



**(FRA) Joint Centre  
for Concepts,  
Doctrine and  
Experimentation**



## Redeployment

**Joint Doctrine Note  
(FRA) JDN-4.2.1\_REDEPLOYMENT(2013)**

**No. 199/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 25 November 2013**



## Foreword

This Doctrine document was prepared by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations [CICDE]*). It is promulgated and made public by the Director of the *CICDE*, as part of its mission of joint doctrine development and experimentation in a national and multinational context, and participation in interministerial studies and research.

It was conceived and written by a panel of experts working at the *CICDE*: it is a Doctrine document and not a legal document; it has no regulatory effect.

As set out in § 107 to 111 of the capstone document DC\_001(A)\_DOCTRINE(2013) for doctrine in general, the content of this document serves as a common reference, provides a rigorous analytical framework for thought and helps to define a language and methods shared by all those who are tasked with developing and executing plans, missions and orders. It cannot therefore affect the authority or limit the responsibility of the command structure, whether it be in organizing forces or planning and executing missions.

This French Joint Doctrine (FRA) JD-4.2.1 *Redeployment* is in compliance with the prescriptions of the *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 47(A) Allied Joint Doctrine Development*. The front cover of this document was created by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*CICDE*).

**Please note: the only official reference document is the electronic online French version released on the Internet and/or Intradef pages of the *CICDE* (<http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr>).**

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(FRA) JD-4.2.1

**REDEPLOYMENT**

No. 199/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 25 November 2013

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# Letter of Promulgation

Paris, 25 November 2011  
No. 199/DEF/CICDE/NP

Subject: Promulgation of the French joint doctrine, entitled DIA-4.2.1 *Désengagement*.

References:

- Ministerial order of 21 April 2005 on the creation of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations (CICDE)*.
- Instruction no. 1239 DEF/EMA/GRH/OR of 20 June 2006 concerning the organization and operation of the *Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations (CICDE)*.

The French joint doctrine, entitled DIA-4.2.1 *Désengagement*, dated 25 November 2013, is hereby promulgated.

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## Table of Amendments

1. This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*CICDE*), based on the table in Annex C (see p. 59).
2. The amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* are written in **red** in the table below in chronological order.
3. The amendments are shown in **purple** in the body of the text of the new version.
4. The front cover of this document and the first page will be annotated to show the existence of a new version. The official registration number must thus be amended in **red** with the following mention: "**amended Day / Month / Year**".
5. The amended version of the text to be used as a joint reference document replaces the previous version in all electronic database.

No.	Amendment	Source	Effective Date
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### References

- a. **Défense et sécurité nationale. Le Livre blanc.** La Documentation française, May 2013, foreword by François Hollande, President of the Republic. For ease of reading, this document will hereinafter be referred to as LBDSN-2013. **English version available:** *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*.
- b. **Arrêté du 3 septembre 2012** portant organisation de l'état-major des armées et fixant la liste des autorités et organismes directement subordonnés au chef d'état-major des armées.
- c. **Arrêté du 21 février 2012** relatif à la gestion logistique des biens mobiliers affectés au ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants.
- d. **Lettre n° D-12-00551 DEF/EMA/ESMG/NP du 20 janvier 2012** portant sur l'exercice de l'autorité du chef d'état-major des armées sur les services de soutien interarmées.
- e. **CIA-01\_CEF(2013), Concept d'emploi des forces**, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013. **English version available:** (FRA) JC-01\_CCMO(2013), *Capstone Concept for Military Operations*.
- f. **RDIA-2013/003\_SOUT(2013), Soutien**, no. 101/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 17 June 2013.
- g. **DIA-01\_DEF(2011), Doctrine d'emploi des forces**, no. 127/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 July 2011. **English version available:** (FRA) JD-01\_DEF(2011), *Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces*.
- h. **DIA-03\_CEO(2010), Commandement des engagements opérationnels**, no. 217/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 30 juillet 2010.
- i. **DIA-04(B)\_SOUT(2013), Le soutien aux engagements opérationnels**, booklets 1 to 3, no. 040/DEF/CICDE/DR as of 14 mars 2013.

### Background: Withdrawal of Operations

1. Further to France's latest operational engagements (EUFOR in Chad, Pamir – Héraclès in Afghanistan, Harmattan in Libya), marked by complex, varied and always delicate force redeployment stages, it seemed necessary to draw up a specific doctrine on this unique joint manoeuvre.
2. Every projected operational engagement concludes with a redeployment stage. This final stage consists of withdrawing the forces from their operational mission, regrouping them and repatriating them or deploying them on another operation.
3. This stage of the operation, which appears straightforward, is in fact especially complex to plan and execute. How it is conducted has a direct effect on the final outcome of the operation.
4. Therefore, it would be simplistic to limit redeployment to a simple support manoeuvre. In fact, redeployment covers operational aspects, aspects related to the comprehensive approach and support aspects that must be closely coordinated.

## Purpose of (FRA) JD-4.2.1

1. (FRA) JD-4.2.1 deals with redeployment doctrine. It originates in DIA-01 (capstone doctrine on the employment of the armed forces), DIA-3 (command of operational engagements doctrine) and DIA-4 (support [LOG] to operational engagements).
2. The Redeployment Joint Doctrine (FRA) JD-4.2.1 (1st edition) covers the fourth and final stage of an operational engagement, which, after the decision to engage (stage 0), includes operations planning and force generation (stage 1), projection (stage 2) and intervention, properly speaking (stage 3).
3. (FRA) JD-4.2.1 focuses on the joint nature of the redeployment stage. Specifically, it incorporates the latest major transformations in Defence in the area of support<sup>1</sup>.
4. It is intended primarily for operational actors. In the first instance, it is intended for the joint chiefs, so that they can measure the actions of their subordinates in the joint forces, branches and services, but also so that they can anticipate the major milestones of this delicate stage.

It is also intended for engaged units and/or those sent as reinforcements so they can coordinate their action by referring to shared, clear, key principles.

Finally, it provides a framework for the actions of actors before and after an operation, specifically those in charge of organic and functional support (from planning to warehousing and inventory replenishment, etc.).

## Structure

1. (FRA) JD-4.2.1 is divided into four chapters:
  - a description of the operational framework (Chapter 1);
  - command and general organization of redeployment (Chapter 2);
  - conduct of redeployment (Chapter 3);
  - particular provisions with respect to components, support functions and redeployment framework (Chapter 4);
2. Four annexes complete the document, of which one provides a possible distribution of responsibilities (Annex A), while another provides an example of a redeployment directive (Annex B).

## Interoperability

1. There is no document dealing specifically with redeployment (*désengagement*) yet within NATO or the EU.
2. NATO intends to produce a document on redeployment in 2016 with the release of a Joint Operational Guidance (JOG) in 2014 as an intermediate step.
3. (FRA) JD-4.2.1 will be helpful for NATO's work.

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<sup>1</sup> Support (*soutien*) is a joint key function covering logistics and military administrative support; it is not to be mistaken with support as in "combat support".

## Redeployment Overview

### Definitions

Redeployment is the **final stage of a military operation**. It consists of withdrawing forces from their operational mission, regrouping them, and repatriating them or deploying them to another operation.

Redeployment cannot, therefore, be reduced to a simple support manoeuvre. Redeployment includes operational aspects, aspects related to the comprehensive approach and support aspects.

Redeployment can take two main forms, whether it is from an assault operation or a stability operation:

- a. **withdrawal** (*retrait*), when the desired end state has been fully or partially achieved. This is the general case;
- b. **retirement** (*repli*), when the situation is urgent. This special case is due to circumstances.

### Tipping Point

The joint chief will have to monitor combat conditions. The redeployment manoeuvre will lead him to gradually reduce the forces and capabilities available to him and therefore simultaneously reduce the range and scope of the combat part of his mission. At some point, he will no longer be able to conduct the combat mission on his own, except for self-defence, and logistics operations will become more important.

This tipping point must be very precisely identified and be the subject of a specific order.

The only residual mission would be to conduct the final transfers of authority that would remain during the redeployment and make sure the force is protected. Protecting the force will take different shapes depending on whether the force is leaving a base, in a secondary or primary staging area or in a convoy linking those various points.

### Responsibilities

Traditionally, command (see § 2003 and Annex A) is structured around the strategic (*CPCO* and its centres: *CICLO*, *CMT*, *CIAO*, *CIAE*)<sup>2</sup>, operational (FCdr or FRA NCC)<sup>3</sup> and tactical levels. To successfully conduct this stage, the *CPCO* may set up a temporary cell for the planning and control of the manoeuvre (*CCD*)<sup>4</sup>.

As required, reinforcements are sent to the theatre for certain specific, identified functions.

### Tasks

Various transfers have to be made: mission (see § 2016), responsibility (see §§ 2020–2021), bases (see § 2022), materiel (see § 2026), personnel (see § 2029).

<sup>2</sup> *CPCO*: Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations (French joint operations centre); *CICLO*: Centre interarmées de coordination de la logistique des opérations (operational logistic coordination joint centre); *CMT*: Centre multimodal des transports (multimodal transportation centre); *CIAO*: Centre interarmées d'administration des opérations (operations administration joint centre); *CIAE*: Centre interarmées des actions sur l'environnement (environmental actions joint centre).

<sup>3</sup> FCdr: Force Commander; FRA NCC: French National Contingent Commander.

<sup>4</sup> *CCD*: Cellule de coordination du désengagement (redeployment coordination cell).

Redeployment is divided into different phases (see § 2035):

- a. P0: Planning (takes place before redeployment) and preparation;
- b. P1: Initial Actions (mainly operational);
- c. P2: Effort (mainly support);
- d. P3: Actions in France (refurbishment and rehabilitation, Lessons Learned [LL]).


### *Conduct of Redeployment*

The conduct of redeployment (see § 3001) is initiated by a redeployment directive (see Annex B) issued by the strategic level, and an order to redeploy, written by the operational level.

The orders describe the kinematics (chronology, carriers, men and materiel to be moved, formalities) and staging areas (SAs), and describe what is to be done with regards to personnel (see § 3012), bases (see § 3020), supplies and equipment (see § 3026), movements (see § 3035), communication and information systems (see § 3040) and tracking of flows and carriers (see § 3043).

Particular provisions describe the specificities of the forces and components (see § 4002) and the thirteen logistics and military administrative support sub-functions (see § 4024).

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# Chapter 1

## Operational Framework

1001. This Joint Doctrine covers the doctrine of redeployment. It originates in DIA-01 (capstone doctrine on the employment of armed forces), DIA-03 (command of operational engagements doctrine) and DIA-04 (support<sup>5</sup> doctrine).
1002. Redeployment concludes any military operation. It is the fourth and final stage of an engagement, which, after the decision to engage (stage 0), includes operations planning and force generation (stage 1), projection (stage 2) and intervention proper (stage 3).
1003. This doctrine defines the **operational framework** of redeployment (Chapter 1), **command responsibilities** (Chapter 2), the **conduct** of redeployment (Chapter 3) and some **particular provisions** (Chapter 4).
1004. This chapter covers a number of **general aspects** (Section I), describes the conditions of the **operational environment** that affect redeployment (Section II) and determine the **three priorities of effort** of the joint chief who must conduct the redeployment manoeuvre (Section III).

### Section I – General

#### Definition

1005. Redeployment is the **final stage of a military operation**. It consists of withdrawing forces from their operational mission, regrouping them, and repatriating them or deploying them to another operation.

#### Redeployment Objectives

1006. Redeployment cannot, therefore, be reduced to a simple support manoeuvre. Redeployment covers:
- operational aspects (force protection, Command and Control [C2], relief by allied or local units, information operations);
  - aspects related to the comprehensive approach (coordination with local authorities, public safety, economic and commercial ties, public reaction, media impact, etc.);
  - support aspects (transport, but also legal, environmental, subcontracting and other aspects).
1007. Redeployment, therefore, pursues **several objectives** at the same time.
1008. First of all, operational continuity must be assured (action of our own troops, coordination with allies and local security forces, including possible relief), while ensuring troop safety.
1009. The environment must be taken into account by considering the interests of public authorities (government, international organizations), private organizations (non-governmental organizations, businesses) and the population.
1010. There is also a need to help manage the political, psychological and media impact of redeployment at the local, national and international levels.

<sup>5</sup> Support (*soutien*) is a joint key function covering logistics and military administrative support; it is not to be mistaken with support as in "combat support".

1011. Arrangements must be made to repatriate the troops and return, transfer or destroy equipment, while terminating legal and contractual agreements that were concluded during the engagement.

## Main Forms

1012. Redeployment can take two main forms, whether it is from an assault operation or a stability operation:
- a. **withdrawal** (*retrait*), when the desired end state has been fully or partially achieved. This is the general case;
  - b. **retirement** (*repli*), when the situation is urgent. This special case is due to circumstances. It occurs, for example, when strong, unpredictable external constraints compromise the success of the operation;
  - c. this doctrine does not deal with force extraction.

## Principles

1013. **Anticipation.** "Redeployment is an integral part of any engagement. It must be considered at the initial strategic operations planning phase and planned as soon as possible."<sup>6</sup> This anticipation means spreading efforts over time and pacing action. Therefore, among the three factors of the strategic decision (space, forces, time), the time factor becomes the most important.
1014. **Force Protection.** The more redeployment is anticipated, the more force protection can be assured. It is a constant concern of the military chief in charge of the operation.
1015. **Gradual Support Effort.** Redeployment consists of reducing operational activities while simultaneously increasing support activities. That means **increasing** the volume of men and capabilities dedicated to support for the redeployment stage. Such reinforcement is all the more gradual, because it was anticipated.<sup>7</sup>
1016. **Coordination.** Redeployment is a joint manoeuvre. Since the framework for engagement is usually multinational, the manoeuvre is coordinated closely with allies or partners, more specifically a possible relief unit. Coordination will vary depending on whether the whole multinational force is withdrawing or just the French troops. The latter is obviously easier to conduct. The coordination will cover pooled resources (materiel including transport carriers, communication channels and infrastructure). Finally, the redeployment must first and foremost be coordinated with the host country, and any international organizations present.
1017. **Command Unity and Continuity.** Redeployment is a special manoeuvre that is nevertheless part of the force's overall manoeuvre. That is why unity of command must be maintained, which suggests that a dedicated HQ is not required. This principle does not prohibit internal adjustments at the force Command Post (PC). If the nature and context of the operation make it impossible to follow these principles to the letter, a redeployment operations centre (*COD*<sup>8</sup>) could be deployed (see Lessons Learned [LL] from Operation Artémis, conducted in 2004).
1018. **Economy of Means.** This principle of war applies particularly to a redeployment manoeuvre. It has various aspects:
- a. **sorting** consists of choosing what the force will leave (handover, destruction) and what will be repatriated (necessary equipment, sensitive resource management). Sorting is based on several criteria: cost and scarcity of the resource (residual value), capacity (industrial, financial) to renew or replace, cost of repatriation, etc., independent of the simple ownership criteria;
  - b. **establishing an order of priority** consists of determining the order in which troops and resources will be repatriated;

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<sup>6</sup> Ref. g., p. 69, § 3113.

<sup>7</sup> Withdrawing units also take part in the redeployment by refurbishing their own materiel and materiel on loan before sending it back to the support chain.

<sup>8</sup> *COD: Centre opérationnel de désengagement.*

- c. **rationalization** of carriers consists of making the best use of the available modes of transport according to their cost, their availability and the diplomatic, or even weather,<sup>9</sup> conditions;
  - d. **outsourcing** is a complementary process that makes it possible to conduct certain redeployment operations, depending on the circumstances. This process is used mainly for strategic routing (air, sea and even rail).
1019. **Compliance (with standards)**. Operations must be in compliance with various standards: legal, accounting, contractual, sanitary, environmental, transportation safety, pyrotechnic safety, etc.
1020. Although all these principles apply to a withdrawal, an urgent retirement may mean that not all can be applied. In such a case, it is up to the military chief to set priorities.

