effect and scale of the engagement agreed by

aptitude opérationnelle : Disposition particulière pour remplir une mission fixée en termes généraux. L'aptitude s'exprime en termes de compétence, sans référence à un volume précis de moyens. Cette notion sous-entend l'existence de capacités.

effet opérationnel : Résultat obtenu par l'engagement de moyens militaires face à une situation donnée.

Note : Cinq familles d'effets opérationnels peuvent être distinguées : intimidation, confinement, neutralisation, sécurisation et assistance. La combinaison des effets opérationnels dans l'espace et dans le temps contribue à la réalisation des différents volets de l'état final recherché.

fonction opérationnelle : Ensemble d'activités opérationnelles, transverses à l'organisation hiérarchique, qui, afin de garantir la performance globale d'une force, nécessite, à certains niveaux, des prises de décision et une coordination mettant en œuvre une organisation particulière.

module opératif : il existe trois types de modules génériques qui ont chacun une vocation spécifique :

a. *module planification : apporte une capacité de planification et d'aide à la décision : l'équipe de liaison et de reconnaissance de théâtre (ELRT) en est un exemple ;*

b. *module renfort : s'insère dans un PC existant en apportant la plus-value et les expertises nécessaires au niveau opératif ;*

c. *module cadre : garantit le fonctionnement d'un PC opératif en apportant une capacité de commandement de la force au niveau opératif. Un module cadre opératif est appelé à constituer le cœur d'un noyau-clé de PC opératif.*

organique : Formant partie intégrante d'un organisme militaire. (AAP-6)

option stratégique : Volet militaire de l'option globale, elle définit un certain nombre de voies, moyens et modalités pour atteindre les objectifs stratégiques et, in fine, contribuer à l'atteinte de l'objectif politique. Elle définit également les ambitions nationales dans un cadre international. Elle s'exprime par la définition d'une mission confiée aux forces armées, en vue de contribuer à la réalisation des différents aspects de l'état final recherché.

L'option stratégique se décline concrètement en types d'opération militaire. Six types d'opération différents peuvent être distingués en fonction des effets opérationnels recherchés et de l'ampleur de l'engagement voulu par les autorités politiques.

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[114] *ELRT: Équipe de liaison et de reconnaissance de théâtre*. Similar and interoperable with NATO Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).

political authorities.

a. **Seizure and control of one or several environments in the long term** (O1). This option is the most ambitious. It implies a significant joint Force so as to, as part of a multinational operation for instance, claim responsibility as a framework nation. It also requires the relief of the deployed forces.

b. **Seizure and temporary control of one or several environments** (O2). This option is at the same level as the first one, but does not imply the relief of the Force.

c. **Long-term targeted operation** (O3). Operation that does not imply control of an environment, but which requires targeted actions (types of air strikes) over a long period (several months).

d. **Targeted and limited operation** (O4). Operation of limited scale and duration.

e. **Securing environments in the long term** (O5). Low intensity engagement which can be carried out over long durations.

f. **Preventive or deterrence operation** (O6). Operation aiming to prevent or contain a crisis by deterring belligerents.

Note:

a. Strategic options are mainly based on three families, which may be complementary or successive:

(1) provision of support to prevention and security;

(2) control of violence;

(3) forceful actions.

b. Each strategic option is a combination of military actions in which forces and resources are used accordingly with the existing guidelines and at various level of intensity.

a. *Conquête et contrôle d'un ou plusieurs milieux dans la durée (O1). Cette option, la plus ambitieuse, implique une Force interarmées significative, afin, par exemple, dans une opération multinationale de revendiquer une responsabilité de nation cadre. Elle implique la relève des forces déployées.*

b. *Conquête et contrôle temporaire d'un ou plusieurs milieux (O2). Cette option du même niveau que la première s'entend sans relève de la Force.*

c. *Opération ciblée dans la durée (O3). Il s'agit d'une opération qui n'implique pas de contrôle de milieu, mais qui requiert des actions ciblées (de type frappes aériennes) sur une durée significative (plusieurs mois).*

d. *Opération ciblée et ponctuelle (O4). Il s'agit d'une opération limitée dans son ampleur et dans sa durée.*

e. *Sûreté des milieux dans la durée (O5). Il s'agit d'un engagement de basse intensité, mais qui peut s'inscrire dans la durée.*

f. *Opération préventive ou dissuasive (O6). Il s'agit d'une opération visant à prévenir ou à contenir une crise en dissuadant les belligérants.*

Notes :

a. *Les options stratégiques relèvent principalement de trois familles, parfois complémentaires ou successives :*

(1) *le soutien de la prévention et de la sécurité ;*

(2) *la maîtrise de la violence ;*

(3) *les actions de force.*

b. *Chaque option stratégique est une combinaison d'actions militaires dans lesquelles forces et moyens sont employés selon des orientations choisies et à des degrés d'intensité variables.*

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Initialisms

K01.   Each letter of an initialism is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.