## Section II – Operational Environment

### Nature of Operation

1021. The operation may take place in a hostile, semi-permissive or permissive environment. Power projections, violent coercive actions, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance operations are all very different and facilitate redeployment operations to a greater or lesser extent.
1022. Similarly, the action may be mainly military or with greater cooperation with civil actors. The framework will usually be joint.
1023. Logically, the volume of forces engaged affects the scope and conduct of redeployment. However, current engagements would suggest that a redeployment of joint forces of more than 25,000 men is unlikely.<sup>10</sup>
1024. Similarly, the nature of the equipment engaged would leave a greater or lesser logistics footprint that would affect redeployment.

### Geographic Framework

1025. The geographic framework conditions redeployment in two main ways:
- a. first of all, by the distance of the theatre from France (or the force's destination base), which is an essential characteristic;
  - b. but also by the environment, which affects the manoeuvre according to two main criteria:
    - i. hemmed-in position: a force operating in the middle of a continent (Africa, Chad 2009; or Asia, Afghanistan 2012) does not redeploy in the same way as a force with access to a port;
    - ii. environmental conditions: desert, equatorial or polar, climate, mountains, humid areas.
1026. If the theatre is hemmed in, one or more air embarkation points must be found and the transportation infrastructure (road, rail and even fluvial) must be studied. Transit and intermediate reloading points corresponding to changes in modes of transport must also be studied.

<sup>9</sup> The load capacity of strategic aircraft (AN 124- IL 76) is very sensitive to temperature variations.

<sup>10</sup> LBDSN-2013 calls for a maximum contract for the Army of 15,000 men, to which one must add several thousand men from other forces, directorates and services.

## Duration

- 1027. Redeployment will be more complicated if the operation has been going on for a long time: a legacy of several years can mean disputes and all kinds of problems as well as an accumulation of materiel and resources.
- 1028. The expected duration of redeployment conditions how it is conducted, depending on whether the decision-maker has set a time limit or not (case of Operation Pamir in Afghanistan in 2012), which may mean additional costs.

## International Framework

- 1029. The different frameworks for multinational engagement (NATO, EU, UN, AU, ad hoc coalitions) have specific rules. For example, cases in which France is the Logistics Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistics Role Specialist Nation (LRSN) must be taken into account.
- 1030. The best case is redeployment from an operation conducted in a bilateral framework, since coordination is only with the host nation.
- 1031. Some operations are conducted from stationing points of forces of presence or sovereignty forces, which could also be redeployment destination bases for the force. Attention must be paid to the specific rules covering such situations. For example, the redeployment from Afghanistan was able to take advantage of the base in Abu Dhabi.

## Psychological and Media Framework

- 1032. The psychological dimension must be taken into account. It may be negative: from a local feeling of abandonment to displays of hostility. Similarly, the French public may see the withdrawal as a national failure, or feel that the country suffered human loss and financial sacrifices without convincing results. Or allies and partners may feel they have been betrayed, etc.
- 1033. On the other hand, positive aspects may come to the fore, such as a sense of accomplishment, contribution to a country's stability, operational or humanitarian usefulness, etc.
- 1034. These psychological factors must be taken into account in the media manoeuvre, since the media are a sounding board for the psychological dimension.

## National Territory (NT)

- 1035. Redeployment from operations on the national territory faces similar challenges. Although the principles are similar, the specific case of the national territory will be examined in Chapter 4.

## Typology

- 1036. The typical scenarios listed below are intended to illustrate, on the basis of real cases, the different redeployment configurations and their main characteristics.
- 1037. In the case of a small unit such as the company based in Boali, Central African Republic (CAR), the hospital deployed to Jordan or the small special forces detachments, redeployment is a relatively simple operation that can be conducted as a simple manoeuvre requiring little logistics effort.
- 1038. The allied mission in Bosnia (Operation Salamandre as part of SFOR<sup>11</sup>) was very large at first (there were 60,000 men, including 7,600 French personnel). However, stabilization in the theatre made it possible to gradually reduce the size of the force from 1996 to 2004.<sup>12</sup> The final redeployment therefore consisted of repatriating a minimal force, despite a significant legacy.

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<sup>11</sup> SFOR: Stabilization Force.

<sup>12</sup> In addition, the French operation inherited the mission in the framework of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), which had begun in 1992.

1039. The EUFOR<sup>13</sup> mission in Chad and CAR from 2007 to 2009 had up to 3,700 men from 23 European Union countries. Redeployment from that operation was characterized by the transfer of the mission to the UN's MINURCAT<sup>14</sup> 2 and thus by ceding positions to relief forces.
1040. The allied mission in Afghanistan (Operation Pamir in the framework of ISAF<sup>15</sup>) was not only large (up to 4,000 men) but also intense. The greatest effort was from 2008 to 2012. This relatively short operation required a significant redeployment effort, however, because it was far from France and the hemmed-in theatre had few evacuation routes.
1041. The "Séisme Haïti" mission in 2010 within the framework of the Haiti earthquake operation was conducted using forces from the Antilles with reinforcements from France in a multinational framework with the emphasis on humanitarian aid. Consequently, the redeployment was easy.
1042. The allied mission in Libya in 2011 was short and supported from bases in France (Saint-Dizier, Istres and Solenzara) as well as allied bases in Souda, Crete, and Sigonella, Italy. Some air/land operations were conducted from a command and projection ship. In fact, the redeployment operations were relatively simple and were supported by sea and air carriers.

## Section III – The Joint Chief's Three Priorities of Effort

1043. Support (*soutien*) is only one aspect of the general redeployment manoeuvre, which must take into account three priorities: combat conditions, a comprehensive approach and redeployment support. This manoeuvre constitutes a complete operational mission.

1044. The principles explained here refer to a withdrawal, and therefore generally to a stabilization or even standardization stage.

### Combat Conditions

#### *Tipping Point*

1045. The joint chief will have to monitor combat conditions. The redeployment manoeuvre will lead him to gradually reduce the forces and capabilities available to him and therefore simultaneously reduce the range and scope of the combat part of his mission. At some point, he will no longer be able to conduct the combat mission on his own, except for self-defence, and logistics operations will become more important.
1046. This tipping point must be very precisely identified and be the subject of a specific order.
1047. The only residual mission is to conduct the last handovers and final transfer of authority remaining during the redeployment and to ensure the protection of the force, especially the logistics convoys. Force protection takes different forms, depending on whether it is at a ceded or abandoned base, secondary or primary regrouping point or a convoy linking those various points.
1048. It is also necessary to chose between operational imperatives (hold a key piece of terrain to assure such and such a mission) and logistics imperatives (leave the farthest position first to concentrate forces or, on the contrary, maintain that intermediate support position, even if it is difficult to protect).

#### *Coordination*

1049. In all cases and in keeping with a comprehensive approach, the joint chief has to coordinate his efforts with several actors.

<sup>13</sup> EUFOR: European Force.

<sup>14</sup> MINURCAT: *Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad* (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad).

<sup>15</sup> ISAF: International Security Assistance Force.

1050. In a multinational framework, coordination with the coalition is of the utmost importance. It will vary depending on whether the withdrawal is isolated or a general withdrawal of the operation. Each time, dialogue and anticipation are the keys to success. This principle also applies to the transfer of a mission to another international organization (UN, OAU<sup>16</sup>, EU, etc.).
1051. In addition, the joint chief has to coordinate his activities with the country's political, administrative and military authorities at the central, regional and local levels. Dealing with them requires time and negotiations consistent with the operational environment.

### Operational Environment

1052. The joint chief will have to take into account the duration of the engagement, the operational conditions and particularly whether the decrease in the number of engaged troops is gradual or rapid. The configuration of the operation should be taken into account: the presence of a buffer zone or conduct of a simple area control, existence of prisoners or refugees.
1053. He will usually go into crisis management mode, even though a more coercive fighting plan may be required: conditions vary depending on whether the redeployment is from a conventional conflict, a peacekeeping operation, or participation of the armed forces in managing a calamitous event (pandemic or natural disaster) on the national territory.
1054. The conduct of the manoeuvre will depend on the intensity of enemy pressure (symmetrical or asymmetrical, permissive environment or not), which, among other things, will help determine if a withdrawal or retirement is required (for the latter case, see § 1078).

### Information Operations

1055. This pillar of the manoeuvre is of special interest in the redeployment phase in that it replaces combat units' presence and physical action with the perception of the effect of their presence.
1056. It is a matter of creating an informational environment favourable to both the force that is leaving and the authority that is taking over (if such is the case) by, among other things:
- a. explaining why the redeployment is necessary in such a way as to cast a favourable light on the force/coalition;
  - b. minimizing the negative aspects;
  - c. and maximizing the positive aspects, creating the perception, at least at the local level depending on the situation, of the presence and capacities of a still sizeable force, and highlighting past achievements and the abilities of the authority taking over from the one that is withdrawing.
1057. In the most difficult cases (redemption with strong adverse pressure), planning and deceptive actions can increase the chances of success of this stage.

### Comprehensive Approach

1058. *"The comprehensive approach to external crisis management aims at the prevention or lasting, and as soon as possible settlement to the crisis by a synergy of actions carried out by various agents in the fields of governance, security, and economic and social development."*<sup>17</sup>
1059. The armed forces contribute to the comprehensive approach, specifically for the security pillar. They coordinate with the other actors in the theatre in other areas as required. The armed forces are thus one actor among many.

<sup>16</sup> OAU: Organization of African Unity.

<sup>17</sup> Ref. RDIA-2011/001, *Approche globale (AG) dans la gestion des crises extérieures (contribution militaire)*, no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP, 24 January 2011. English version available: (FRA) JDN-2011/001, *Comprehensive Approach (CA) to External Crises Management (CM) – Military Contribution*.

## *Security, Governance, Development and Stabilization*

1060. The general rule, and specifically the French approach, is to restrict the force's intervention in governance, and economic and social development to those aspects that the civil authorities (International Organizations [IOs], Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs], local institutions and actors) cannot deal with, either for security reasons or the availability and suitability of the required means. Such involvement in those areas, dictated by operational necessity, is always planned. Planning systematically includes the procedures and time frames for the handover to the appropriate civil authority. Planning includes defining indicators in the four areas, which make it possible to determine the degree of operational "maturity" reached, and to know if the conditions are right.
1061. Redeployment usually occurs when the conditions are right, that is on the one hand, when general security conditions have been re-established, and on the other hand, when the actors in governance, and economic and social development are again able to effectively assume their roles. From that angle, the planning of this stage consists of detailing, sequencing and synchronizing the different tasks that constitute the details of this passing of the baton.
1062. A significant part of the transfer of authority regarding those aspects of governance and development in which the force decided or was constrained to intervene has logically taken place before the redeployment stage.
1063. The most frequent case in our operations is that in which operational engagement has made it possible to reach a stabilization, or even standardization, phase. At that point, military action must be coordinated with other, not exclusively military objectives, as described in the comprehensive approach. However, there may be certain residual fields of activity in which the force has a secondary role to play in governance (some policing aspects, maintaining law and order) or development (maintaining infrastructure with a dual security/development role).
1064. Therefore, the redeployment must follow lines of operation that are in keeping with that approach and are not directly included in the combat mission.

## *Transfers*

1065. Many bases will be transferred to military or police units. For operational reasons, they may belong to allied forces acting within the coalition. But it is very likely that they will be entities of the host nation (armed force, police or other state body), or belong to a peacekeeping operation being conducted by an international organization (UN, AU or other regional or sub-regional organization).
1066. Some installations or materiel may be handed over to local authorities or private operators.
1067. These considerations must be taken into account in the planning and require early coordination with the authorities, as well as with the commander of any relief force when it is constituted. This confirms the need for long-term planning.
1068. Such planning should take into account:
- a. a possible concomitant mission (training the armed force,<sup>18</sup> reforming the security sector, etc.), to which certain capabilities may have to be transferred;
  - b. the kind of government in place (civil or military);
  - c. the information operations that need to be carried out well before the actual start of redeployment operations. They will be devoted to preparing, monitoring and effecting the transfer of authority to local stakeholders, or the relief forces;
  - d. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) actions taking place or yet to be conducted.
1069. Finally, the comprehensive approach requires taking into account the economic consequences of redeployment, and therefore considering relations with private enterprises (of all types: local and international) and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

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<sup>18</sup> Épidote mission (Afghanistan) and European Union Training Mission (EUTM) (Mali) are recent examples.

## Redeployment Support Operations

1070. Above all, planning must take into account the **legal framework** of the redeployment operation: that includes any UN resolution, defence agreements, documents governing the presence of the force (Memorandum of Understanding [MOU], Status of Force Agreement [SOFA], etc.).
1071. The first support operation is to take an **inventory of assets**, which of course is ongoing throughout the engagement, but must be consolidated. The inventory must not be limited to quantity but also include qualitative aspects such as an assessment of whether assets are in a condition to be transported. In addition, all contracts must be reviewed, all obligations checked (overhaul, indemnification, various clauses, etc.), and stakeholders and their intentions identified.
1072. It must also be determined **what will be left behind and what will be repatriated**, along with the appropriate legal procedures. To that end, various criteria must be established early on: operational needs in the theatre (or other theatres), scarcity, cost of repatriation, use or replacement value, local transfer value, availability, capacity to manage waste in situ (disassembly, clean-up), etc. The criteria are specific to each operation and are defined at the strategic level.
1073. **Return flows** require a highly concerted effort, since they require several actions:
- a. identifying needs, setting priorities (according to the criteria referred to);
  - b. identifying routes (intra-theatre, then from the theatre to France or an intermediary or final destination) and possibly bilateral negotiations with countries through which shipments may need to transit;
  - c. organizing logistics flow tracking to track resources from the regrouping area in theatre to the final destination in France (or another theatre). This tracking of resources is the responsibility of all actors, who must set up ad hoc logistics information systems at each shipping, receiving and transit point;
  - d. identifying carriers, making reservations, chartering (the more advanced planning, the lower the costs);
  - e. concentration (Staging Area [SA] for theatre departure);
  - f. loading and customs formalities;
  - g. dispersal (arrival SA, distribution).
1074. These movements will conclude with contract closeout arrangements and all final discharges. To that end, a **liquidator** will be created to handle all disputes, among other things. They remain until all resources have been moved out. At that point, the French embassy takes over.
1075. **Security provisions, in the civil and broader sense**, must also be taken into account and affect the logistics of redeployment:
- a. some are governed by agreements with the country: site clearance (waste, clean-up), safety (mine disposal), viability of infrastructure (deconstruction). They depend on negotiations with the authorities;
  - b. others are French or international standards, such as sanitation and health measures (troop quarantine, disinfection and fumigation of equipment, phytosanitary certificates), ammunition conditioning, fuel handling provisions, traffic control;
  - c. technical specialists will inform the planning team as early as possible of any constraints related to their function that could affect the established criteria.

1076. Redeployment must terminate **local employee contracts** (normally referred to as Locally Recruited Civilian Staff [LRCS]). Some very specific, special cases (agents facing very serious, proven threats) require personalized treatment.<sup>19</sup>
1077. Finally, once back in France or in another theatre, certain special support activities must be carried out (reconditioning, overhaul), which must also be planned. However, the general rule holds that constraints related to these operations should not constitute specific criteria for return flow priorities.

### The Special Case of Retirement

1078. In the special case of **retirement** (*repli*), unlike withdrawal (*retrait*), operational pressure may lead the joint chief to make two types of decision that affect the priorities of effort just explained:
- a. some concern combat operations, leading to taking more operational risks at that moment of redeployment;
  - b. others concern logistic operations, leading to the reconsideration of certain actions described in §§ 1070–1077;
  - c. that in no way justifies disregarding legal or ethical rules.

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<sup>19</sup> Depending on the threats they face, they may be sent to France on a case-by-case basis. In such a case, the decision and action are interministerial and do not fall within the competence of the Ministry of Defence.

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# Command and General Organization

2001. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the general organization of redeployment, specifying the responsibilities of the different actors (Section I, Who?), the nature of the transfers to be made (Section II, What?) and the general pace of redeployment (Section III, When?).

## Section I – Who? Responsibilities

2002. Organization of command of the redeployment stage distributes responsibilities among the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

### Command Organization

2003. Since redeployment concludes any operation, in keeping with the continuity principle, a special command organization is not necessary. The three levels (strategic, operational and tactical) and coordination with external commands (coalition command, relief force command, co-located operations command, country authorities) remain.

2004. That is why redeployment is conducted by the command structures in place, which are reinforced as need be.

2005. Normally, a redeployment operations centre (*COD*) is not set up.

### Strategic

2006. The French joint operations centre (*CPCO*<sup>20</sup>) commands the redeployment at the strategic level. It is responsible for **strategic design**. All *CPCO* divisions are involved. It is the point of interministerial coordination for everything having to do with defence agreements, special measures for LRCS, opening of avenues of withdrawal and other non-military matters.

2007. It may set up a temporary redeployment coordination cell (*CCD*<sup>21</sup>) for the planning and control of the manoeuvre. It would resolve any disputes.

2008. The specialized centres (*CMT*, *CICLO*, *CIAO*)<sup>22</sup> are responsible for **conducting the manoeuvre at the strategic level**. They coordinate with specialized structures (force or service headquarters).

### Operational

2009. The Force Commander (FCdr) is responsible for **implementing** the redeployment.

a. If it is a coalition operation, the French National Contingent Commander (FRA NCC) conducts the redeployment of national forces in coordination with the rest of the force.

(1) Redeployment can be general (the whole force) or independent (French contingent only). The latter is generally easier.

(2) In all cases, the French National Support structure is reinforced to prepare and conduct the redeployment (see § 1017). Such reinforcement is a necessary condition for not setting up a *COD*.

<sup>20</sup> *CPCO*: Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations.

<sup>21</sup> *CCD*: Cellule de coordination du désengagement.

<sup>22</sup> *CMT*: Centre multimodal des transports (multimodal transportation centre); *CICLO*: Centre interarmées de coordination de la logistique des opérations (operational logistic coordination joint centre); *CIAO*: Centre interarmées d'administration des opérations (operations administration joint centre). *CMT* and *CICLO* will merge in 2014.

- b. If it is a national operation, the redeployment is conducted by the FCdr's HQ and the structure of the Deputy Chief of Staff Support (DCOS Sp<sup>23</sup>) is reinforced.
  - c. In a multinational operation, the joint support assistant chief of staff (ASIA<sup>24</sup>) plays a key role. However, the coordination of the redeployment, that is not limited solely to logistical aspects, is the responsibility of the Chief of Defence Staff (CEMA<sup>25</sup>).
2010. The Theatre Joint Support Group (GSIAT<sup>26</sup>) conducts the support part of the redeployment in accordance with instructions from ASIA. Specifically, it looks after the staging areas and transit areas, as well as the organization of the Theatre Joint Support Base (BSIAT<sup>27</sup>).

## Tactical

2011. The component commands work together to implement the redeployment; for example, by making their means of transportation available, and by locally coordinating possible allied contributions to transport to Air (APOE), Sea<sup>28</sup> (SPOE), and Rail (RPOE) Points of Embarkation.
2012. The particular provisions for each force or service are described in Chapter 4.

## Attention Points

2013. Liaison officers or detachments can be created for liaison with HQ or host nation organizations (and, if applicable, the coalition force) during the conduct of the redeployment.
2014. Similarly, during the planning and conduct of the redeployment, each component of the force must create liaison cells with the GSIAT.
2015. A typical distribution of roles is given in Annex A.

## Section II – What to do? Proceed with Transfers

### Mission Transfer

2016. Combat operations, made up of a set of distinct missions, will gradually be reduced. Each of the missions will either be abandoned or taken over by other actors.<sup>29</sup>
2017. In the first case, the Operations Commander (OpCdr) clearly establishes the conditions for the end of the missions concerned, by setting the effective date and the area or responsibility concerned.
2018. In the second case, the relief arrangements will be set out in a specific order. They will be made in liaison with the relief unit, which will require early discussions and sufficient anticipation:
- a. it could be internal relief, specifically the merging of areas of responsibility under the same authority. This case presents no major problems;
  - b. it could also be relief from other units: either units from friendly forces or units from the host nation's forces. In that case, the Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) will be more detailed, specifically regarding the handover checklist before the actual transfer of responsibility occurs.
2019. If France has a specific logistical function in the multinational force (LLN, LRSN), the transfer arrangements for those responsibilities will be examined and negotiated, and be the subject of a detailed FRAGO.

<sup>23</sup> *Sous-chef d'état-major Soutien (SCEM/SOUT).*

<sup>24</sup> *ASIA: Adjoint soutien interarmées.*

<sup>25</sup> *CEMA: Chef d'état-major des armées.*

<sup>26</sup> *GSIAT: Groupement de soutien interarmées de théâtre.*

<sup>27</sup> *BSIAT: Base de soutien interarmées de théâtre.*

<sup>28</sup> For redeployment, the special procedure of amphibious re-embarkation may be used (Cf. [FRA] JD-3.1.1).

<sup>29</sup> They could be military units, but also police units, private security companies, etc.

## Transfer of Responsibility

2020. "Command responsibility" is the subject of §§ 2003–2012. This section will discuss other types of responsibility that need to be dealt with (either transferred or terminated). These are mainly contractual responsibilities (various contracts signed by the force) and their financial and legal aspects.
2021. This responsibility applies to all the types of standards listed in § 1019. The more the process is anticipated (inventory and updating of the different contracts and obligations), the smoother the redeployment process.

## Transfer of Bases

2022. A base occupied by a force unit is handed over to another unit (friendly or host nation), returned to its owner or abandoned.
2023. Ideally, this transfer involves comparing the condition of the base with its original condition, an inventory of any work done, and a list of any damage.
2024. Site clearance operations (ammunition, fuel and lubricants, waste of all types, wreckage) should be carried out. Given the time it takes, they need their own planning and specific resources (men, equipment, funds).
2025. Planning the transfer of bases may affect how the redeployment unfolds, and require adjustments to operational priorities; again, anticipation is crucial.

## Transfer of Materiel

2026. There are many different kinds of pieces of materiel and equipment. In liaison with central authorities (operational headquarters, forces and directorates or services), theatre asset managers set priorities<sup>30</sup> (in accordance with the sorting criteria set out in Chapter 1, Section 1):
- a. materiel that must absolutely be repatriated as a matter of priority, regardless of its condition;
  - b. materiel that must not be repatriated, regardless of its condition;
  - c. materiel that must be assessed to determine if it should be repatriated or not;
  - d. for the remaining materiel, the theatre commander has two options: handover or destruction.
2027. The lists are combined by DCOS Sp (national) or ASIA (multinational), who submits them to the chief of staff (national) or the NCC CP (multinational) depending on the type of operation, to check their operational suitability. After that, a consolidated list is sent to *CPCO* and *CICLO* for validation, then to *CMT* to establish the return routing operations.
2028. The theatre joint prevention assistant proposes an operational sanitary control plan, which is validated by DCOS Sp or ASIA, in order to meet the various health and sanitation obligations. The operational sanitary control plan can also affect the timing of the redeployment.


## Transfer of Personnel

2029. It may happen that certain specialists or specific units are sent as reinforcements for implementing the redeployment. The paradox is only apparent, since the additional personnel help to redeploy a heavy flow of troops and equipment. It corresponds to the classic so-called "plate" phenomenon as regards support specialists.

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<sup>30</sup> One must not forget the possibility of repatriating non-French materiel, either materiel "taken from the enemy" or materiel provided by the host nation. Such materiel is usually subject to demilitarization, in accordance with special procedures (legal and technical).

## The Plate Phenomenom



2030. Personnel are redeployed by unit, when possible, or individually, for composite organizations (HQ and isolated cells). The chief in charge of redeployment must clearly identify what functions he must interrupt, and thus the associated personnel he can repatriate.
2031. Some especially intense missions require an end-of-mission transition period. The decision rests with the *CPCO* and it is implemented by the designated component. The theatre defines the soldiers who are eligible for such transition periods (see ref. g., page 9).
2032. The troops then go through the usual return procedures (chancellery procedures, territory exit message, return to garrison, etc.).

### Communication

2033. Communication about the redeployment is the responsibility of the Defence Staff (*EMA*) (i.e. the operations communications cell of the *CEMA*). It gives specific directives to the communication officer in the theatre. The communication officer, who is familiar with the media situation in the theatre, provides input into the development of those directives, in liaison with other contributors to information operations.
2034. In the case of a multinational operation, the communication officer liaises with the force's Public Affairs Office (PAO).


## Section III – When? Redeployment Timeline

2035. A military operation goes through three main stages (in addition to the prior stages of the political decision to engage and operations planning):<sup>31</sup> the projection stage (engagement), intervention (conduct of the mission: initial response, stabilization, normalization...) and then redeployment. The redeployment stage is divided into different phases:
- P0: Planning (takes place before redeployment) and preparation;
  - P1: Initial Actions (mainly operational);
  - P2: Effort (mainly support);

<sup>31</sup> According to DIA-01: "An operational engagement usually follows the following (and partly overlapping) main stages: political decision to engage (stage 0), operations planning and force generation (stage 1), projection (stage 2), intervention (stage 3), and redeployment (stage 4)."

- d. P3: Actions in France (refurbishment and rehabilitation, Lessons Learned [LL]).

## Phases of Redeployment



### Planning (P0)

2036. Planning is initiated and directed at the strategic level. It puts into effect governmental and intergovernmental directives, which can be expressed simply as personnel to be repatriated.
- The *CPCO* then issues a **redeployment directive**, which transforms these elements into operational capacities to repatriate according to a space-time framework.
  - At the operational level, the direction becomes a **redeployment order**, which is a Supplementary Plan (SUPPLAN) of the Operation Plan (OPLAN).  
  
This document should concretize personnel and equipment movements (in and out), and infrastructure to be restored. FRAGOs describe each specific operation.
  - An operational sanitary control plan is drawn up (see § 2028 and §4062).
2037. Those documents (redeployment directive and redeployment order) must describe the three priorities of effort mentioned in Chapter 1: operations, comprehensive approach and support. They set out detailed qualitative and quantitative objectives for each phase. They refer to, and actualize, all the corresponding elements of the initial planning.

### Preparatory Measures (P0)

2038. Preparatory measures are carried out at the same time as planning. Certain measures that are an interministerial responsibility are coordinated by *CPCO*. They are intended to gather advance information (for example, inventories, vehicles, routes, required volumes, and number and quality of containers), and possibly reduce replenishment orders.
2039. A specific intelligence plan may be necessary.
2040. Coordination with operational headquarters, directorates and services is essential. Service directorates must be informed about resource return planning to make their own plans for receiving, reconditioning and maintenance, in order to be able to draw up their own plans for rebuilding the force.

## Initial Measures (P1)

2041. These measures must apply to the three priorities of effort, knowing that the combat mission remains the priority.

### *Operational Priority*

2042. In addition to decreasing operational missions, the security of lines of communication must be reinforced, certain groups reassembled and structures reorganized. The first units are redeployed. When certain bases are dismantled, one-off protection reinforcement may be necessary. Other reinforcements may be required (transport and transit units, force protection units, technical specialists). Information operations may replace the "presence" of physical forces, and thus contribute to force protection. Intelligence collection is assured.

### *Comprehensive Approach Priority*

2043. The economic consequences of redeployment are carefully assessed and may lead to special measures. Customs authorities and other local agencies are contacted (setting up liaison detachments). Communication is directed especially to allies and the host nation. *CIMIC* priorities may be reordered.

### *Support Priority*

2044. The first bases are being dismantled and transferred. The logistics flow tracking chain is identified. Excess stock is repatriated or handed over; maintenance flows are limited. Some categories of materiel and ammunition are repatriated. Sub-contractors and contractors are notified to start the necessary procedures. Archiving measures are taken. The operational sanitary control plan is finalized. Unit autonomy is adjusted. Specific studies are conducted (environmental studies, pyrotechnic safety, etc.). Staging Areas (SAs) are set up in theatre.<sup>32</sup>

One or more SAs in France are also prepared.<sup>33</sup> Complimentary capabilities (carriers, containers) are put in place.

## Tipping Point (from P1 to P2)

2045. The tipping point is the moment when the force no longer carries out combat action independently with a view to producing effects on the terrain or the enemy: the combat posture is reduced to force protection and logistics priorities and areas. The priority shifts to the support manoeuvre.

## Conduct (P2)

2046. The conduct of the redeployment is aimed at withdrawing units and resources from their areas of operations. This occurs through regrouping at SAs before being redeployed to France (or to another destination).

### *Operational Priority*

2047. All that is left is a defensive posture of force protection. The organization is adjusted to the volumes remaining in theatre. The flow and convoy manoeuvre is conducted by the force as a joint manoeuvre. Mission transfers are made, required destruction carried out. Intelligence collection needed for the operation continues. If necessary, the logistic or technical support provided to allied forces or the host nation is continued.

### *Comprehensive Approach Priority*

2048. Local contractors may be used for certain redeployment functions. Similarly, cooperation with NGOs is strengthened. Special communication with the public is initiated. Contracts with LRCS are terminated. Customs circuits and environmental and sanitary control are activated.

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<sup>32</sup> For the Pamir redeployment, two large SAs were set up, one near Kabul and the other at Bagram.

<sup>33</sup> An intermediate SA may be set up: the United Arab Emirates base was used as an intermediate SA for the Operation Pamir redeployment.

## Support Priority

2049. Support quality is temporarily adjusted, with more rustic conditions and greater mobility. Specialized means for refurbishment are activated. The strategic Movement Control and Transport (MCT) chain is strengthened. The self-sustainment of the Force implies a minimum security level. The reintegration and reconditioning circuit at the SAs is activated so as to control, sub-function by sub-function (see Chapter 4), all units, materiel and equipment before repatriation. Embarkation then starts.
2050. In France, one or more receiving SAs are set up to take stock and divide up the materiel and resources among their destination units or refurbishment agencies. All transit points on the strategic MCT chain are reinforced.

## Logistics Flow Tracking

2051. One of the main difficulties is tracking resources. The flow tracking Logistics Information System (LIS) used is *SILCENT*, which is to be replaced in 2015 by *SILRIA*.<sup>34</sup>
2052. To be tracked, resources need to be initialized (described in the *LIS*) by the shipper and each logistics node should report their passing or operations carried out (conditioning, loading/unloading, departure, arrival, etc.).
2053. Setting up the flow tracking chain may require creating dedicated teams to reinforce the shippers, to initialize the resources or temporarily man the logistics nodes.
2054. Flows are affected by transport constraints (classes of materiel, dangerous goods, carrier capacity, etc.).

## Liquidation

2055. During redeployment, administrative formations must be dissolved by the overseas operations quartermaster (*DIRCOM*<sup>35</sup>), before the latter is dissolved. The result is that *DIRCOM* must leave the theatre with the force's post-cursor element. The actions it must undertake, not only in terms of dissolving supported administrative formations, but also in terms of disputes with the host nation, means that these multiple aspects must be dealt with locally—not at a distance.
2056. For theatres of operation that do not have a *DIRCOM*, the latter's mandate can be assumed, as appropriate and in relation to their skills, by:
- a. the operations administration joint centre (*CIAO*);
  - b. the Villacoublay local legal services (*SLC*<sup>36</sup>);
  - c. the logistics and transportation specialized service (*SSLT*<sup>37</sup>);
  - d. the French overseas quartermaster (*DICOM*<sup>38</sup>);
  - e. the *DIRCOM* in a neighbouring theatre or in special cases the financial services of the nearest French embassy or consulate.
2057. This may require setting up an ad hoc team as proposed by the central directorate of the joint supply and secretariat department (*DCSCA*<sup>39</sup>) and approved by *CPCO*.
2058. Once the different administrative formations are dissolved, the *DIRCOM* is dissolved. Its mandate is transferred to a liquidator appointed by *DCSCA*. It also appoints the personnel in charge of the liquidator in the field. Such personnel may be part of *DIRCOM* personnel.

<sup>34</sup> *SILCENT*: Système d'information logistique central (central logistics information system); *SILRIA*: Système d'information logistique pour le suivi de la ressource interarmées (logistics information system for the tracking of joint resources).