Acronyms

K02.   Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.

Graphic Charter of the Lexicon

K03.   In this lexicon, the characters which constitute an initialism or acronym are written in capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning.

K04.   French initialisms and acronyms are written in *bold, italic, Arial font, size 9, in red Roman characters*. Anglo-Saxon initialisms and acronyms are written in **bold Arial font, size 9, in blue Roman characters**.

List of Initialisms and Acronyms Used within this Document

ADCON   ADministrative CONtrol

AJP   Allied Joint Publication

APEO   *Action sur les Perceptions et l'Environnement Opérationnel*
                   activity on perceptions and within the operational environment

ARS   *Armée Responsable des SIC*
                   service responsible for CIS

ASIA   *Adjoint Soutien InterArmées*
                   joint support assistant chief of staff

C2   Command and Control

CBRN   Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CCIR   Commander's Critical Information Requirements

CEMA   *Chef d'État-Major des Armées*
                   chief of Defence Staff (FRA)

CI   Counter-Intelligence

CIA / **JC**   *Concept InterArmées*
                   Joint Concept

CICDE   *Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrines et d'Expérimentation*
                   joint centre for concepts, doctrine and experimentation

CIMIC   CIvil-MIlitary Cooperation

CIS   Communication and Information Systems

COMANFOR   *COMmANdant de la FORce*
                   Force Commander (FRA)

COMSICIAT   *COMmandant des Systèmes d'Information et de Commandement InterArmées de Théâtre*
                   information system and joint theatre command commander

CONOPS	CONcept of OPerationS
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
CP	Command Post
CPCO	*Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* FRA joint operations centre
DAJ	*Direction des Affaires Juridiques* legal affairs directorate
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (UK)
DCOS Sp	Deputy Chief of Staff Support
DES	Desired End State
DIRISI	*Direction Interarmées des Réseaux d'Infrastructure et des Systèmes d'Information* joint directorate for defence infrastructure networks and information systems
DIRMED	*DIRecteur MEDical* medical director
ELRT	*Équipe de Liaison et de Reconnaissance de Théâtre* theatre liaison and reconnaissance team
EMA	*État-Major des Armées* French Defence Staff
EMIA FE	*État-Major InterArmées de Force et d'Entraînement* joint force and training headquarters
ENU	*Échelon National d'Urgence* national emergency force
FCdr	Force Commander
FIR	*Fonction Interarmées du Renseignement* joint intelligence function
FRA	FRAnce (NATO country code)
GAS	*Groupe d'Anticipation Stratégique* strategic anticipation group
GCOS	*Général Commandant des Opérations Spéciales* general special operation commander
HUMINT	HUMan INTelligence
IA	Information Assurance
IMINT	IMagery INTelligence
Info Ops	Information Operations
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
DIA / **JD**	*Doctrines InterArmées* Joint Doctrine

JMED	Joint MEDical	
JUROPS	*section JURidique OPérationnelle* military legal section	
KLE	Key Leader Engagement	
LOGCON	LOGistic CONtrol	
MRI	Military-Related Intelligence	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
NCC	National Contingent Commander	
NR	NATO Restricted	
NSE	National Support Elements	
OHQ	Operational HeadQuarters	
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team	
OpCdr	Operation Commander	
OPCOM	OPerational COMmander	
OPCON	OPerational CONtrol	
OPP	Operations Planning Process	
OSINT	Open Source INTelligence	
PCIAT	*Poste de Commandement InterArmées de Théâtre* joint theatre command post	
PsyOp	Psychological Operations	
RDIA **/ JDN**	*Réflexion Doctrinale InterArmées* Joint Doctrine Note	
ROE	Rules of Engagement	
SIGINT	SIGnals INTelligence	
SNR	Senior National Representative	
SOC	Special Operations Command / Special Operations Commander	
SOFA	Status Of Force Agreement	
TACOM	TActical COMmand	
UN	United Nations	
USN	*Unité Spécifique Nationale* National Specific Unit	

(FRA) JD-01(A)

Translation of DIA-01(A) *Doctrine d'emploi des forces*