<sup>35</sup> *DIRCOM*: Direction du Commissariat en opération extérieure.

<sup>36</sup> *SLC*: Service local du contentieux de Villacoublay.

<sup>37</sup> *SSLT*: Service spécialisé de la logistique et du transport.

<sup>38</sup> *DICOM*: Direction du Commissariat outre-mer.

<sup>39</sup> *DCSCA*: Direction centrale du service du commissariat des armées.

## Assessment

2059. The assessment of the joint redeployment manoeuvre is made on the basis of post-operations debriefings written by the key people in charge of the manoeuvre (operational and logistical).
2060. It is based on the process and usual responsibilities of the joint LL chains, forces, joint directorates and services as described in PIA-7.7 (LL) and PIA-7.7.1 (A) (post-operations debriefings).

# Conduct of Redeployment (How?)

3001. Conduct is the second phase of the redeployment stage (P2). It gives priority to the "Support"<sup>40</sup> key function.

3002. The conduct of redeployment is mainly the responsibility of the operational level, which pursues the objectives set by *CPCO*.

3003. It is a matter of combining operational concerns (force protection), qualitative data and quantitative data. To resolve this equation, priorities must be set (command role), which translates into a redeployment order that involves kinematics (chronology, carriers, men and materiel to move, formalities).

## Redeployment Order

3004. The redeployment order is written by the operational level.

3005. First it describes the operational environment, transport networks, priority nodes, and embarkation points.

3006. It then defines the general scheme of redeployment, specifically the order in which different operational bases are abandoned, following a general scheme of "from farthest to closest." This principle can be adjusted, since contemporary operational situations rarely have a continuous front. Often on the contrary, units are spread out in a patchwork. Each component adapts the general scheme to its specific capabilities.

3007. That is why the redeployment manoeuvre must carefully determine the final embarkation points: those are "the closest" and determine which are "the farthest".

a. For example, in Afghanistan, "the closest" was Kabul, even though Bagram and Kandahar served as embarkation points for a time.

b. Similarly in Chad, the redeployment of EUFOR Chad–CAR mainly used N'Djamena.

3008. The kinematics combines timetable priorities, available means of transport both in theatre and between the theatre and the final destinations, men and equipment, as well as the taking into account of the various formalities (reintegration, administrative formalities, sanitation, customs, etc.).

3009. The kinematics is double: it must combine intra-theatre kinematics with strategic kinematics. The SAs make it possible to harmonize them.

a. The intra-theatre kinematics aims to withdraw the farthest (and often the lightest) positions to gradually concentrate on intermediate positions, and finally on the exit point.

b. The strategic kinematics aims to repatriate the men and materiel assembled at the theatre SAs towards the destination SA. It is conditioned by strategic carrier planning, which usually requires anticipation far in advance (if costs are to be reduced) by the strategic level (*CCD, CMT, CIAO, CICLO*).

3010. The redeployment order must organize movements (places, routes and pace), but also flow tracking (information associated with bases, people and equipment).

<sup>40</sup> Support (*soutien*) is a joint key function covering logistics and military administrative support; it is not to be mistaken with support as in "combat support".

3011. To that end, the specific order concerning flow tracking should be written for the redeployment. Among other things, it specifies the architecture and organization of the flow tracking chain described in § 2051, as well as specific instructions for initializing resources. The order also validates possible requests for temporary reinforcements.

## Personnel

3012. The notion of military unity makes it possible to bring together several constituents that must be examined separately. These are persons, bases, assets and equipment.<sup>41</sup> A unit is composed of soldiers and possibly salaried civilians (LRCS).
3013. The formed units cover a majority of deployed personnel. However, they are quite easy to redeploy, since they have an integrated command and represent significant volumes. Above all, the tasks required for redeployment can be assigned to them (self-sustainment, transport, cleaning the base, self-protection, etc.).
3014. However, the administrative formalities for each soldier in the unit must also be completed.
3015. The difficulty at this point in the operation is properly coordinating the movement of personnel with that of materiel.
3016. The most difficult thing is dealing with all the special cases that are currently labelled as "individual". They usually have positions of responsibility that always require very careful management of their movements, but also specific integrations they must make, in addition to the generic integration (weapons, individual equipment, medical and sanitation measures, etc.).
3017. LRCS are usually local; however, it may be necessary to transport them to another part of the territory. In special cases, the force may need to extract them from the country. Those are individual cases that are managed specifically by the command (see § 1076).
3018. Some soldiers may need to go through an end-of-mission transition period, which requires special monitoring (see § 2031).
3019. The HQ is specially reinforced to conduct the additional activity related to the redeployment. This in particular is aimed at completing the formalities for exiting the territory, which are concentrated in time compared with normal relief. The formalities include transit, chancellery, health, finances.

## Bases

3020. A withdrawing unit usually leaves a base. The departure must be prepared ahead of time. Such preparation includes inventories, preparatory inspections, but also some infrastructure work.
3021. Dismantling specific infrastructure (ammunition or fuel depots) requires special decontamination procedures.
3022. The unit that occupies the base may need to gradually regroup in certain specific areas. It may even have to share the base with other occupants, both military and civilian. However, in all cases, the command must ensure that the necessary level of force protection is maintained.
3023. SAs may be required to accommodate additional personnel or materiel. Therefore, some bases may in fact grow, at least temporarily, which requires infrastructure adjustments (quarters, storage, ammunition, weapons, etc.).
3024. In more complex cases, a redeployment infrastructure blueprint may need to be drawn up.
3025. Infrastructure operations require specific reinforcements: they could be implementation teams and the associated resources (materiel, consumables, budgets), or experts and specialists from the HQ.

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<sup>41</sup> In the case of the Navy, ships are redeployed.

## Assets and Equipment

3026. All assets and equipment must be packaged before the redeployment, i.e. it is prepared with a view to strategic transport by plane, ship or rail. Shipment must be initialized in a resource tracking system (*SILCENT* then in 2015, *SILRIA*).
3027. Such packaging usually takes place at the departure base, except for vehicles and individual weapons, which are packaged in the SAs. Certain types of materiel require special reinforcements (nuclear, biological, chemical).
3028. Assets and equipment pass through a reconditioning chain that includes technical, administrative and sanitary aspects. They are then regrouped at the SAs.
3029. Weapons require special security conditions, and specific administrative formalities, which makes managing them more complicated.
3030. The same holds for ammunition. It must be packaged in specific packaging and is subject to restrictive security rules (separation of classes, IATA and IMDG standards<sup>42</sup>). Some may be destroyed locally.
3031. As for fuel, anticipation should make it possible to reduce the stock in theatre to a minimum. The excess is dealt with in conformity with the provisions in the Petrol, Oil, Lubricant (POL) support paragraph.
3032. Communication and Information Systems (CIS) are hardwired. Their redeployment means they must go to mobile configurations, which means a decrease in capabilities. The SAs must, however, maintain a robust CIS capacity. The decrease in capabilities accompanies the decrease in personnel in theatre.
3033. Some waste must be repatriated, such as lithium batteries and certain sanitary waste.
3034. Special cases require specialized reinforcement teams to be temporarily sent.

## Movements

3035. Force protection is the most important point of these movements: a logistics convoy is organized and conducted like a military operation, as soon as the threat level requires it.
3036. Redeployment needs could require reinforcing the means of transport: trucks, trains, planes, helicopters and ships. Such reinforcement can be outsourced when security conditions (environment and resource transported) allow it.
3037. Movement planning must order flow in the direction of regrouping points and SAs. They are organized by the theatre movement cell. The Deputy Chief of Staff Support (DCOS Sp) or ASIA works to optimize intra-theatre flow. Transport requests are made via the single transport request (*DUT*<sup>43</sup>) logistics information system (integrated into *SILRIA* in 2015).
3038. The pace of strategic movements between embarkation points and the destination SAs is set by the joint coordination centre for transportation, transit and movements (*CCITTM*<sup>44</sup>) within the FRA National Support in multinational operations or by J4/Mvt at the force CP in the case of national operations. The *CCITTM* or J4/Mvt, as the case may be, is reinforced for the duration of the redeployment.
3039. The SAs make it possible to adjust the flow between intra-theatre movements and strategic MTC.

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<sup>42</sup> IATA: International Air Transport Association. IMDG: International Maritime Dangerous Goods.

<sup>43</sup> *DUT*: Demande unique de transport.

<sup>44</sup> *CCITTM*: Centre de coordination interarmées de transport, transits et mouvements.

## Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

3040. The CIS dismantling phase must meet two requirements:
- a. fit into the general framework of the redeployment manoeuvre "in a timely manner" by proper phasing of the dismantling of the CIS capabilities deployed;
  - b. guarantee that command is able to remain in control until the final withdrawal of the last element from the theatre, especially the support function.
3041. The CIS manoeuvre must therefore be anticipated well in advance between *COMSICIAT*<sup>45</sup>/J6 and J4, with the technical support of the joint directorate for defence infrastructure networks and information systems (*DIRISI*<sup>46</sup>), and may require temporary reinforcements or even specific light equipment with a mobile capacity to meet requirements.
3042. The use of civilian resources, which may include the return of infrastructure that had been deployed, is also to be considered.

## Tracking Flows and Carriers

3043. Once redeployment has been planned, the major difficulty is tracking both the resources and the carriers transporting them. It is the matter of traceability: it must be possible to determine where resources are at a given time.
3044. LISs are required for that. They are set up by specialized personnel sent as reinforcements to the theatre for the duration of the redeployment. Similarly, the SA in France is reinforced by specialized teams.
3045. Flow tracking is carried out with a LIS (now the *SILCENT* software, in future the *SILRIA* software), as defined in the specific flow tracking order (see § 3011) in accordance with the principles set out in the preparatory phase (see § 2038).
3046. When materiel and equipment sent to a theatre or territory are processed or tracked using a dedicated LIS, the military authority should—as far as possible—use the same LIS (*DUT*, *SILRIA*, etc.) and the same procedures for planning the redeployment and withdrawal of the materiel.
3047. The transport carriers are tracked and managed in the following fleet management systems:
- a. MEAT, GCTAM<sup>47</sup> for air carriers;
  - b. WINTRANS for surface vehicles in France;
  - c. AGIT2<sup>48</sup> for the loading of maritime carriers.
3048. The GCTAM application also makes it possible to synthesize all carriers tracking.

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<sup>45</sup> *COMSICIAT*: Commandant des systèmes d'information et de commandement interarmées de théâtre (information system and joint theatre command commander).

<sup>46</sup> *DIRISI*: Direction interarmées des réseaux d'infrastructure et des systèmes d'information.

<sup>47</sup> MEAT: Management European Air Transport; GCTAM: Gestion centralisée des transports aériens militaires (military airlift centralized management).

<sup>48</sup> AGIT2: Aide à la gestion informatisée du transit maritime (maritime transit computerized management).

4001. This chapter sets out particular provisions: they cover first of all the different forces, components and directorates (Section I), but also the thirteen support sub-functions (Section II). Finally, they describe the special case of the national territory (Section III).

### Section I – Forces and Components

4002. In addition to the three forces (French Army, Navy and Air Force), this section will cover the national Gendarmerie and special forces.

#### French Army

4003. The Army guarantees the coherence of the land force support system. In the case of a joint force with a land component (usual case), the contribution of the land component during the redeployment phase is essential.

4004. The Army has critical capacities for theatre opening and closing: the reception, staging, movement, integration (*RSMI*<sup>49</sup>) process and effective contribution to airport and port operations. It has the capacities to integrate into the equivalent allied arrangement, the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) process.

4005. For the Army, the logistics functions in direct support of redeployment<sup>50</sup> are maintained until the last moment and are scaled to the nature of the operations being conducted. The force protection and movement missions can therefore require maintaining some combat potential by a force in a redeployment stage. However, units must also "lighten" themselves and gain mobility before redeployment (reduced ammunition stocks, maintenance/fuelling on the go, mobile medical station, loaded CIS, etc.)

4006. The Army adapts its organization to the mission's redeployment stage and to the priorities set by the force commander. A combat unit has a potential of trades and manpower that are useful in the redeployment stage.

4007. There is always overlap and interdependence between the land units and the joint services. If the land component is large, it will have a sizeable logistical footprint (capacities, infrastructure and inventory). The French Army light aviation (*ALAT*<sup>51</sup>) units withdraw in a manner similar to that of the Air Force (aeronautical materiel and support).

#### French Navy

4008. If redeployment has led to the landing of workshops and parts stores, how they will be repatriated must be studied by the tactical commander with the operational controller and the fleet support service (*SSF*<sup>52</sup>), and proposed to the force commander.

4009. If a port or coastal protection system made up of underwater mines is in place, it must be neutralized or the plans given to the local authorities.

4010. The repatriation of inland water transport and mobile port facilities (pontoons, floating cranes, floating docks) must also be studied and planned for.

4011. Generally speaking, planners must pay attention to the safety of the last ships leaving, especially as regards the most serious threats in maritime approaches.

<sup>49</sup> *RSMI: Réception, Stationnement, Mouvement et Intégration.*

<sup>50</sup> Movement control and transport, maintenance of operational readiness, individual support, medical support, ammunition support, POL support.

<sup>51</sup> *ALAT: Aviation légère de l'armée de terre.*

<sup>52</sup> *SSF: Service de soutien de la flotte.*

## French Air Force

4012. Support for the Air Force is usually provided where the aircraft are stationed (Deployable Operating Base [DOP] or APOD). It requires a ground segment composed of an operational structure and air infrastructure. The operational structure includes capabilities for detection, control and communication, as well as capabilities for the security and protection of ground installations and air approach corridors.<sup>53</sup>  
The air infrastructure includes specialized technical infrastructure, technical services for receiving and maintaining aircraft with the attendant capabilities, but also supplies of fuel, aircraft fluids, stores and spare part flows.
4013. In most cases, the redeployment manoeuvre for Air Force planes (or naval aviation) is carried out quickly<sup>54</sup> and independently, in support of and on the orders of *CPCO*.
4014. The support redeployment manoeuvre is conducted in stages, differentiating between:
- specific unit support:** it is provided by the Air Force. Because of their critical nature, sensitivity and also attractiveness, the environment materiel and spare parts for the weapons systems and CIS capabilities will be redeployed as quickly as possible to permit their use in France or another theatre of operations;
  - platform support:** mainly provided by branches and services (*DIRISI*, *SEA*, *SSA*, *SIMu*, *SCA*, *SID*,<sup>55</sup> etc.) and its redeployment must be coordinated accordingly at the theatre level.
4015. Special attention must be paid to the redeployment date for transport and attack aircraft because of their importance in the intra-theatre logistics manoeuvre.
4016. During the redeployment phase, *CSFA*<sup>56</sup> units, known as "air manoeuvre support units", may be called on to dismantle and recondition Air Force materiel (infrastructure and CIS). Their redeployment capacities are those of the deployment support units, which include the support operations air group (*GAAO*<sup>57</sup>), the 25th air engineer regiment (*25è RGA*<sup>58</sup>) and the aeronautical information and communication systems battlegroup (*GTSIC Aéro*<sup>59</sup>). Work on runways is done by an airfield engineering detachment.

## National Gendarmerie

4017. In overseas operations,<sup>60</sup> although the presence of the Provost Gendarmerie is systematic when a force is engaged, the Gendarmerie component is not activated unless the specifics of the mission require it. It may be composed of crowd and riot control units (*EGM*) or specialized forces (*GIGN*).<sup>61</sup>
4018. During the redeployment phase, and in addition to the capabilities systematically deployed (duty weapons, communications, etc.), the most restrictive capabilities could be: light infantry weapons, law enforcement materiel, explosives (mainly used by squadrons on missions to maintain or re-establish public order), armoured vehicles (the Gendarmerie's wheeled armoured vehicles).

## Special Forces

4019. Special forces are usually redeployed in the same manoeuvre as the rest of the force. However, they may receive specific missions, including after the tipping point.

<sup>53</sup> Depending on the air threat, a joint surface-to-air defence system could have been deployed.

<sup>54</sup> The redeployment from Crete to Harmattan lasted "only" two months but mobilized state and chartered ships and planes.

<sup>55</sup> *SEA*: Service des essences des armées (fuel military service); *SSA*: Service de santé des armées (military health service); *SIMu*: Service interarmées des munitions (joint ammunition agency); *SCA*: Service du commissariat des armées (joint supply and secretariat department); *SID*: Service d'infrastructure de la Défense (Defence infrastructure service).

<sup>56</sup> *CSFA*: Commandement du soutien de la force aérienne (air force support command).

<sup>57</sup> *GAAO*: Groupement aérien d'appui aux opérations.

<sup>58</sup> *RGA*: Régiment du génie de l'Air.

<sup>59</sup> *GTSIC Aéro*: Groupement tactique des systèmes d'information et de communications aéronautiques.

<sup>60</sup> Ref. DIA-3.18(A)\_GEND-OPEX(2013), *Emploi de la gendarmerie nationale en opérations extérieures*, no. 126/DEF/CICDE/NP, 10 July 2010.

<sup>61</sup> *EGM*: Escadron de gendarmerie mobile; *GIGN*: Groupe d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale.

4020. However, such an option can be decided on only after thorough study. Within the general framework of the manoeuvre, the redeployment of these units must have a timetable based on the missions to be carried out up until the end of the mandate, and the maintenance of the capability for responsiveness and reversibility specific to such forces. Specific points are submitted for adjudication to *ASIA* in liaison with the special operations command detachment liaison (*DL COS*<sup>62</sup>).

## Directorates

4021. Since the joint branches are dealt with in Section II below, here we will discuss only *DIRISI* and the directorate of military intelligence (*DRM*<sup>63</sup>).
4022. ***DIRISI*** makes sure the networks needed by the force for redeployment are set up, via *COMSICIAT/J6*.
4023. ***DRM*** (though the J2 of *CPCO*) provides the force's J2 with the elements necessary for assessing the situation, within the framework of the redeployment manoeuvre.

## Section II – Support (*soutien*) Functions

4024. The key function "support" includes two main operational functions: logistics and military administrative support. Those functions are further divided into thirteen support sub-functions. This section describes the redeployment procedures specific to each sub-function.

### *Logistics Sub-functions*

4025. The operational function "logistics" covers ten sub-functions.

- Movement Control and Transport (MCT)

4026. The sub-function "Movement Control and Transport (MCT)" consists of planning and conducting transport and transit operations for forces and their support, by air, sea and possibly land using military and civilian carriers.

4027. Within the redeployment framework, the MCT sub-function is organized in close collaboration between the strategic level and the operational and tactical levels.

4028. Redeployment is a true military operation planned and conducted as such. In the chain of command, redeployment is planned by the strategic level. The operational and tactical levels are in charge of executing the manoeuvre, which, depending on local tactical conditions, may be adjusted.

Thus, the objectives, general timetable and avenues of extraction are determined by the strategic level. The operational and tactical levels set the tempo, in relation to the tactical and security conditions in the theatre, which has a direct effect on the MCT manoeuvre.

4029. The strategic level, for its part, is responsible for the planning and conduct of inter-theatre, strategic MCT. To extract freight from a theatre of operations, it is not uncommon for there to be several options to meet the qualitative and quantitative objectives of redeployment. Some options are applicable at all times and in all places, such as the air or sea route, or a combination of the two.

Certain avenues, more interesting financially, such as roads, railways and even waterways, require prior transit agreements with all the countries through which they pass, and in all cases entail having in due course specific transport contracts for the manoeuvre (e.g. the Pamir 2 end-to-end contract). Finally, close coordination between the resource managers (*CICLO*), the people in charge of strategic MCT (*CMT*) and *ASIA* (*CCITTM*<sup>64</sup>) or the DCOS Sp (J4/Mvt) is absolutely necessary to synchronize the presence of the resource to be transported and the strategic transport carriers.

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<sup>62</sup> *DL COS: Détachement de liaison du Commandement des opérations spéciales.*

<sup>63</sup> *DRM: Direction du renseignement militaire.*

<sup>64</sup> *CCITTM: Centre de coordination interarmées des transports, transits et mouvements* (joint coordination centre for movements, transportation and transit).

4030. The operational and tactical level is in charge of the intra-theatre manoeuvre, which is conducted using air and road theatre tactical capabilities, and if applicable locally outsourced road, rail and air solutions, where they exist. Theatre responsibilities extend from operational bases, to staging areas then to theatre APOEs, SPOEs and RPOEs.
4031. Managing containers is an important part of the redeployment manoeuvre, since certain containers in the theatre may prove to be unfit for transport.

a) **Roles and Responsibilities.**

4032. The general organization of materiel repatriation involves many players, who are links in a chain from the bases to the garrisons in France.
4033. At the strategic level, *CPCO* has strategic oversight of MCT. *CICLO* has oversight delegated by *CPCO* for optimizing the support flows to destinations in theatres of operations. *CMT* has delegated functional oversight of strategic MCT. It is also responsible for the operational units' strategic transport budgets. It is supported by the logistics and transportation specialized service (*SSLT*), an outside agency of *SCA* tasked with concluding transport contracts for the Ministry of Defence as a whole and making the corresponding expenditures.
4034. At the operational and tactical levels, the intra-theatre transport missions are the responsibility of the forces, under the authority of FCdr:
- a. within the force's Area Of Responsibility (AOR), movements are the responsibility of units (*Div*, *BIA* or *GTIA*)<sup>65</sup>, which may be reinforced by specific capabilities of logistics units, which may be in theatre (*GSIA*T) or at the tactical level (*GSD* and *BATLOG*)<sup>66</sup>;
  - b. MCT between the main bases and the theatre SA is the responsibility of *ASIA* (multinational) or *DCOS Sp* (national), which delegates the organization and execution of convoys to the theatre logistics unit.

b) **Tasks.**

**Intra-theatre Movements.**

4035. Within the framework of redeployment, intra-theatre movements involve either freight or units. Planning unit convoys is done by the force in coordination with *ASIA* (multinational) or *DCOS Sp* (national).

Planning freight convoys is the responsibility of *CCITTM* (multinational) or *J4/Mvt* (national), that may, under certain conditions, delegate this task to *GSIA*T (or a subordinate logistics unit, possibly *BATLOG*).

However, *CCITTM* (multinational) or *J4/Mvt* retains planning of intra-theatre routings by air in close coordination with the air component command (*RAMCC* within *JFACC*)<sup>67</sup>.

4036. *GSIA*T is under Operational Control (OPCON) of *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, and looks after all *BSIA*T logistics missions. It arms an operations centre, in order to manage all surface movements, storage areas in the SA and APOEs/SPOEs/RPOEs.

**Convoys from Forward Operating Bases (FOB) to the SA.**

4037. At the time of redeployment, units leave their AOR independently and in accordance with an Operation Order (OPORD) from the force or *GTIA*. On the other hand, planning redeployment freight convoys is the responsibility of *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, in liaison with subordinate logistics units and in coordination with the redeployed unit's logistics officer.

<sup>65</sup> *Div*: Division (division); *BIA*: Brigade interarmes (combined-arms brigade); *GTIA*: Groupement tactique interarmes (combined-arms group).

<sup>66</sup> *GSD*: Groupement de soutien divisionnaire (division support group); *BATLOG*: Bataillon logistique (logistic battlegroup, i.e. logistic unit adapted to the support to a combined-arms brigade).

<sup>67</sup> *RAMCC*: Regional Air Movement Control Center; *JFACC*: Joint Force Air Component Command.

4038. As regards convoy organization,<sup>68</sup> the number of carriers must be limited and adjusted to the specifics of the operation and the security situation. A large number of small convoys makes it possible to take advantage of swiftness and surprise. It is the preferred mode from the point of view of overall security. The other alternative is to organize a limited number of large convoys concentrating on protection. It is especially appropriate in theatres where multiple checkpoints or bottlenecks mean long, tedious negotiations. The constitution of convoys is the responsibility of the operation centre of the designated logistics unit.
4039. In the case of outsourcing, it is possible to integrate civilian carriers into the convoys.<sup>69</sup> The convoy leader must provide them with protection. The proportion of civilian carriers, usually driven by locals, should, however, be limited to approximately 20%, in order to allow the convoy leader to maintain the integrity of his plan and manoeuvre the convoy if it comes under fire.
4040. An independent civilian supplier, i.e. one that is not integrated into a military convoy, may be used, but not for the transport of major or sensitive materiel. This is possible in a permissive environment.

### Regrouping in SAs.

4041. The redeployment manoeuvre depends on *BSIAT*. It can accommodate one or more Staging Areas (SAs) for packaging freight before its repatriation. Setting up the theatre SA is the responsibility of *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*. *GSIAT* implements it.
4042. A SA must be able to receive materiel, but also personnel from redeployed units. It must be set up so as to be able to store vehicles, containers of materiel and ammunition to be repatriated.
4043. Depending on the space available, the SA can extend over several bases. The storage areas are essential, since they are holding areas for freight to be repatriated. After materiel repackaging operations, it is important to organize a storage area near the *APOEs/SPOEs/RPOEs*, so as to be ready to load the strategic carriers at any time.

### Convoys from the SA to the APOE/SPOE/RPOE.

4044. In this case, convoys are organized by *GSIAT* with drivers from the units redeployed.
- Carriers and containers are convoyed from the storage areas to the *APOE/SPOE/RPOE*. The convoys are organized in the same way as those from forward operating bases.
4045. At the *APOE/SPOE/RPOE*, a forward storage area is used to receive the convoys and prepare the loads for the strategic carriers. *GSIAT* personnel manager this storage area and packaging operations for strategic freight.

### Inter-theatre Movements.

4046. The planning/programming and conduct of strategic MCT (including pre- and post-MCT) are the responsibility of *CMT*. In this case, the latter acts under the authority of *CPCO* and in liaison with *CICLO* and the main support contributors in each theatre. The strategic MCT missions by land, sea or air are ordered by *CMT*. They are implemented by organizations charged with coordinating transport and transit (*CTTS*,<sup>70</sup> *519<sup>e</sup> GTM*,<sup>71</sup> *EAM*<sup>72</sup>, which all report to *CMT*, and *EATC*<sup>73</sup>) and executed by forces, allies or civilian contractors.
4047. *ASIA* in each internal or external theatre, in liaison with *CICLO*, *CMT* and main support contributors, coordinates, optimizes and rationalizes the return MCT. Coordination of inter-theatre movements with *CMT* is the responsibility of *CCITM* attached to *FRA* National Support.
4048. Anticipation and planning allow *CMT* to improve the performance of strategic MCT, in liaison with *CICLO*.

<sup>68</sup> Includes transport vectors and all other elements making up the convoy.

<sup>69</sup> Purchased civilian transport capacity is provided by a local contractor and comes with drivers.

<sup>70</sup> *CTTS*: Centre des transports et transits de surface (surface transportation and transit centre).

<sup>71</sup> *519<sup>e</sup> GTM*: 519<sup>e</sup> Groupe de transit maritime (519th maritime transit group).

<sup>72</sup> *EAM*: Escale aérienne militaire (military air transit).

<sup>73</sup> *EATC*: European Air Transport Command.

### Monitoring Resources of the MCT Sub-function (Information System Used as Support).

4049. Resources are tracked using the *SILCENT*<sup>74</sup> software. Transportation requests are processed using the "single transport request" (*DUT*<sup>75</sup>) application. The *DUT* application creates a link between the carrier and the resource. *DUTs*<sup>76</sup> must be issued by components or sub-components to *CCITM* or J4/Mvt, so that they can implement the required carriers, depending on the effect to be achieved. The choice of carrier is the sole responsibility of *CCITM* or J4/Mvt.

### c) Degree of Interoperability.

4050. The interoperability of this sub-function is important and regularly implemented with our allies:
- a. internationally with the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), whose role is to optimize the transport capacity of its member states;
  - b. in NATO and the EU with the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) agreement;
  - c. in the European framework with EATC (pooling of air transport means by France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands);
  - d. bilaterally between France and the United Kingdom through a technical arrangement making it possible to optimize sea transport capacities;
  - e. this interoperability depends to a great extent on the *ATARES*<sup>77</sup> international agreement, which provides for air transport charters and in-flight fuelling.

### • Personnel Welfare During Operations

4051. All the actions contributing to personnel welfare<sup>78</sup> occur during the deployment of units in the field until their return to France.
4052. Accordingly, welfare activities must be maintained until the end of the redeployment stage, with a gradual reduction in services and support as the last elements withdraw. Theatre command must issue specific directives for welfare in the orders for the conduct of the redeployment.
4053. Special attention must be paid to adjusting the welfare system to control the known risk that reduced operational activities can have for soldiers' morale. The link with family (mail, telephone or Internet) should therefore be maintained as long as possible.
4054. Unlike the reduction in means accompanying the redeployment of other support, controlling this risk could even mean maintaining the system, as far as is justified by need.

### • Hygiene and Security During Operations (HSO)

4055. The measures for preventing occupational hazards on overseas operations defined in DIA-4.0.2 are applicable during the redeployment phase. They cover occupational health and safety regarding activities carried out by deployed military personnel, except for combat actions per se.
4056. The reference regulations to take into account flow from the technical rules in part 4 of the French labour code (*Code du travail*). They should, however, be adapted to local conditions and the operational environment.
4057. The HSO organization in theatre is adjusted to the withdrawal timetable and the nature of the occupational activities carried out. Specific expertise may be deployed during redeployment.

<sup>74</sup> *SILCENT* will eventually be replaced with *SILRIA*.

<sup>75</sup> *DUT*: *Demande unique de transport*.

<sup>76</sup> The *DUT* must be as precise as possible. The dimensions, weight, volume of the elements to be transported must systematically be provided.

<sup>77</sup> *ATARES*: Air Transport & Air to air Refueling and other Exchange of Services.

<sup>78</sup> Personnel welfare during operation is a combatant support function that is intended to maintain the operational capacity of units deployed on overseas operations by keeping up morale, by meeting individual and group needs. It helps in preventing troops from wearing down due to difficult life conditions which are hard to support over a long period of time, even for a battle-hardened troop.

4058. The joint theatre prevention assistant (*AIPT*<sup>79</sup>), in liaison with the medical support sub-functions and infrastructure support in particular, propose to *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, HSO measures for redeployment, and conduct and control their execution.
4059. The redeployment stage is characterized by an increase in technical and logistical activities in the context of a decrease in the available capabilities and serious time constraints. The risk of work accidents is therefore significant and exposes formation chiefs to liability. Such risk justifies the special attention that the whole chain of command must give to this issue.
4060. The requirements for assessing risks, defining measures for risk prevention and protection, personnel information and traceability of exposure remain applicable during the redeployment phase. The protection equipment needed to manage the risks identified must therefore be kept until the last detachment leaves.
4061. The operational sanitary control plan, mentioned in § 2028 and § 2044, is intended to prevent the introduction into France, as well as intermediate transit sites, of plants and animals that pose a health risk, when forces return from an operation, whether it be by air, sea or land.
4062. Established by *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, the operational sanitary control plan defines, among other things, rodent/pest control and disinfection measures for carriers, materiel and equipment. Such measures must be planned ahead and integrated into redeployment planning.
4063. The inside of containers must be disinfected and rodent/pest control measures carried out before the containers are closed and sealed, and the treatment certificate completed. Vehicles and other materiel must be treated just before being loaded onto the last carrier leaving the host country. Such disinfection must be the subject of official agreements between the force redeployed and the host nation.

- Maintenance of Operational Readiness

4064. Anticipation of the maintenance of operational readiness sub-function of redeployment is a key to the success of the overall operation. This is because of the role maintenance plays in maintaining the forces operational capacity to face any possible threats until the end of the withdrawal, and also because of the inventory, equipment and personnel concerned.
4065. That is why the forward maintenance capacities must be adjusted as soon as possible in order to minimize the logistic footprint and take advantage of all the return flows to the departure SA. This requirement includes, among other things, a reduction in inventory to the expected consumption levels and retaining in the field the materiel with the greatest potential for use, with a view to minimizing maintenance. At more forward positions, the use of light intervention teams should be favoured whenever possible, even if it means compensating the most penalizing availability problems by maintaining a complete reserve of materiel.
4066. Preserving resources and ensuring smooth logistic "return" flows requires that residual materiel and inventory be accounted for as early as possible. It is a matter not only of avoiding filling up the different carriers with assets whose residual value does not compensate for the repatriation costs, but also of facilitating MCT to final destinations from the arrival SA. The specific information provided by the LISs, especially *SILCENT*, plays a crucial role in this area.

- Environmental Protection During Operations

4067. Environmental protection actions carried out in the redeployment stage are aimed at reducing as far as reasonably possible the ecological consequences of the force's deployment on the theatre.
4068. Besides the direct consequences for the population and ecosystem, poor management of this phase can lead to a tarnished image among the population and media of the intervention and, more generally, the intervening countries.
4069. Actions undertaken in this area must be logged to make it possible to demonstrate after the fact the force's good conduct with regard to environmental obligations and thus avoid subsequently having to pay costs for remedial measures according to the "polluter pays" principle. Specific military public affairs activities in this regard may be carried out.

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<sup>79</sup> *AIPT*: Adjoint interarmées à la prévention de théâtre.

4070. In regard to environmental protection, the reference regulations to be taken into account are the strictest standards among those of the host country (if it has any), NATO, EU or France (depending on the operation).
4071. In this framework, the goal of site clearance operations, mentioned in § 1075 and § 2024, is to return or transfer the base in an acceptable ecological state, as close as possible to the state it was in (zero state) when it was first occupied.
4072. If remedial measures are not taken as the intervention unfolds, they must be anticipated well ahead of time to ensure that they can be carried out before the end of the redeployment. Studies must be conducted before site clearance operations are carried out to identify potentially polluted sites (POL storage areas, pyrotechnics ranges, firing ranges, waste storage areas, etc.), and terrain analyses carried out, in addition to the necessary verifications to determine what actions need to be taken.
4073. Waste must be disposed of in a safe and environmentally friendly manner. The treatment of hazardous waste must be traceable. Hazardous waste that cannot be disposed of in the field or the host country must be repatriated. The same holds for some "sensitive" waste, such as asbestos waste, used lithium batteries, radionuclides, etc.
4074. Equipment left in the field (that is not handed over) and the remains of destroyed materiel fall within the scope of the paragraph below (§ 4080).
4075. If site clearance is not complete or satisfactory, the future occupants of the site must be officially informed of the residual state before the site is returned or transferred.
- Individual Support
4076. Mobile asset management. The logistic action to be taken for the redeployment of individual support materiel falls within mobile asset management. As such, they are decided on by theatre delegated asset managers (*DIRCOM*, J4/Individual support and administrative formation chiefs) in accordance with the authority thresholds and action limits defined in the *SCA* regulations that determine the organization of mobile asset management and its implementation by the different authorities.
4077. The role of *DIRCOM* is complementary to that of the officer in charge of individual support within the logistics division of the theatre joint support command (J4/Individual support) and that of the chiefs of administrative formations on overseas operations.
4078. *DIRCOM* has authority over field authorities to have carried out all logistic actions that do not fall with the responsibility of the officer in charge of individual support in the logistics division of the force CP (J4/Individual support) or an administrative formation command on overseas operations. The decisions concern specifically:
- a. the disposal of certain categories of assets or beyond a certain threshold;
  - b. the processing of the loss, destruction, deterioration or deficit of certain categories of assets or beyond a certain threshold;
  - c. the transfer or handover of assets for valuable consideration.
4079. Under the supervision of *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, the J4/Individual support officer performs, on a priority basis, all the actions delegated to him by the central director of *SCA*. When there is no J4/Individual support in theatre, *DIRCOM* must ensure that all asset transfer decisions are made.
4080. Disposal of materiel. For the disposal of materiel, *DIRCOM* initiates procedures to hand it over to the state property department or, if applicable, the destruction of material in the field.
4081. Handover. Any handover without charge of equipment or material to a foreign state or international organization is subject to the exclusive decision of the Minister of Defence. No handover procedure can be undertaken by the theatre if it has not been initiated by a diplomatic telegram from the office of the minister or an Army HQ.

4082. Handovers for valuable consideration must systematically be handled by the state property department, represented by the Armed Forces treasury/liaison office of the military treasury (CIAO/BLTA<sup>80</sup>) or the treasury office at the embassy or consulate, if there is one. For a mission in theatre, this service looks after sales for the state property department and collecting payment from buyers. Before it comes, the handover file must be fully complete, including the handover agreement or protocol attached to the decision.

- Medical Support

4083. As for any military manoeuvre, the delivery of medical support for a redeployment operation must be integrated into the planning work for the initial stage.

4084. The redeployment of surgical-medical capacities has several imperatives:

- a. the plate effect concerns almost exclusively the specialists in health product and medical materiel supply (pharmacists, health storemen, health materiel technicians), whose expertise is essential in facilitating the return flow of medical equipment;
- b. the threshold effect concerns medical support as a whole. The overall coherence of the medical chain requires maintaining all tactical segments of support (Role 1, Role 2 Light Manoeuvre, medical air evacuation capacities). Since operational medical units are not divisible, redeployment cannot follow a linear logic. The withdrawal of health capabilities can only be by stages;
- c. the necessity of maintaining permanent medical support during all phases of redeployment means going from organic support for basic units to area support.

4085. The gradual redeployment of medical-surgical capacities falls under the general framework of risk management, which can go as far as having no national medical support nearby.<sup>81</sup>

- Ammunition Support

4086. General framework. The ammunition support chain is adjusted to the timetable for the withdrawal of personnel and tactical materiel in relation to the changing operational context. It must ensure the destruction of obsolete or unserviceable ammunition or ammunition whose repatriation cost exceeds the residual price, as well as the sorting and repackaging of ammunition to be repatriated.

4087. The *SIMu* deploys qualified personnel, particularly reinforcements needed for the redeployment phase.

4088. Ammunition evacuated on a priority basis are weapons systems that have been withdrawn from the theatre (ammunition that has become unemployed) and surplus ammunition.

4089. Redeployed units turn in their ammunition, but they can keep security ammunition until their arrival to the SA.

4090. In the redeployment stage, technical surveillance work and resource reconditioning may require reinforcements of qualified personnel and materiel.<sup>82</sup> The work guarantees that the ammunition can be transported (by air, road, rail and/or sea) under the required safety conditions.

4091. Explosive remnants of war can also be destroyed before the end of redeployment (see PIA-7.7.7\_REG[2011], amended 26 October, 2012).

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<sup>80</sup> BLTA: Bureau de liaison de la Trésorerie aux armées.

<sup>81</sup> A remaining detachment of a force could, depending on the circumstances (personnel, location, etc.) have no operational medical unit.

<sup>82</sup> International regulations on transporting hazardous materials require certified packaging for transporting ammunition.

## Organization of Ammunition Support Chain and Actors' Missions

4092. CPCO/J4. In liaison with *SIMu* and the theatre via *ASIA* and its joint ammunition support assistant (*AISM*<sup>83</sup>), it decides how the ammunition sub-function is organized and how big it is: number of ammunition depots to keep; it orders the deactivation and dismantlement of theatre depots, and the types and volume of ammunition to maintain, given the operational context (initial ammunition autonomy).
4093. CICLO. It ensures that the ammunition returns flows from the theatre are integrated into the redeployment plans; in liaison with the *SIMu*, it ensures consistency between operational requirements and the ammunition resource to maintain in the theatres; it has authority to order the retransfer of excess inventory (with the agreement of *CPCO*).
4094. *SIMu*. In cooperation with *AISM*, it proposes to *CPCO* and FCdr via *ASIA*, the volume of ammunition to be maintained and the technical level of the expert personnel to deploy to guarantee the conduct of the redeployment stage; it does everything possible to avoid a shortage (sensitive ammunition).
4095. *AISM* (joint ammunition support assistant):
- handles specific "redemption" pyrotechnics security files; offers its expertise in reorganizing the ammunition support sub-function in the context of redeployment. It is the associate assets manager for ammunition;
  - organizes the ammunition aspect of redeployment (flow of ammunition leaving the theatre, loading into containers of ammunition to be evacuated, closing of forward depots), ensure inventory is maintained to ensure the security of elements and meet operational requirements;
  - ensures consistency in the distribution of inventory in the theatre and the deployment of appropriate personnel on missions.

### Specific Points:

- Waste management: the destruction of ammunition in the theatre creates specific waste, the treatment of which is not now the responsibility of the *SIMu* directorate, but that of *ASIA* or DCOS Sp.
- The deconstruction or handover of depots closed because of redeployment is not the responsibility of *SIMu* but of the theatre infrastructure adviser (*CONSIT*<sup>84</sup>).

### • Petrol, Oil, Lubricant (POL) Support

4096. General framework: in the continuum of logistic support, POL support during redeployment is provided for the benefit of troops still present and with a view to a compromise between the required cessation of activity and the indispensable continuation of that activity under certain conditions (outsourcing, technical arrangements, etc.). Carried out gradually at the pace of the force's redeployment, POL support is proportionate to that phase of the operation.

### Responsibilities

4097. All administrative and technical aspects of POL support are affected by redeployment. These actions are the responsibility of the central directorate of the central directorate of the fuel military service (*DCSEA*<sup>85</sup>). Transverse actions are the responsibility of other entities.
4098. The redeployment pillar that affects POL support logistic operations is planned locally by the joint POL support assistant (*AISP*<sup>86</sup>) of the *ASIA* or DCOS Sp, following the orders of *CPCO* and FCdr and in accordance with *DCSEA* directives for repatriating materiel, POL, ingredients, diverse products and packaging.

<sup>83</sup> *AISM*: Adjoint interarmées de soutien munitions.

<sup>84</sup> *CONSIT*: Conseiller infrastructure de théâtre.

<sup>85</sup> *DCSEA*: Direction centrale du Service des essences des armées.

<sup>86</sup> *AISP*: Adjoint interarmées de soutien pétrolier.

4099. *AISP* may delegate the conduct and execution to the *SEA* detachment (*DETSEA*<sup>87</sup>) chief.

### Conduct of Redeployment

4100. Fuel. As soon as the specific order establishing the tipping point is issued, the reduction in fuel supply is begun in order to reduce inventory to a level compatible with the load capacity of repatriated tankers. In spite of that, any remainder is offered for sale on a priority basis to the *SEA* stakeholders. If there are none, purchase by a third party can be considered. Finally, if none of those solutions is possible, handover free of charge is proposed (preferable to destruction) with the authorization of the Minister of Defence.
4101. The management of waste resulting from POL support activities is not the responsibility of *SEA*.
4102. Equipment. *SEA* POL and tactical vehicles in operating condition are repatriated. For the other vehicles, all management rules can be applied (condemn, destruction, handover, etc.). All civilian vehicles bought in the theatre are handed over or discarded. All other rolling stock and POL support materiel (mobile laboratory, fuel bladders, motor pump sets, maintenance material, etc.) are repatriated.
4103. Infrastructure. Specialized POL installations are handed over, neutralized and secured, or destroyed in the field. Their handover and/or destruction is/are not the responsibility of *SEA*. It is the responsibility of the theatre infrastructure adviser (*CONSIT*). For handovers, only the search for a buyer or buyers is the prerogative of *AISP*. Following environmental protection rules falls within the competence of the specialized POL installations operators (*SEA*). Handling disputes in the case of known pollution is the responsibility of *DIRCOM* assisted by the Provost.
4104. Contracts. *DCSEA* terminates fuel supply contracts in the theatre. *DCSEA* looks at what kind of contracts are required for the POL support of the remaining units (other, completely outsourced *SEA* contracts, technical arrangements with the host nation, allies, etc.).
4105. Specialized reinforcements. Some POL support technical operations, which are usually occasional or spread out over time (gas freeing/cleaning, ADR<sup>88</sup> visits, etc.), may require reinforcements of specialists when they are included in the reduced space-time framework of redeployment.

### Intra-theatre and Strategic Carriers

4106. The choice of carriers for intra-theatre transport or post-shipment has a significant impact on POL support during redeployment. It has an effect on force consumption and therefore on the capabilities needed to be kept in the theatre (this is especially important in the case of redeployment by air). The choice also has an effect on the preparation of POL carriers.
4107. The *SEA*'s and armed forces' POL carriers must be grouped together in relation to the carrier that will be used for repatriation. Vehicles to be sent back to France by air and/or sea (civilian and military) are specifically handled (emptying and gas freeing/cleaning, filling to 80%, type of fuel loaded, etc.). Those operations must be carried out as close to the point of embarkation as possible. The POL support area of the departure SA is adapted for those operations.

### Particular Provisions

4108. Specific logistic functions. When France provides a specific logistical function, LRSN or LLN, a detailed FRAGO must make it possible to coordinate the transfer of POL support activities with allied nations, whether they are taken over by the host nation or one or more allies, or outsourced.
4109. Comprehensive approach. It may happen, especially where the oil industry fabric does not exist or is not sufficiently developed, that POL support for international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may be provided by force POL support systems. In such cases, information to those organizations regarding the cessation of the force's POL support sub-function is provided by *ASIA* or *DCOS Sp*, on the recommendation of *AISP*. *AISP*, with its knowledge of the local oil industry, can then provide IOs and NGOs with useful advice on setting up their future POL support chain.

<sup>87</sup> *DETSEA: Détachement du Service des essences des armées.*

<sup>88</sup> ADR: European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road.

4110. Customs. Current taxes must be paid on fuel coming from the theatre in repatriated tankers (*SEA* and armed forces) when they enter National Territory (NT). Customs procedures regarding fuel imported into the NT are the responsibility of *DCSEA*. It designates establishments in France to look after those formalities. The tankers concerned go to those establishments by order from the arrival and reception SA.

4111. Inter-theatre transfer. Depending on the area of operations, an inter-theatre transfer of ingredients, diverse products and packaging inventory may be preferable to repatriation to the NT.

In this case, the reassignment of inventory is carried out by *DCSEA*. This type of transfer may also cover all kinds of POL support materiel.

4112. Archives. The administrative and technical archives of *AISP*, the accountant and *DETSEA* are recorded and the list is attached to the debriefings. They are compiled physically as "operations archives" correctly collated and identified. Once back in France, the *DETSEA* turns them over to the joint POL logistics and development directorate (*DELPIA*<sup>89</sup>) for retention.

- Infrastructure Support

4113. In the redeployment preparation phase, the *CONSIT* under the orders of *ASIA* (or *DCOS Sp*) and in liaison with the defence infrastructure service (*SID*) checks and completes as required the exhaustive inspection (quantitative and qualitative) of the infrastructure, as well as the state property file for each site concerned. All of the documents constitute the site's occupation file.

4114. During redeployment, the *SID*, via its *CONSIT*, conducts deconstruction work and infrastructure transfer or the restoration of sites in accordance with the contracts with authorities and applicable regulations. The materiel deployed by the *SID* are repatriated, handed over locally or destroyed, in accordance with the directives of the *SID* central directorate.

4115. The execution of the site redeployment culminates in the signing of the inventory and transfer agreement in the presence of an *SID* representative, among others.

4116. The infrastructure manoeuvre for the force during the redeployment stage may require, in addition to the intervention of the *SID*, elements specialized<sup>90</sup> in armed forces deployment assistance (Army or Air Force).

### *Sub-functions of Military Administrative Support*

4117. The "military administrative support" operational function includes three sub-functions. They are described below.

4118. On a case-by-case basis, specific directives are issued by the joint supply and secretariat department (*SCA*) to specify and adapt redeployment measures. They require thorough preparation by the different administrative formations and other actors involved. The overseas operations quartermaster (*DIRCOM*) responsible for the administrative and financial redeployment of the force is called to operate until the last minute and be dissolved at the latest in order to carry out the administrative and financial liquidation operations.

- Administrative Support

4119. Each administrative formation must be dissolved. When a formation is dissolved, a temporary liquidator will conduct liquidation operations within *DIRCOM*, while a final liquidator will make the final rendering of accounts. The different official records of the administrative formations (*RPAA*, *RPV*,<sup>91</sup> civil status, etc.) are closed and transferred with the archives to the printing, distributing, archiving centre of the armed forces quartermaster (*EDIACA*<sup>92</sup>), the official seals and stamps are destroyed with the relevant records.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> *DELPIA: Direction de l'exploitation et de la logistique pétrolières interarmées.*

<sup>90</sup> The specialized elements are made up of Army engineering companies and Air Force deployment support units.

<sup>91</sup> *RPAA: Registre de publicité des actes administratifs* (administrative acts register); *RPV: Registre des procès-verbaux* (minute book).

<sup>92</sup> *EDIACA: Établissement de diffusion, d'impression et d'archivage du Commissariat des armées.*

<sup>93</sup> Refer to PIA-7.7.6(A) on operational archives, as of 25 April 2013.

4120. The dissolving process is carried out in three phases:
- a. a complete stop of accounts and assets;
  - b. a detailed audit of all accounting records and their agreement with cash balance and inventory;
  - c. the writing of the dissolving report by the commissioner responsible for control operations.
4121. Liquidation is carried out by a dedicated team, made up of the people in charge of administrative and financial matters in the dissolved formation. Generally activated for a month within *DIRCOM*, it must take stock of funds and materiel, pay outstanding invoices, collect any accounts receivable, compile dispute files, sort and prepare archives to be repatriated, etc. It ceases to exist when the liquidation report is written.
4122. Accounts are rendered by DIRCOM. *DIRCOM* is responsible for ensuring expenditures incurred by the detachment are paid within two months at the most. When all revenue has been cashed and expenditures paid, a report is drawn up to render accounts.
4123. LRCS. In order to terminate the work contracts for Locally Recruited Civilian Staff (LRCS), local labour law must be applied, in keeping with the duties and rights of the employer and employees in close collaboration with the embassy or the coalition. The hiring files are closed and transferred to *DIRCOM*, along with the work contracts.
4124. Room and board. The supervisory authority transmits the dissolution file to *DCSCA* three months before the desired closing date so that the corresponding order can be issued. The person responsible will be included in the temporary liquidator (see § 4118). The procedures for transferring any assets are proposed when *DCSCA* signs (transfer to *FME*<sup>94</sup>).
4125. Archives. A data backup of the last six months of *SCA* trade applications (*CRISTAL*, *ORDINOPEX*, *FOYEROPEX*, *SOLDOPEX*, *SIRIUS*, *GEMACAT*, etc.) is done by the *CIS* correspondent. The backup must be done on a CD-ROM and sent to *DIRCOM* for archiving.
- Financial Support
4126. The authority responsible for an operational unit (*RUO*<sup>95</sup>) concerned by the budget operating plan—overseas operations—homeland missions<sup>96</sup> (*DIRCOM*, *CIAO*, *CMT*), keeps track of dissolution costs as regards their budget. A report is submitted to the authority responsible for the budget operating plan<sup>97</sup> (*CPCO/J8*). If required, a request for a supplementary allocation is submitted to *CPCO/J8* according to a specific timetable.
4127. Materiel acquired with overseas operations credits must be scrapped beforehand with identification of its destination.
4128. Military cash. The operational cash advance must be reconstituted and transferred to the paymaster of the armed forces centralized cash pooling (*RCA*<sup>98</sup>) before the rendering of accounts.
4129. Executing service. Once all invoices received have been paid, all outstanding legal commitments must be closed (*IS CHORUS*).
4130. Contracts. Current contracts made obsolete by the dissolution of administrative formations or the return of bases are terminated. As far as possible, and to avoid disputes, it is good practice to obtain a client accounting statement showing any possible invoices to be drawn up and/or unpaid invoices for each supplier. Any advances, penalties or outstanding guarantees must be finalized. Similarly, the service provider is informed as early as possible of the end of the requirement and provides a client accounting statement showing any possible invoices to be drawn up and/or unpaid invoices. In the case of a space or materiel handover, a sight condition inspection must be conducted.

<sup>94</sup> *FME*: Fonds ministériel d'entraide (ministerial mutual aid fund).

<sup>95</sup> *RUO*: Responsable d'unité opérationnelle.

<sup>96</sup> *BOP OPEX MISSINT*: Budget opérationnel de programme—opérations extérieures—missions intérieures.

<sup>97</sup> *RBOP*: Responsable de budget opérationnel de programme.

<sup>98</sup> *RCA*: Réserve centralisée des armées.

4131. Any outstanding payment owing after the *DIRCOM* dissolution operations are handled by *CIAO* (*DIRCOM* final liquidator).
- Legal Support
4132. Disputes: after an exhaustive check of possible disputes, the dispute files, made up of the proper paperwork, that are in the process of being resolved or are to be resolved are transferred in their entirety to the legal affairs directorate (*DAJ*<sup>99</sup>).

## Section III – National Territory

4133. For internal missions as for external operations, the redeployment procedures are dictated by the type of engagement from which they flow.
4134. Forces can be engaged in the national territory in three different cases:<sup>100</sup>
- a. internal security;
  - b. civil security;
  - c. non-specific missions.
4135. The volume of forces engaged, and thus that must be redeployed, can range from a few dozen soldiers to several thousand (protection contract).
4136. Deployment can be unexpected (natural or technological disaster) or planned (participation in providing security for a major event such as the G20).
4137. In the second case, engagement and redeployment are planned at the same time. In the first case, redeployment procedures depend on how the situation evolves on the ground and will be decided on during the engagement.
4138. The nature of the engagement area, which may be very different depending on the event that justifies military deployment, impacts on redeployment (**distance**: distant engagement area for an engagement in a French overseas department or on the contrary nearby for an engagement in metropolitan France; **dispersion**: broad engagement area, major engagement in response to a major social crisis affecting France and the overseas departments or on the contrary limited area such as for the Neptune plan (flooding of the Seine), for which the deployment of 10,000 men is envisaged for the Paris area; **available military facilities**: redeployment is easier if the deployed force can count on military infrastructure facilities in the NT).
4139. The legal framework within which forces are engagement in the national territory must also be taken into account for the redeployment phase.
4140. The frameworks are:
- a. **request for assistance**, which involves the participation of forces as needed in general interest activities, as a reinforcement or complement to the appropriate state public services, and mainly on civil security missions. When requests for assistance are accepted, a protocol must be established between the Ministry of Defence and the co-contractor.
  - b. **requisitioning** of the deployment of armed detachments as part of an internal security operation.<sup>101</sup> The system by which arms are employed under an operational contract for protection is that of a requisition.
4141. The decision to engage the armed forces—and thus to have recourse to an operational contract for protection—must be a decision of the highest state authorities (Prime Minister, or even President of the Republic). The logic of decision-making at the highest level holds also for the redeployment of the armed forces.

<sup>99</sup> *DAJ: Direction des affaires juridiques.*

<sup>100</sup> Ref. IIM 10100.

<sup>101</sup> Except for French Navy units in the 12 nautical mile strip and the Air Force within the framework of a standing security posture.

4142. For a request for assistance, the decision to redeploy remains with the armed forces. For a requisition, the decision to redeploy rests with the authority that made the requisition.
4143. Beyond the geographical, quantitative and legal typologies of the engagement, redeployment in the NT is subject to limits and imperatives that cover:
- a. **operational aspects** (security situation, re-establishment of public infrastructure, relief by internal security or civilian forces, coordination with allies in the case of assistance provided by foreign armed forces to manage a natural disaster, etc.);
  - b. **comprehensive approach aspects** (civilian-military links, communications, military contribution to an interdepartmental crisis cell);
  - c. **support aspects** (improvised SAs for redeployment after having served as deployment SAs, strategic MCT for redeployment in French overseas departments, direct support for disaster victims and/or as part of civilian and interior security forces, disputes, reimbursement by civilian authorities of expense related to the availability of military capacities,<sup>102</sup> special studies in liaison with prefectural authorities, routes used for redeployment and applicable regulations, specific use of those routes, etc.).
4144. In all cases, the military chief must coordinate the operations (military aspects) with the objectives set by the interministerial authority in the NT.

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<sup>102</sup> The costs of making available military capacities to civilian authorities should in principle be included in a budget. The estimate can then be used as a basis for implementing reimbursement procedures provided for in the regulations in favour of the Ministry of Defence.

# Possible Distribution of Responsibilities

A01. The distribution suggested here is only indicative. It must be adapted to each operation.

### CPCO: Design and Control

- A02. Define responsibilities and C2 architecture.
- A03. Define objectives and general redeployment timetable.
- A04. Choose among priorities if necessary.
- A05. Report to the *CEMA* on the conduct of redeployment.

### CICLO: Strategic Conduct

- A06. Set up a redeployment coordination cell (*CCD*) that would bring together *CMT* and *CIAO*.
- A07. Translate *CPCO* priorities into flow planning.
- A08. Define routing priorities in liaison with the theatre, HQ and joint directorates and services.
- A09. Order the creation of staging and transit areas in the theatre and in France.
- A10. Produce orders for resource tracking operations.
- A11. Report to *CPCO* weekly on the conduct of the redeployment.
- A12. Submit decisions to *CPCO* for arbitration if necessary.

### CMT: Strategic Movement Control and Transport (MCT)

- A13. Take part in the *CCD* set up by *CICLO*.
- A14. Plan and conduct strategic MTC.
- A15. Take into account the kinematics of the soldiers' return through an end-of-mission transition period.
- A16. Conduct transit operations in France and via the *BTT*<sup>103</sup> and *CCITTM* or theatre J4/Mvt.
- A17. Conduct post-MCT operations.

### CIAO: Administrative and Financial Support

- A18. Take part in the *CCD* set up by *CICLO*.
- A19. Monitor all contract files and set up a dispute monitoring system.
- A20. Compile administrative and financial files.
- A21. Assist *DIRCOM* in its areas of responsibility in the theatre for which it is the first point of contact for all the *SCA*'s areas of action.

<sup>103</sup> *BTT*: Bureau Transport–Transit (transport–transit office).

A22. Be the final liquidator for *DIRCOM*.

## FRA NCC and ASIA or DCOS Sp: Implementation

A23. Suggest a pace of shipping.

A24. Man an SA.

A25. Implement operational sanitary control plan measures for materiel that must be repatriated directly.

A26. Assemble and package freight before shipping.

A27. Provide transport between the SA and embarkation points using support means.

A28. Report to *CPCO*, *CICLO* and *CMT*, and even *CIAO* on the conduct of redeployment operations in the theatre (via the redeployment matrix).

A29. Report on freight availability forecasts.

A30. Make sure resource tracking operations are implemented (implementation of related LISs) by shippers and operators of logistics nodes.

A31. Report on forecast departure of soldiers, specifying if they are eligible to go through the end of the mission transition period.

A32. Approve specific risk management measures (HSO, environmental protection) and investigate any breach of the regulations.

## Operational Staffs, Directorates and Services: Reintegration of Materiel in France

A33. Inform *CICLO* of the destination of redeployed materiel.

A34. Inform *CICLO* of any MCT priorities.

A35. Ensure the receipt/accounting for and refurbishment of repatriated freight.

A36. Issue directives on handling of materiel in France (maintenance priorities, basic or full refurbishment, shipments tracking, etc.).

## French Support Elements (for close support of a presence or sovereignty force)

A37. Support the force's *ASIA* for the coordination of convoys.

A38. Implement transit capacities.

A39. Manage storage in SAs and report on occupation rates.

A40. Report on the condition of materiel and its potential before it is repatriated.

# Example of a Redeployment Directive

B01. The framework suggested here is only an example. It must be adapted and expanded depending on the operational context of each redeployment manoeuvre.

## General Objectives

B02. The general objectives of redeployment are:

- a. to enable the force to continue its mission in the best possible conditions while executing redeployment operations;
- b. to ensure a coordinated receipt of materiel/equipment/resources in France to facilitate refurbishment operations;
- c. to optimize the "return" flows by maximizing the use of the strategic carriers for redeployment.

B03. This entails:

- a. the handover/return of bases to the host nation or a member state of the coalition, or their dismantling, with all the administrative, dispute, HSO, infra and multinational coordination that that involves;
- b. repatriating our materiel to France.

## Actions

B04. In order to better anticipate redeployment operations, a project leader can be sent by *CPCO* to the National Contingent Command (NCC); he provides an assessment of the situation beforehand.

B05. The distribution of responsibilities and deadlines are as follows:

## Coordination

B06. This aspect is fundamental to the success of redeployment operations. A "coordination matrix" must be drawn up to identify actions to be taken and coordinated in time (to be annexed).

B07. Drawn up by the *CPCO/J4*, it is regularly expanded by additions from different actors through an iterative process (monthly or as events occur). The additions are incorporated into the "master" matrix by the *CPCO/J4*, which is disseminated after each update.

## Management

B08. Under the orders of *CPCO*, *CICLO* conducts redeployment operations. To do so, it relies on the services of the theatre *ASIA*, which if need be can set up a redeployment operations centre (*COD*) "forward", and the services of the main support contributors, which implements a *COD* "behind" within their HQ. As part of its responsibilities, *CICLO* monitors and synthesizes operations. It reports monthly to *CPCO*.

## Communication

B09. In order to meet internal (population, units, etc.) and external (allies, host country, etc.) communication needs, language elements are written by *CPCO/J4* and *EMA/COM* and relayed by the theatre.

## Strategic Routes

- B10. The volume of materiel/equipment/resources to be redeployed, the deadlines for redeployment and the probable saturation of routes by the coalition call for the diversification of strategic exit routes.
- B11. Feasibility studies of alternative routes to those currently used by France should be carried out (by *EMA* or an HQ, e.g. *EMIA FE<sup>104</sup>*). If new lines of communication prove useful from the date of redeployment, negotiations with countries to be crossed and coordination with our allies must be anticipated.

## Inventory of Materiel/Equipment/Resources

- B12. In order to determine the requirements for transport carriers and anticipate the receipt of materiel/equipment/resources in France, the theatre must carry out a quantitative and qualitative inventory of all the capabilities. In relation to the withdrawal timetable, the theatre suggests freight pace options for repatriation and specifies the nature and volume of each rotation. The suggestions are validated by *CICLO* in agreement with the HQ, joint directorates and services. Depending on the receipt capacities in France and the priorities for redeployment of the repatriated materiel/equipment/resources, *CICLO* can make adjustments.

## Destination for Materiel/Equipment/Resources

- B13. In order to guide the theatre in deciding what should be repatriated and what could be left behind (reform, donation, handover, etc.), the joint directorates and services indicate to *CPCO/J4*:
- a. the materiel/equipment which must necessarily be repatriated regardless of its condition (tactical materiel, weapons, etc.);
  - b. the materiel/equipment/resources that will not be repatriated regardless of their condition (furniture, etc.);
  - c. the materiel/equipment/resources that must be assessed and the subject of a dialogue to decide if they should be kept or not (bungalows, TC 20, etc.).
- B14. *CPCO/J4* compiles the information and disseminates it in the theatre, to *CICLO* and the HQ.

## Future of Infrastructures

- B15. The objective is to handover in good condition the maximum of infrastructure to local authorities (host nation's armed forces, communities or villages). The theatre must have a consolidated vision of the future/destination of each base in the months preceding deactivation. This minimum deadline should make it possible to get a clear view of any needed restoration work and the related deadlines. The general transfer plan is established in accordance with directives from *EMA/REG* (France/host nation cooperation treaty, if there is one) and the Force's requirements.

## Planning "Return" Carriers

- B16. Initial examination of strategic carrier capacities: ships, planes, trains.

This work is the responsibility of *CMT*, which must anticipate reserving strategic carriers when national capabilities are not available or are insufficient.

Carrier planning and its adjustments remains the responsibility of *CMT* subject to possible amendments to the withdrawal timetable approved by *CPCO* and fluctuations in the quantities of materiel/equipment/resources to be repatriated envisaged by the theatre.

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
<sup>104</sup> *EMIA FE: État-major interarmées de force et d'entraînement* (joint force and training headquarters).

## Timetable

- B17. A tracking matrix of the forces to be redeployed must be drawn up. It shows in relation to the phases: the units, their volume of vehicles, carriers, freight and pax; the departure and arrival points, intermediate sites; carrier projections, etc.
- B18. A distribution by wave can then be established with a view of the resulting capacities.

## Command Organization

- B19. Example of command organization.



## Request for Amendments

1. Readers of this joint reference document are invited to report any errors, misprints or mistakes, as well as any remark or suggestion for improvement to:

**CICDE**  
**École militaire**  
**21, place Joffre**  
**75700 PARIS SP 07**

or online on *CICDE's* Intradef and/or Internet pages at <http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr>

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2. The amendments validated by the director of the *CICDE* will be highlighted in red in the "*Table of Amendments*" featured on [page 7 of the electronic version of the document](#).

### Part I – Initialisms and Acronyms

#### Initialism

- D01. In an initialism, each letter is pronounced separately as if it was separated by a period from the next letter.

#### Acronyms

- D02. An acronym is made up of one or more syllables that can be pronounced like a word.

#### Graphic Layout

- D03. In this section, the characters which constitute an initialism or acronym are written in capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning.
- D04. French initialisms and acronyms are written in **Arial bold, size 9, red italics characters**. English initialisms and acronyms are written in **Arial bold, size 9, blue Roman**.

#### List of Initialisms and Acronyms Used in this Document

<b>ADR</b>	European <u>A</u> greement Concerning the International Carriage of <u>D</u> angerous Goods by <u>R</u> oad
<b>AGIT3</b>	<i>Aide à la Gestion Informatisée du Transit maritime</i> maritime transit computerized management
<b>AIPT</b>	<i>Adjoint Interarmées à la Prévention de Théâtre</i> joint theatre prevention assistant
<b>AIMS</b>	<i>Adjoint Interarmées de Soutien Munitions</i> joint ammunition support assistant
<b>ALAT</b>	<i>Aviation Légère de l'Armée de Terre</i> French Army light aviation
<b>AOR</b>	Area Of Responsibility
<b>APOD</b>	Air Point Of Debarkation
<b>ASIA</b>	<i>Adjoint Soutien InterArmées</i> joint support assistant chief of staff
<b>ATARES</b>	Air Transport & Air to air Refueling and other Exchange of Services
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BATLOG</b>	<i>BATaillon LOGistique</i> logistic battlegroup
<b>BIA</b>	<i>Brigade InterArmes</i> combined-arms brigade
<b>BLTA</b>	<i>Bureau de Liaison de la Trésorerie aux Armées</i> liaison office of the military treasury
<b>BOP</b>	<i>Budget Opérationnel de Programme</i> budget operating plan
<b>BSIAT</b>	<i>Base de Soutien InterArmées de Théâtre</i> theatre joint support base
<b>BTT</b>	<i>Bureau Transport–Transit</i> transport–transit office
<b>C2</b>	Command and Control
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic

<b>CCD</b>	<i>Cellule de Coordination du Désengagement</i> redeployment coordination cell
<b>CCITTM</b>	<i>Centre de Coordination Interarmées de Transport, Transits et Mouvements</i> joint coordination centre for transportation, transit and movements
<b>CEMA</b>	<i>Chef d'État-Major des Armées</i> French chief of Defence Staff
<b>CIAE</b>	<i>Centre InterArmées des actions sur l'Environnement</i> environmental actions joint centre
<b>CIAO</b>	<i>Centre InterArmées d'Administration des Opérations</i> operations administration joint centre
<b>CICLO</b>	<i>Centre Interarmées de Coordination de la Logistique des Opérations</i> operational logistic coordination joint centre
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Cooperation
<b>CMT</b>	<i>Centre Multimodal des Transports</i> multimodal transportation centre
<b>COD</b>	<i>Centre Opérationnel de Désengagement</i> redeployment operations centre
<b>COMSICIAT</b>	<i>COMmandant des Systèmes d'Information et de Commandement InterArmées de Théâtre</i> information system and joint theatre command commander
<b>CONSIT</b>	<i>CONseiller Infrastructure de Théâtre</i> theatre infrastructure adviser
<b>CP</b>	Command Post
<b>CPCO</b>	<i>Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations</i> FRA joint operations centre
<b>CSFA</b>	<i>Commandement du Soutien de la Force Aérienne</i> Air Force support command
<b>CTTS</b>	<i>Centre des Transports et Transits de Surface</i> surface transportation and transit centre
<b>DAJ</b>	<i>Direction des Affaires Juridiques</i> legal affairs directorate
<b>DCSCA</b>	<i>Direction Centrale du Service du Commissariat des Armées</i> central directorate of the joint supply and secretariat department
<b>DCSEA</b>	<i>Direction Centrale du Service des Essences des Armées</i> central directorate of the fuel military service
<b>DELPIA</b>	<i>Direction de l'Exploitation et de la Logistique Pétrolières InterArmées</i> joint POL logistics and development directorate
<b>DETSEA</b>	<i>DÉTachement du Service des Essences des Armées</i> fuel military service detachment
<b>DICOM</b>	<i>Direction du Commissariat Outre-Mer</i> French overseas quartermaster
<b>DIRCOM</b>	<i>DIRrection du COMmissariat en opération extérieure</i> overseas operations quartermaster
<b>DIRISI</b>	<i>Direction Interarmées des Réseaux d'Infrastructure et des Systèmes d'Information</i> joint directorate for defence infrastructure networks and information systems
<b>Div</b>	<i>Division</i> division
<b>DL COS</b>	<i>Détachement de Liaison du Commandement des Opérations Spéciales</i> special operations command liaison detachment
<b>DOP</b>	Deployable Operating Base
<b>DRM</b>	<i>Direction du Renseignement Militaire</i> military intelligence directorate
<b>DUT</b>	<i>Demande Unique de Transport</i> single transport request
<b>EAM</b>	<i>Escale Aérienne Militaire</i> military air transit
<b>EATC</b>	European Air Transport Command

<b>EDIACA</b>	<i>Établissement d'Impression, de Diffusion et d'Archivage du Commissariat des Armées</i> printing, distributing, archiving centre of the armed forces quartermaster
<b>EGM</b>	<i>Escadron de Gendarmerie Mobile</i> crowd and riot control unit
<b>EMA</b>	<i>État-Major des Armées</i> French Defence Staff
<b>EMIA FE</b>	<i>État-Major InterArmées de Force et d'Entraînement</i> joint force and training headquarters
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUFOR</b>	EUropean FORce
<b>EUTM</b>	European Union Training Mission
<b>FCdr</b>	Force Commander
<b>FME</b>	<i>Fonds Ministériel d'Entraide</i> ministerial mutual aid fund
<b>FRA</b>	FRAnce (NATO country code)
<b>FRAGO</b>	FRAGmentary Order
<b>GAAO</b>	<i>Groupement Aérien d'Appui aux Opérations</i> support operations air group
<b>GCTAM</b>	<i>Gestion Centralisée des Transports Aériens Militaires</i> military airlift centralized management
<b>GIGN</b>	<i>Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale</i> Gendarmerie Nationale intervention group
<b>GSD</b>	<i>Groupement de Soutien Divisionnaire</i> division support group
<b>GSIA</b>	<i>Groupement de Soutien InterArmées de Théâtre</i> theatre joint support group
<b>GTIA</b>	<i>Groupement Tactique InterArmes</i> combined-arms group
<b>GTM</b>	<i>Groupe de Transit Maritime</i> maritime transit group
<b>GTSIC Aéro</b>	<i>Groupement Tactique des Systèmes d'Information et de Communications Aéronautiques</i> aeronautical information and communication systems battlegroup
<b>IATA</b>	International Air Transport Association
<b>IMDG</b>	International Maritime Dangerous Goods
<b>IO</b>	International Organization
<b>IS</b>	Information System
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>JFACC</b>	Joint Force Air Component Command
<b>LBDSN</b>	<i>Livre Blanc sur la Défense et Sécurité Nationale</i> French white paper on defence and national security
<b>LIS</b>	Logistics Information System
<b>LLN</b>	Logistics Lead Nation
<b>LRCS</b>	Locally Recruited Civilian Staff
<b>LRSN</b>	Logistics Role Specialist Nation
<b>MCCE</b>	Movement Coordination Centre Europe
<b>MEAT</b>	Management European Air Transport
<b>MINURCAT</b>	<i>Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad</i> United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
<b>MISSINT</b>	<i>MISSions INTérieures</i> homeland missions
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum Of Understanding
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NT</b>	National Territory
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>OpCdr</b>	Operation Commander

<b>OPCON</b>	OPERational CONtrol
<b>OPEX</b>	<i>OPération Extérieure</i> overseas operation
<b>OPLAN</b>	Operation PLAN
<b>OPORD</b>	OPERation ORDer
<b>PAO</b>	Public Affairs Office
<b>POL</b>	Petrol, Oil, Lubricant
<b>RAMCC</b>	Regional Air Movement Control Center
<b>RBOP</b>	<i>Responsable de Budget Opérationnel de Programme</i> authority responsible for the budget operating plan
<b>RCA</b>	<i>Réserve Centralisée des Armées</i> armed forces centralized cash pooling
<b>RGA</b>	<i>Régiment du Génie de l'Air</i> Air engineer regiment
<b>RPAA</b>	<i>Registre de Publicité des Actes Administratifs</i> administrative acts register
<b>RPOD</b>	Rail Point Of Debarkation
<b>RPV</b>	<i>Registre des Procès-Verbaux</i> minute book
<b>RSMI</b>	<i>Réception, Stationnement, Mouvement, Intégration</i> reception, staging, movement, integration
<b>RSOM</b>	Reception, Staging and Onward Movement
<b>RUO</b>	<i>Responsable d'Unité Opérationnelle</i> authority responsible for an operational unit
<b>SALIS</b>	Strategic AirLift Interim Solution
<b>SCA</b>	<i>Service du Commissariat des Armées</i> joint supply and secretariat department
<b>SEA</b>	<i>Service des Essences des Armées</i> fuel military service
<b>SFOR</b>	Stabilization FORce
<b>SIAé</b>	<i>Service Industriel Aéronautique</i> aircraft maintenance service
<b>SID</b>	<i>Service d'Infrastructure de la Défense</i> Defence infrastructure service
<b>SILCENT</b>	<i>Système d'Information Logistique CENTral</i> central logistics information system
<b>SILRIA</b>	<i>Système d'Information Logistique pour le suivi des Ressources InterArmées</i> logistics information system for the tracking of joint resources
<b>SIMMAD</b>	<i>Structure Intégrée du Maintien en condition opérationnel du Matériel Aéronautique de la Défense</i> integrated through-life support structure for defence aeronautical equipment
<b>SIMMT</b>	<i>Structure Intégrée du Maintien en condition opérationnel du Matériel Terrestre</i> integrated through-life support structure for terrestrial equipment
<b>SIMu</b>	<i>Service Interarmées des Munitions</i> joint ammunition agency
<b>SMITer</b>	<i>Service de la Maintenance Industrielle Terrestre</i> industrial maintenance Army service
<b>SOFA</b>	Status Of Force Agreement
<b>SPOD</b>	Sea Point Of Debarkation
<b>SSA</b>	<i>Service de Santé des Armées</i> military health service
<b>SSF</b>	<i>Service de Soutien de la Flotte</i> fleet support service
<b>SSLT</b>	<i>Service Spécialisé de la Logistique et du Transport</i> logistics and transportation specialized service
<b>SUPPLAN</b>	SUPport PLAN
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	United Nations PROtection FORce

## Part II – Terms and Definitions

- D05. Support actors, depending on the different sub-functions, use the notions of *maître d'œuvre* (supervisor) and *maître d'ouvrage* (foreman) to define their relationships and responsibilities.
- D06. There are four different levels: *maître d'ouvrage* (foreman), *maître d'ouvrage délégué* (deputy foreman), *maître d'œuvre* (supervisor) and *maître d'ouvrage fonctionnel délégué* (deputy functional supervisor).
- D07. The definitions given here are general and vary depending on function, with observable variations according to whether the work is in the area of infrastructure, informatics, maintenance or support by defence bases. Further information is provided in specific texts.

### *Maître d'ouvrage* (foreman)

- D08. The *maître d'ouvrage* (MOA) is the entity responsible for defining operational requirements, the related budget and how they are to be achieved.

It defines objectives and performance contracts, decides on means (personnel, budget, etc.), sets the scope and format of the activities of the *maître d'œuvre* (see below), establishes deadlines, determines how the work is to be done (internally or outsourced), and checks results.

### *Maître d'ouvrage délégué* (deputy foreman)

- D09. When the MOA (foreman) does not have the trade experience needed to lead the project, it may call on a deputy foreman to manage the project. The foreman uses the deputy foreman to carry out various functions, without, however, relinquishing his responsibilities.
- D10. The *maître d'ouvrage délégué* (MOAD) is the entity to which the MOA (foreman) delegates overall management of support in its field to meet specific requirements; the MOAD (deputy foreman) develops an acquisition strategy and proposes the general support organization in its field. It acts as an interface between MOAs (foremen). Relations between MOAD and MOE may range from direct leadership (e.g. SIMMT/SMITer) to contractual relations (e.g. SIMMAD-SIAé).

### *Maître d'œuvre* (supervisor)

- D11. The *maître d'œuvre* (MOE) is the entity that carries out all or part of the work in accordance with conditions (which may be costs, deadlines and quality or set out in a contract) set either directly by the MOA (foreman), or generally by the MOAD (deputy foreman). The MOE (supervisor) may be state operational, state industrial or private. It is responsible for making the technical choices required to carry out the project and directs the execution of the project.

### *Maître d'ouvrage fonctionnel délégué* (deputy functional supervisor)

- D12. *Maître d'ouvrage fonctionnel délégué* (MOAFD) is the entity to which the MOE (supervisor) delegates a specific logistic function if the MOAD (deputy foreman) does not have the required competences.
- D13. MOAD and MOE may be co-located within different organizations or within the same organization carrying out both direction tasks (MOAD) and execution tasks (MOE).

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# Summary

## (FRA) JDN-4.2.1

### Translation of DIA-4.2.1 *Désengagement*

1. The French joint doctrine on redeployment (DIA-4.2.1) covers the redeployment from an operation that is in its final stage. This final stage consists of withdrawing forces from their operational mission, regrouping them, and repatriating them or deploying them to another operation. It follows the decision to engage, operational planning and force generation, projection and finally intervention, properly speaking.
2. Knowing how to end an operation is a complex, delicate manoeuvre that involves operational aspects, comprehensive approach aspects and support aspects that must be closely coordinated. The quality of redeployment affects the achievement of the desired end state.
3. The French document DIA-4.2.1 makes up for the lack of a redeployment doctrine. It originates in DIA-01 (doctrine on the employment of the Armed Forces), DIA-03 (doctrine on the command of operational engagements) and DIA-04 (doctrine on support). It incorporates the latest developments in joint support and specifies the roles and responsibilities of the actors in the support chain.
4. It is intended primarily for operational actors. In the first instance, it is intended for the joint chiefs, so that they can measure the actions of their subordinates in the joint forces, directorates and services, but also so that they can anticipate the major milestones of this delicate stage.
5. It is also intended for engaged units and/or those sent as reinforcements so they can coordinate their action by referring to shared, clear, key principles.
6. Finally, it provides a framework for the actions of players before and after an operation, specifically those in charge of organic and functional support (from planning to warehousing and inventory replenishment, etc.).
7. First of all, it describes the operational framework of redeployment; then it describes command and general organization; and finally focuses on the conduct of redeployment and the particular provisions by environment, actor and component.
8. Four annexes complete the document, of which one provides a possible distribution of responsibilities (Annex A), while another provides an example of a redeployment directive (Annex B).
9. Finally, it is hoped this document will serve as a basis for the work of NATO and even the EU in the absence of a doctrinal corpus in inter-allied redeployment.



This document has been developed by the (FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation (*CICDE*), a joint agency working on behalf of the French Defence Staff (*EMA*). For any information, please contact the *CICDE* at:

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**École militaire**  
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